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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

UNCLASSIFIED

13 March 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Justification for US Military Intervention
in Cuba (TS)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the attached Memorandum for the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, which responds to a request of that office for brief but precise description of pretexts which would provide justification for US military intervention in Cuba.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the proposed memorandum be forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes. It is assumed that there will be similar submissions from other agencies and that these inputs will be used as a basis for developing a time-phased plan. Individual projects can then be considered on a case-by-case basis.

3. Further, it is assumed that a single agency will be given the primary responsibility for developing military and para-military aspects of the basic plan. It is recommended that this responsibility for both overt and covert military operations be assigned the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED
BY JCS ON 21 May 84
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED

L. L. Lemnitzer

L. L. LEMNITZER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

1 Enclosure

Memo for Chief of Operations, Cuba Project

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY

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13. Accordingly, although the Cover and Deception 33-C and 33-D Plans are forwarded in compliance with CSG (WG) Tasks 33c and 33d, it is concluded that:

a. The necessary scope of any major military Cover and Deception (C&D) effort required to disrupt the 1962 sugar harvest period, is not commensurate with the possible effects to be gained; however, such C&D effort may be appropriate and applicable to other missions and tasks of the Caribbean Survey Group.

b. The first phase of a US endeavor to cause the overthrow of the Castro Government should include the creation of a condition of unrest by covert means rather than the active use of major military forces, if practicable.

c. After a modicum of revolutionary feeling or action has been created by subversion, sabotage or other means, a C&D plan of major proportions can be used in a comprehensive, thoroughly planned, and coordinated Cover and Deception effort to initiate a second phase; including overt military intervention.

d. The Cover and Deception plans and forces involved should be used to:

(1) Create the required psychological build-up of the desired atmosphere in Cuba.

(2) Gain the necessary favorable prepositioned US military posture to counter a possible hostile Cuban reaction.

(3) Then lure or provoke Castro, or an uncontrollable subordinate, into an overt hostile reaction against the United States; a reaction which would in turn create the justification for the US to not only retaliate but destroy Castro with speed, force and determination.

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