Operation Gladio

Document Collection

e-book collection of documents relating to state-sponsored terrorism during the Cold War

edited by Tom Secker
## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction by Tom Secker</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes on meeting at Yalta between the Big Three, 6 February 1945</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Memorandum, ‘Soviet Foreign Policy Toward Western Europe’, March 21, 1946</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Department Security Briefings on Italy, May 1947-April 1948</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIFAR report on Gladio, 1st June 1959 (Italian)</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Army Field Manual 30-31B ‘Stability Operation – Intelligence: Special Fields’, 18th March 1970 (German version)</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Report by former Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti for the Strage Commission, October 18th 1990 (French)

Introduction

This collection of around 150 pages of once-classified material sheds light on the ideological and operational origins of the now-infamous Operation Gladio. ‘Gladio’ is an umbrella name used by commentators and historians to refer to a series of small-scale covert armies active across Europe throughout the Cold War (1945-1990).

These secret armies were originally set up at the end of World War 2 in most NATO countries as a means of resisting Soviet military invasion. Their design was based on the resistance movements who fought against the Nazis in continental Europe during the Second World War. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS – later the CIA) and the Special Operations Executive (SOE – later MI6) were instrumental in establishing them. They consisted of a mixture of volunteers, ex-military men, paid-up spies of various state intelligence organisations and, ultimately, terrorists.

Starting in the 1960s, Western Europe was for two decades the main target of terrorist attacks. What these documents show is not only that the governments of senior NATO countries (primarily the US and UK) were the main instigator of this violence, but also why. Taking the documents in turn:

*Notes on meeting at Yalta between the Big Three, 6 February 1945 – source: [http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/documents/*](http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/documents/)*

At the Yalta conference three old men – Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin – carved up the world, creating two blocs divided down the middle of Europe, and thus creating the Cold War.

The notes on one of the meetings at the conference show that the decision as to how to define Poland’s borders was entirely geostrategic. There was no concern for Poland having suffered at the hands of both Germany and Russia. The Americans were trying to ensure that Poland be given certain oil-rich territories, the British were worried about Poland’s ‘sovereign independence and freedom’ and the Russians wanted to make sure that the country would stop serving as a ‘corridor’ for German attacks.
Churchill spoke of using the meeting to create a government for Poland, a ‘slip of the tongue’ that Stalin mocked. The murderous tyrant pointed out that there were no Polish delegates at the conference, joking how, ‘they all say that I am a dictator but I have enough democratic feeling not to set up a Polish government without Poles.’

Pertinently for the Gladio story, Stalin also spoke of ‘agents of the London government connected with the so-called resistance’ in Poland, saying that they had killed 212 Russian soldiers. Roosevelt countered by suggesting they adjourn the meeting, before Churchill offered a non-denial denial, saying ‘I must put on record that both the British and Soviet governments have different sources of information in Poland and get different facts.’

‘Text of the Agreement Reached at the Crimea (Yalta) Conference’, March 24, 1945 - source: 
http://legacy.wilsoncenter.org/coldwarfiles/files/Documents/YALTA.pdf

Despite these squabbles, the men managed to come to an agreement on a new ‘world organisation’ stretching from Poland to Iran. This effectively became the new battle line, and within a few years the Soviets had annexed Eastern Europe and the British and Americans were staging coups in everywhere from Iran to Guatemala. This text of the agreement spells out the result of the Yalta conference.

Perhaps tellingly, the question of Italy’s importance in all this was left to later discussion.

Presidential Memorandum, ‘Soviet Foreign Policy Toward Western Europe’, March 21, 1946 – source: 
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/

This memorandum for President Truman shows how the primary concern was not about Soviet military occupation of Western Europe, but of support for democratic Communist parties. It comments that, ‘Through the national Communist Parties the Soviets apparently intend to creat[e] Leftist coalitions leading to a large measure of Communist control in national governments.’
It went on to speak of the Vatican as being a ‘potent anti-Communist weapon’, and this was how the civil war of terrorism in Italy happened. On the right there was the Catholics and the neo-Fascists. On the left there was the Communists. Each side had its attendant militant groups, from Ordine Nuovo to the Red Brigades. This ideological divide between the two pro-statist factions saw hundreds of people killed and very little accomplished in progressing Italian democracy.


These security briefings make clear the West’s worry over internal subversion of Europe via democratic means. The international alliance of Communist political parties was gaining numbers and strength. The Soviets were doing their bit for democracy by sending hundreds of thousands of Soviet nationals westward. What this shows is how the public, in particular those who might give democratic support for Communism, were both a problem and a target.

As the April 1948 election loomed, the briefings got more and more urgent. One admits that, ‘we are doing everything possible to support the moderate democratic elements in Italy without giving the impression of interfering in Italian affairs.’ As the final briefing in this selection makes clear, even after the Americans got the result that they wanted in the Italian election they were still concerned about popular support for Communism.


It is in this light that we should view NSC 10/2. The National Security Act of 1947 had brought the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency into being. Within a few months the NSC formally charged the CIA with responsibility for covert operations.

The document defines covert operations as, ‘all activities (except as noted herein) which are conducted or sponsored by this Government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but
which are so planned and executed that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them.’

Among the specific examples outlined by NSC 10/2 is, ‘support of indigenous anti-communist elements.’ Indigenous anti-communist elements such as neo-Fascist terrorists? Naturally.

_SIFAR report on Gladio, 1st June 1959_

This doctrine was firmly embedded in the stay-behind in Italy as early as 1959. This report described how the enemy was not military occupation, but internal subversion by popular Communist movements. It explicitly describes how the ‘theories and practices’ of Gladio (the stay-behind) should be used to counter this threat. Infiltration, a cell structure and the carrying out of special operations are all advocated.

This document emerged during the parliamentary inquiries in Italy and the link where I obtained this copy is no longer available. It is written in Italian but a good dictionary and a prior understanding of Gladio make it relatively easy to interpret.


This is one of several definitively authentic US Army Field Manuals that were translated and used for training Gladio operatives. This manual was one of a batch used in Turkey to train the local stay-behind units known as _Counter-Guerrilla_.

The manual details exactly who is involved in the operations, listing:
‘(1) Civilian volunteers and those impressed by coercion.
(2) Military leaders and specialists.
(8) Deserters.
(4) In time of active war, military individuals or small groups such as those who have been cut off, deliberate stay-behinds,
escaped prisoners of war, and downed airmen.’

Presumably far-right terrorists manipulated by the security services come under ‘those impressed by coercion’. The manual includes a diagram explaining a cell structure that includes terrorist units. ‘Though this is supposedly a ‘picture of the enemy’ it is the same structure laid out in the SIFAR report only two years earlier.

http://cryptome.info/fm30-31b/FM30-31B.htm

Available in both German and English in this collection, this document is a matter of great controversy and debate. Most Gladio researchers maintain that it is real. The US authorities have dismissed it as a Soviet forgery. Reading the explosive nature of the text, it is easy to see why there is such disagreement.

‘There may be times when Host Country Governments show passivity or indecision in the face of communist subversion and according to the interpretation of the US secret services do not react with sufficient effectiveness. Most often such situations come about when the revolutionaries temporarily renounce the use of force and thus hope to gain an advantage, as the leaders of the host country wrongly consider the situation to be secure. US army intelligence must have the means of launching special operations which will convince Host Country Governments and public opinion of the reality of the insurgent danger.’

In essence, provoking or instigating violence as a means of scaring the public and governments into believing in and acting against the ‘threat’ of democratic Communism. My personal take on this document is that it probably is of Soviet origin, and began life as a piece of disinformation. Though it bears direct comparison with known authentic US Army Field Manuals, it is not entirely convincing.

However, the document became widely known about when it was found in a raid on the house of Licio Gelli, the grand master of the CIA-funded Masonic lodge Propaganda Due, or P2. When asked by Allen Francovich where he got
the document, Gelli replied ‘a friend in the CIA gave it to me. He said, “read this when you have time”’. Even if FM 30-31B did start out as a Soviet forgery, what Gelli’s answer suggests is that it became part of the training documentation for covert operations. Readers are encouraged to do their own comparison between the document and others in the US Army’s FM (Field Manual) series and develop their own conclusions as to its authenticity.


Though the CIA has refused or delayed FOIA requests about Gladio, this is one of the files available on their website that sheds light on the subject. This analysis shows how the ‘historic compromise’ between the Christian Democrats and the Communists in Italy at this time was causing tremendous concern in the security agencies of the West.

The paper describes how if the Communists did join a coalition government then they would potentially have access to NATO intelligence and defence plans, including nuclear planning information. The paper says that in such a situation that Italy would have to be cut off from NATO rather than risk such information falling into Soviet hands.

As such, Italy’s future in NATO was at stake, and the implication of the rhetoric in this document is that ‘something must be done.’


That ‘something’ conveniently happened when Aldo Moro, the head of Christian Democrats, was kidnapped by the ostensibly Communist terrorist group the Red Brigades. Moro was held for 55 days before being executed.

By the time of the kidnapping the original leadership of the Red Brigades were all in prison, and the group had been infiltrated by the Italian secret services.
As such, the most likely explanation for Moro’s assassination is that it was state-sponsored, a means of destroying the ‘historic compromise’.

This CIA paper, written while Moro was held captive, makes it obvious that the Agency understood the effect of the kidnapping as it was happening. It comments that aside from Moro, ‘no one else is equipped to play his stabilizing role in Christian Democratic internal politics, and in the party’s relations with the Communists.’

*Report by former Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti for the Strage Commission, October 18th 1990*

A French version of a report written by then Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti for the Strage (massacre) Commission. Andreotti outlined the stay-behind in detail, how cells of highly trained men, arms caches and clandestine communications networks existed all over the country. The document is in French, so again a good dictionary may be required.

*European Parliament, ‘Resolution on the Gladio affair’, November 22 1990*

As published by the Official Journal of European Communities, this resolution explicitly condemns Gladio. Though it called for the paramilitary structures to be dismantled, and for parliamentary inquiries to be set up, most countries have simply denied the existence of such units. Only three countries have held inquiries – Belgium, Italy and Switzerland, and in most cases we can only speculate at to whether the same or similar structures are still active today.
TOP SECRET

NOTES ON MEETING AT YALTA BETWEEN THE BIG THREE
4-8 P.M., FEBRUARY 6

PRESENT

Americans:

The President
The Secretary of State
Ambassador Harriman
Mr. Harry Hopkins
Justice Byrnes
Mr. Bohlen
Mr. Matthews
Mr. Hiss

British:

The Prime Minister
Mr. Eden
Sir Alexander Cadogan
Ambassador Clark Kerr
Sir Edward Bridges (Secretary of War Cabinet
Interpreter
Mr. Bob Dixon
Mr. Jeffrey Wilson
Mr. Gladwyn Jebb

Russians:

Marshal Stalin
Mr. Molotov
Mr. Vyshinski
Mr. Maisky
Ambassador Gromyko
Ambassador Goussov
Mr. Pavlov (interpreter)

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(The first part of the meeting was devoted to a
discussion of the voting procedure for the world
organization. This is covered in Mr. Hiss's notes.)

POLAND

President:

I should like to bring up Poland. I come from a great
distance and therefore have the advantage of a more
distant point of view of the problem. There are six

or seven
or seven million Poles in the United States. As I said
in Tehran, in general I am in favor of the Curzon line.
Most Poles, like the Chinese, want to save face.

Stalin:

(interrupting) Who will save face, the Poles in Poland
or the emigre Poles?

President:

The Poles would like East Prussia and part of Germany.
It would make it easier for me at home if the Soviet
Government could give something to Poland. I raised the
question of giving them Lvov at Tehran. It has now been
suggested that the oil lands in the southwest of Lvov
might be given them. I am not making a definite state-
ment but I hope that Marshal Stalin can make a gesture
in this direction.

But the most important matter is that of a permanent
government for Poland. Opinion in the United States is
against recognition of the Lublin government on the
ground that it represents a small portion of the Polish
people. What people want is the creation of a government
of national unity to settle their internal differences.
A government which would represent all five major parties
(names them) is what is wanted. It may interest Marshal
Stalin that I do not know any of the London or of the
Lublin government. Mikolajczyk came to Washington and
I was greatly impressed by him. I felt that he was an
honest man.

The main suggestion I want to make is that there be
created an ad interim government which will have the
support of the majority of the Polish people. There are
many ways of creating such a government. One of the
many suggestions is the possibility of creating a
presidency council made up of a small number of men who
would be the controlling force ad interim to set up a
more permanent government. I make this suggestion as
from the distance of three thousand miles. Sometimes
distance is an advantage. We want a Poland that will be
thoroughly friendly to the Soviet for years to come.
This is essential.

Stalin:

(interrupting) Friendly not only to the Soviet but all
three allies.

President:
President:

This is my only suggestion. If we can work out some solution of this problem it will make peace much easier.

Prime Minister:

I have made repeated declarations in Parliament in support of the Soviet claims to the Curzon line, that is to say, leaving Lvov with Soviet Russia. I have been much criticized and so has Mr. Eden especially by the party which I represent. But I have always considered that after all Russia has suffered in fighting Germany and after all her efforts in liberating Poland her claim is one founded not on force but on right. In that position I abide. But of course if the mighty power, the Soviet Union, made a gesture of magnanimity to a much weaker power and made the gesture suggested by the President we would heartily acclaim such action.

However, I am more interested in the question of Poland's sovereign independence and freedom that in particular frontier lines. I want the Poles to have a home in Europe and to be free to live their own life there. That is an objective which I have always heard Marshal Stalin proclaim with the utmost firmness. It is because I put my trust in his declaration about the sovereign independence and freedom of Poland that the frontier question I consider not of supreme importance. This is what is dear to the hearts of the nation of Britain. This is what we want to war against Germany for—that Poland should be free and sovereign. Everyone here knows the result it was to us unprepared as we were and that it nearly cost us our life as a nation. Great Britain had no material interest in Poland. Her interest is only one of honor because we drew the sword for Poland against Hitler's brutal attack. Never could I be content with any solution that would not leave Poland as a free and independent state. However, I have one qualification; I do not think that the freedom of Poland could be made to cover hostile designs by any Polish government, perhaps by intrigue with Germany, against the Soviet. I cannot conceive that the world organization would ever tolerate such action or leave it only to Soviet Russia to take proper measures. Our most earnest desire which we care about as much as our lives is that Poland be mistress in her own house and in her own soul. I earnestly hope that we shall not separate without taking a practical step with this objective. At the present time there are two governments about which
which we differ. I have never seen any of the present London government. We recognize them but have not sought their company. But Nikolajczyk, Romer and Grabaki are men of good sense and we have confidence in them. We remain in informal but friendly contact with them. There will be great criticism against us all if we let them divide us when we have such great tasks and common hopes. Can we not make a government here in Poland. A provisional or interim government, as the President said, pending free elections so that all three of us can extend recognition as well as the other United Nations. Can we not pave the way for a free future on the future constitution and administration of Poland? If we could do that we should leave the table with one great step accomplished toward future peace and the prosperity of Central Europe. I am sure that effective guarantees can be laid down to secure the line of communications of the victorious Red Army in its battle to defeat Germany. His Majesty's Government cordially support the President's suggestion and present the question to our Russian allies.

(Stalin suggests a ten-minute intermission.)

Stalin:

The Prime Minister has said that for Great Britain the question of Poland is a question of honor. For Russia it is not only a question of honor but also of security. It is a question of honor for Russia for we shall have to eliminate many things from the books. But it is also a question of security of the state not only because we are on Poland's frontier but also because throughout history Poland has always been a corridor for attack on Russia. It is sufficient that during the last thirty years our German enemy has passed through this corridor twice. This is because Poland was weak. It is in the Russian interest as well as that of Poland that Poland be strong and powerful and in a position in her own and in our interests to shut the corridor by her own forces. The corridor cannot be mechanically shut from outside by Russia. It could be shut from inside only by Poland. It is necessary that Poland be free, independent and powerful. It is not only a question of honor but of life and death for the Soviet State. That is why Russia today is against the Czarist policy of abolition of Poland. We have completely changed this inhuman policy and started a policy of friendship and independence for Poland. This is the basis of our policy and we favor a strong independent Poland.

I refer
I refer now to our allies appeal with regard to the Curzon line. The President has suggested modification, giving Poland Lvov and Lvov Province. The Prime Minister thinks that we should make a gesture of magnanimity. But I must remind you that the Curzon line was invented not by Russians but by foreigners. The Curzon line of Curzon was made by Curzon, Clemenceau and the Americans in 1918-1919. Russia was not invited and did not participate. This line was accepted against the will of the Russians on the basis of ethnological data. Lenin opposed it. He did not want to give Bialystok and Bialystok Provinces to Poland but the Curzon line gives them to Poland. We have retreated from Lenin's position. Some want us to be less Russian than Curzon and Clemenceau. What will the Russians say at Moscow and the Ukrainians? They will say that Stalin and Molotov are far less defenders of Russia than Curzon and Clemenceau. I cannot take such a position and return to Moscow. I prefer that we continue a little longer and give Poland compensation in the west at the expense of Germany. I asked Mikolajczyk what frontier he wanted. Mikolajczyk was delighted to hear of a western frontier to the river Neiss. I must say that I will maintain this line and ask this conference to support it. There are two Neiss rivers. The east and the west. I favor the west.

Now about the government. The Prime Minister has said that he wants to create a Polish government here. I am afraid that was a slip of the tongue. Without the participation of Poles we can create no Polish government. They all say that I am a dictator but I have enough democratic feeling not to set up a Polish government without Poles. It must be with participation of Poles. We had the opportunity in Moscow to create a Polish government with Poles. Both London and Lublin groups met in Moscow and certain points of agreement were reached. Mikolajczyk returned to London and was kicked out of the government. The present London government of Archuchauski, which is in reality under the President Brachewicz. All these people were against the agreement and hostile to the idea. They called the Lublin government "bandits" and "traitors." Naturally the Lublin government paid the same coin to the London government. It is difficult to bring them together. The principal personalities, Beirut, Oskika, Morawski, won't hear of the London government. I ask what kind of concessions can be made. They can tolerate Grabski and General Jelikowski but they won't hear of Mikolajczyk.
Under these circumstances I am prepared to support any attempt to create unity if there is some chance of success. I am prepared to call the Warsaw Poles here or better to see them in Moscow. But frankly, the Warsaw government has as great a democratic basis in Poland as de Gaulle has in France.

Now as a military man I must say what I demand of a country liberated by the Red Army. First there should be peace and quiet in the wake of the army. The men of the Red Army are indifferent as to what kind of government there is in Poland but they do want one that will maintain order behind the lines. The Lublin Warsaw government fulfills this role not badly. There are agents of the London government connected with the so-called underground. They are called resistance forces. We have had nothing good from them but much evil. So far their agents have killed 212 Russian military men. They have attacked supply bases for arms. It was announced that all wireless stations must be registered but these forces continued to break all the laws of war and complained of being arrested. If they attack the Red Army any more they will be shot. When I compare the agents of both governments I find that the Lublin ones are useful and the others the contrary. The military must have peace and quiet. The military will support such a government and I cannot do otherwise. Such is the situation.

(The President says that it is now quarter to eight and that the meeting should adjourn.)

Prime Minister:

I must put on record that both the British and Soviet governments have different sources of information in Poland and get different facts. Perhaps we are mistaken but I do not feel that the Lublin government represents even one third of the Polish people. This is my honest opinion and I may be wrong. Still, I have felt that the underground might have collisions with the Lublin government. I have feared bloodshed, arrests, deportation, and I fear the effect on the whole Polish question. Anyone who attacks the Red Army should be punished but I cannot feel that the Lublin government has any right to represent the Polish nation.
Washington, March 24 - The text of the agreements reached at the Crimea (Yalta) Conference between President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Generalissimo Stalin, as released by the State Department today, follows:

PROTOCOL OF PROCEEDINGS OF CRIMEA CONFERENCE

The Crimea Conference of the heads of the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which took place from Feb. 4 to 11, came to the following conclusions:

I. WORLD ORGANIZATION

It was decided:

1. That a United Nations conference on the proposed world organization should be summoned for Wednesday, 25 April, 1945, and should be held in the United States of America.

2. The nations to be invited to this conference should be:

   (a) the United Nations as they existed on 8 Feb., 1945; and

   (b) Such of the Associated Nations as have declared war on the common enemy by 1 March, 1945. (For this purpose, by the term "Associated Nations" was meant the eight Associated Nations and Turkey.) When the conference on world organization is held, the delegates of the United Kingdom and United State of America will support a proposal to admit to original membership two Soviet Socialist Republics, i.e., the Ukraine and White Russia.

3. That the United States Government, on behalf of the three powers, should consult the Government of China and the French Provisional Government in regard to decisions taken at the present conference concerning the proposed world organization.

4. That the text of the invitation to be issued to all the nations which would take part in the United Nations conference should be as follows:

"The Government of the United States of America, on behalf of itself and of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of China and of the Provisional Government of the French Republic invite the Government of -------- to send representatives to a conference to be held on 25 April, 1945, or soon thereafter, at San Francisco, in the United States of America, to prepare a charter for a general international organization for the maintenance of international peace and security.

"The above-named Governments suggest that the conference consider as affording a basis for such a Charter the proposals for the establishment of a general international organization
which were made public last October as a result of the Dumbarton Oaks conference and which have now been supplemented by the following provisions for Section C of Chapter VI:

C. Voting

"1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.

"2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

"3. Decisions of the Security Council on all matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of Paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting.'

"Further information as to arrangements will be transmitted subsequently.

"In the event that the Government of ------- desires in advance of the conference to present views or comments concerning the proposals, the Government of the United States of America will be pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other participating Governments."

Territorial trusteeship:

It was agreed that the five nations which will have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult each other prior to the United Nations conference on the question of territorial trusteeship.

The acceptance of this recommendation is subject to its being made clear that territorial trusteeship will only apply to (a) existing mandates of the League of Nations; (b) territories detached from the enemy as a result of the present war; (c) any other territory which might voluntarily be placed under trusteeship; and (d) no discussion of actual territories is contemplated at the forthcoming United Nations conference or in the preliminary consultations, and it will be a matter for subsequent agreement which territories within the above categories will be place under trusteeship.

[Begin first section published Feb., 13, 1945.]

II. DECLARATION OF LIBERATED EUROPE

The following declaration has been approved:

The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the people of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in
The three Governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other Governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

When, in the opinion of the three Governments, conditions in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measure necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by the United Nations and our determination to build in cooperation with other peace-loving nations world order, under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and general well-being of all mankind.

In issuing this declaration, the three powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the procedure suggested.

[End first section published Feb., 13, 1945.]

III. DISMEMBERMENT OF GERMANY

It was agreed that Article 12 (a) of the Surrender terms for Germany should be amended to read as follows:
"The United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall possess supreme authority with respect to Germany. In the exercise of such authority they will take such steps, including the complete dismemberment of Germany as they deem requisite for future peace and security."

The study of the procedure of the dismemberment of Germany was referred to a committee consisting of Mr. Anthony Eden, Mr. John Winant, and Mr. Fedor T. Gusev. This body would consider the desirability of associating with it a French representative.

IV. ZONE OF OCCUPATION FOR THE FRENCH AND CONTROL COUNCIL FOR GERMANY.

It was agreed that a zone in Germany, to be occupied by the French forces, should be allocated France. This zone would be formed out of the British and American zones and its extent would be settled by the British and Americans in consultation with the French Provisional Government.

It was also agreed that the French Provisional Government should be invited to become a member of the Allied Control Council for Germany.

V. REPARATION

The following protocol has been approved:

Protocol

On the Talks Between the Heads of Three Governments at the Crimean Conference on the Question of the German Reparations in Kind

1. Germany must pay in kind for the losses caused by her to the Allied nations in the course of the war. Reparations are to be received in the first instance by those countries which have borne the main burden of the war, have suffered the heaviest losses and have organized victory over the enemy.

2. Reparation in kind is to be exacted from Germany in three following forms:

(a) Removals within two years from the surrender of Germany or the cessation of organized resistance from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory (equipment, machine tools, ships, rolling stock, German investments abroad, shares of industrial, transport and other enterprises in Germany, etc.), these removals to be carried out chiefly for the purpose of destroying the war potential of Germany.

(b) Annual deliveries of goods from current production for a period to be fixed.

(c) Use of German labor.
3. For the working out on the above principles of a detailed plan for exaction of reparation from Germany an Allied reparation commission will be set up in Moscow. It will consist of three representatives - one from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, one from the United Kingdom and one from the United States of America.

4. With regard to the fixing of the total sum of the reparation as well as the distribution of it among the countries which suffered from the German aggression, the Soviet and American delegations agreed as follows:

"The Moscow reparation commission should take in its initial studies as a basis for discussion the suggestion of the Soviet Government that the total sum of the reparation in accordance with the points (a) and (b) of the Paragraph 2 should be 22 billion dollars and that 50 per cent should go to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."

The British delegation was of the opinion that, pending consideration of the reparation question by the Moscow reparation commission, no figures of reparation should be mentioned.

The above Soviet-American proposal has been passed to the Moscow reparation commission as one of the proposals to be considered by the commission.

VI. MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS

The conference agreed that the question of the major war criminals should be the subject of inquiry by the three Foreign Secretaries for report in due course after the close of the conference.

[VII. POLAND

The following declaration on Poland was agreed by the conference:

"A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of the western part of Poland. The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

"M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorized as a commission to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and with other
Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganization of the present Government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.

"When a Polish Provisional Government National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the U.S.S.R., which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States of America will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government National Unity, and will exchange Ambassadors by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.

"The three heads of Government consider that the eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometers in favor of Poland. They recognize that Poland must receive substantial accessions in territory in the north and west. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course of the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the peace conference."

VIII. YOGOSLAVIA

It was agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and to Dr. Ivan Subasitch:

(a) That the Tito-Subasitch agreement should immediately be put into effect and a new government formed on the basis of the agreement.

(b) That as soon as the new Government has been formed it should declare:

(I) That the Anti-Fascist Assembly of the National Liberation (AVNOJ) will be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Skupstina who have not compromised themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a temporary Parliament and

(II) That legislative acts passed by the Anti-Fascist Assembly of the National Liberation (AVNOJ) will be subject to subsequent ratification by a Constituent Assembly; and that this statement should be published in the communiqué of the conference.

[End second section published Feb. 13, 1945.]

IX. ITALO-YOGOSLAV FRONTIER - ITALO-ASUTRIAN FRONTIER
Notes on these subjects were put in by the British delegation and the American and Soviet delegations agreed to consider them and give their views later.

X. YUGOSLAV-BULGARIAN RELATIONS

There was an exchange of views between the Foreign Secretaries on the question of the desirability of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian pact of alliance. The question at issue was whether a state still under an armistice regime could be allowed to enter into a treaty with another state. Mr. Eden suggested that the Bulgarian and Yugoslav Governments should be informed that this could not be approved. Mr. Stettinius suggested that the British and American Ambassadors should discuss the matter further with Mr. Molotov in Moscow. Mr. Molotov agreed with the proposal of Mr. Stettinius.

XI. SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE

The British delegation put in notes for the consideration of their colleagues on the following subjects:

(a) The Control Commission in Bulgaria.

(b) Greek claims upon Bulgaria, more particularly with reference to reparations.

(c) Oil equipment in Rumania.

XII. IRAN

Mr. Eden, Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Molotov exchanged views on the situation in Iran. It was agreed that this matter should be pursued through the diplomatic channel.

[Begin third section published Feb. 13, 1945.]

XIII. MEETINGS OF THE THREE FOREIGN SECRETARIES

The conference agreed that permanent machinery should be set up for consultation between the three Foreign Secretaries; they should meet as often as necessary, probably about every three or four months.

These meetings will be held in rotation in the three capitals, the first meeting being held in London.

[End third section published Feb. 13, 1945.]

XIV. THE MONTREAUX CONVENTION AND THE STRAITS

It was agreed that at the next meeting of the three Foreign Secretaries to be held in London, they should consider proposals which it was understood the Soviet Government would put forward in relation to the Montreux Convention, and report to their Governments. The Turkish Government should be informed at the
AOGREEMENT REGARDING JAPAN

The leaders of the three great powers - the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain - have agreed that in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe is terminated, the Soviet Union shall enter into war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that:

1. The status quo in Outer Mongolia (the Mongolian People's Republic) shall be preserved.

2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz.:

   (a) The southern part of Sakhalin as well as the islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union;

   (b) The commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded, and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the U.S.S.R. restored;

   (c) The Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South Manchurian Railroad, which provide an outlet to Dairen, shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese company, it being understood that the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain sovereignty in Manchuria;

3. The Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.

It is understood that the agreement concerning Outer Mongolia and the ports and railroads referred to above will require concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The President will take measures in order to maintain this concurrence on advice from Marshal Stalin.

The heads of the three great powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated.

For its part, the Soviet Union expresses its readiness to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the U.S.S.R. and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.

Joseph Stalin
Franklin d. Roosevelt
Winston S. Churchill

February 11, 1945.
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD WESTERN EUROPE

This is the second of a series of articles which will discuss the foreign policy of the Soviet Union as it applies to specific areas of the world.

Diplomatic pressure and national Communist parties are the chief instruments used in implementing Soviet policy in western Europe. By diplomatic pressure the Soviet Union appears determined to prevent formation of a bloc of western European States oriented towards Great Britain. Through the national Communist Parties the Soviets apparently intend to create Leftist coalitions leading to a large measure of Communist control in national governments.

In analyzing Soviet policy, it is necessary to consider both Soviet aims and capabilities, the latter depending not only on the influence the Soviet Union can attain, but also on foreign and indigenous forces opposing Soviet influence within individual nations.

Principal Soviet efforts in western Europe probably will be directed toward France, because the foreign and domestic policies of Italy, Spain, Portugal, Switzerland, and the Low Countries, to a considerable degree, reflect French political trends.

SOVIET-FRENCH RELATIONS

The official Soviet attitude toward France has passed through two phases since the German invasion of the U.S.S.R. in June 1941. The U.S.S.R. encouraged the Committee of National Liberation and later, the provisional government of General de Gaulle by attempting to implant in the French a sense of indebtedness to the Soviet Union. This policy culminated in a formal alliance on 12 December 1944. While the pact was being negotiated in Moscow, however, the Soviets attempted to coerce the French into immediate recognition of the Polish Committee of National Liberation, which, on 1 January 1945, was to declare itself the Provisional Polish Government. The French, however, refused, on the ground that the regime was not representative of the Polish people.

Since this initial failure to influence the French Government, the U.S.S.R. has sought to reduce French prestige. The cordiality of the early war years gave way to an attitude of reserve, although correct diplomatic relations were maintained. At the insistence of the Soviet Union, France not only was excluded from the Yalta and Potsdam Conference, but also from participation in the Balkan Allied Control Commissions, and from an equal position in the discussion of the Balkan peace treaties. More recently, Soviet-French relations have been authoritatively described as "cold."

Repeated French attempts to obtain Soviet support for internationalization of the Ruhr and organization of an independent Rhine State have elicited only the response that French proposals were being studied. The French colonial position in the Near East was attacked in the UNO by the Soviets, and the
presence of French troops in Syria and Lebanon was called to the attention of the Security Council. The French and the Soviets hold opposite views on Italian boundaires and colonies.

The only current international issue on which France and the U.S.S.R. agree is the Spanish question, on which the French Foreign Ministry, under George Bidault, has been under heavy Leftist pressure in the Assembly. After closure of the French-Spanish border on 1 March and the statement on 4 March by France, Britain, and the United States, appealing to the Spanish people to force Franco's withdrawal, the French Left, particularly the Socialist, urged referral of the Spanish case to the UN Security Council. The U.S.S.R. also apparently favors direct international intervention in the Spanish situation. However, France's desire not to alienate the United States' interest in French problems, and to cooperate to some extent with British Mediterranean policy, may lead the French to compromise at the United Nations Security Council meeting in New York in March. Some efforts will possibly be made, however, to obtain recognition for the Spanish Government-in-exile, whose leaders, now in France, are ideologically close to the French Socialist Party.

THE FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY

The two phases of Soviet-French relations have been found closely paralleled by the domestic policy of the French Communist Party. During the De Gaulle-Soviet period of friendly relations the Communist promoted unity within the national Popular Front; Party Secretary-General Maurice Thorez keynoted this policy in a speech from Moscow in November 1943 when he asked for unity among all Frenchmen from "Communist to Catholics," and deemphasized revolutionary doctrine.

As French-Soviet relations deteriorated early in 1945, however, the Party shifted from a policy of participation in a "united Front" supporting the De Gaulle Government to one of concentration on the formation of a Communist-dominated "Popular Front." Initially, this policy was successful; a Communist-Socialist "comite d'entente" was set up early in 1945, and in the April and May municipal elections the parties presented joint lists of candidates. At the Socialist Party Congress in August 1945, however, the Socialist voted almost unanimously against union with the Communist Party.

Superior organization won the Communist Party and its affiliates 26.2 percent of the total vote in the national elections of 21 October 1945, as compared to 15.3 percent in the national election of 1936, while skillful Communist maneuvering has given the Party equal representation with the Socialists on the executive committee of the General Confederation of Labor and a reported voting ratio of two to one.

Although the strong domestic position of the Communist Party in France gives the U.S.S.R. great influence in western European internal affairs, the Communist position partly depends on flexibility and adaptation to the political temper of the nation. The Party's approach to the problem of nationalization -- that too sudden application would harm production -- appears to indicate realization that the French electorate is not yet sufficiently revolutionary to accept economic crisis as the price of Marxist economic democracy.
The Socialist Party polled 24 percent of the vote in last October's election and the MRP, a party slightly left of center, 25.3 percent, while the Rightist parties, although they have not yet united on a common program, were supported by approximately 15 percent of the electorate.

The clerical tinge of the MRP, similar to the Italian Christian Democrats and the confessional parties of Holland, and the very nature of parties on the Right make them rallying points for anti-Communist sentiment. Western European Socialism always has been strongly opposed to the revolutionary socialism of the Third International. The refusal of the French Socialists to merge with the Communist Party and the Labor victory in Great Britain have encouraged conservative elements in other western European Socialist Parties, particularly in Italy, to risk direct competition with the Communist for popular support.

SOVIET POLICY IN THE WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN

To establish a fully effective security zone in the western Mediterranean, the U.S.S.R. must neutralize Italy as a possible outpost of the British Empire, and either oust or radically modify the regimes of Franco, in Spain, and Salazar, in Portugal. Actual Soviet objectives in the area are to secure control or influence over Venezia Giulia, Tangier, and the Italian colony of Tripolitania. Soviet participation in the administration of Tangier has been assured by the agreement of 31 August 1945. Current Soviet moves toward Trieste and Tripoli may be abandoned if the Soviets secure concessions in the eastern Mediterranean.

The internal political balance in Italy, Spain, and Portugal does not appear to favor the establishment of Communist-dominated governments. The Italian Communist Party until recently supported Soviet demands for Italian reparations and Yugoslav claims on Trieste. This anti-nationalist policy, combined with widespread depredations on the part of irresponsible groups affiliated with the Communists, has added to the popularity of the vigorously anti-Communist Christian Democratic Party. The Christian Democrats are estimated to have the largest voting strength of all Italian parties; they receive encouragement from the Vatican, whose political views are a potent anti-Communist weapon in Catholic Italy.

The Soviets have attempted through indirect action to bring about the fall of the Franco Government in Spain. It is doubtful that any group currently maneuvering to succeed Franco would be completely acceptable to the U.S.S.R. The Spanish Republican Government-in-Exile has no Communist participation. Inside Spain, the resistance movement, ANFD (National Alliance of Democratic Forces), which is reported to be negotiating with the royalist Pretender and with the Government-in-Exile, is not controlled by the Communists, despite their participation. It seems likely that the fall of the Franco regime will depend on internal political factors, influenced, but not determined, by outside pressure from the U.S.S.R. or other Powers.
SOVIET BALTIC POLICY

Soviet policy toward the Scandinavian Governments is predicated on a concept of Scandinavia as part of the Soviet "security zone." The organization of this northern zone began by the acquisition of strategic areas in Finland, and the latter was made militarily helpless and weakened economically and politically. To prevent any possibility of an anti-Soviet grouping around the Baltic, the Soviets may seek to extend this zone to include bases in northern Norway, on Bear Island, or in Spitsbergen, and possibly on Danish or Swedish territory in the Baltic Sea.

The Soviets will continue their efforts to prevent Scandinavian countries from joining a "Western Bloc," or forming a "Northern Bloc" among themselves, to maintain neutrality if the U.N.O. fails to preserve peace among the Great Powers.

Since a successful world security organization would work to the advantage of small countries like Norway, Sweden, and Denmark, it is unlikely that they would at present anger the Soviet Union and simultaneously weaken the U.N.O. by overtly forming alliances predicated on the inability of the U.N.O. to preserve peace. If a collapse of the security system appeared imminent, however, it is likely that Sweden would reassert its traditional policy of neutrality and attempt to induce Norway and Denmark to join in a military alliance; Denmark, on the other hand, probably would choose a different course. Because of her connection with the European mainland, Denmark likely would find it impossible to isolate herself from a war enveloping the Continent.

The usefulness of the Scandinavian Communist Parties to the U.S.S.R. is limited by their relatively small size. At the last elections, the Communists polled 10.4 percent of the Swedish vote, 12 percent of the Norwegian vote, and 12.5 percent of the Danish vote. Moreover, Scandinavian Socialist parties control substantial parliamentary majorities.

CONCLUSIONS

Soviet policy in western Europe seeks to foster leftist governments, with Communist participation, in individual countries while, at the same time, attempting to discourage the formation of a "Western Bloc," viewed in Moscow as potentially anti-Soviet. It appears that Soviet policy, backed by Soviet power in Europe, has been, and will continue to be, successful in preventing formal establishment of such a bloc, although community of interest, common fear, and some dislike of the U.S.S.R. necessarily will result in some degree of unity among the States of western Europe.

The Communist Parties in western Europe have attempted with varying success to implement Soviet desires in national domestic affairs as well as in foreign political affairs. While western European Communists are strong, well-organized, and able to create considerable internal disorder should Soviet interests so demand, they have been sufficiently identified with Moscow to reduce their potential influence and to improve the position of Socialist, as well as
moderate and clerical, parties which benefit from their anti-Soviet and anti-Communist orientation. Communist influence, however, would probably be increased by: (1) prolonged failure to solve the economic problems of the area; (2) evidence that Great Britain and, particularly, the United States did not intend to take an active interest in European affairs; and (3) a definite collapse of Big Three unity and failure of the UNO.
ITALIAN AND FRENCH STRUGGLE AGAINST COMMUNISM

Conditions in France and Italy have now reached a point where the struggle between Communist and non-Communist forces appears to have entered a decisive stage. In France Socialist Premier Ramadier is courageously attempting the experiment of governing with the Communists in opposition. In Italy Premier de Gasperi's coalition cabinet last week resigned in the face of a desperate financial crisis, declining public confidence in the government and unremitting Communist attacks on the moderate parties. The anti-Communist forces in Italy are apprehensive over following the "Ramadier experiment" since they are still fearful of the Communists and the degree of disorder which the Communists might foment if excluded from government participation. De Gasperi's Christian Democrats, however, have apparently decided that they can no longer afford to shoulder the major responsibility for Italy's critical conditions, with the Communists remaining in the government and sabotaging the efforts of the Christian Democrats to improve conditions. Charged by the Communists with having placed undue reliance on Western support while antagonizing the USSR, and accused by almost everybody of having failed to solve Italy's urgent problems, the Christian Democrats have steadily lost ground while the Communists have prospered mightily. In resigning de Gasperi appears to hope for a broader coalition, which will spread responsibility and reduce the number of portfolios in the hands of the Communists, or else for a government excluding the Communists.

Factors in Italian Crisis. The immediate issue which produced the fall of the de Gasperi government was the financial crisis marked by a budget deficit of over 600 billion lire and by general loss of confidence in the future of the lira. Campilli, Italy's able Minister of the Treasury, has admitted that all the measures which he had adopted to restore confidence in the lira had failed and he has expressed the opinion that the only remedy which now exists is the importation of consumer goods on a vast scale. Beneath the financial crisis, however, lies a fundamental lack of confidence in the government, based on several factors in Italian political life since the end of the war. The governments since Liberation have been hampered by the sharply competing philosophies of the parties composing them. The earliest governments had only token authority during military operations. Since the transfer of full responsibility to the Italians, elections, the institutional question, and especially the peace treaty have monopolized the attention of the government and politicians. Party strife and ambitions have resulted in unworkable ministerial organization, and incompetence and inexperience have resulted from the inevitable purges of many individuals trained in government who were Fascists and from paying off obligations.

DECLASSIFIED
NO. 14703, Sec. 56

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obligations to members of the resistance with political positions. The largest factor, however, is the fact that the Communists have used their participation in the government to infiltrate every state administrative organization and to sabotage every effort toward the effective solution of Italy's problems.

**Communist Successes.** An indication of the advance of the Communists in Italy is that their reported membership increased from 1,708,000 to 2,166,000 in 1946. With their Socialist allies they have gained control of the municipal governments in Genoa, Turin, Milan, Florence, Bologna. Last month they won a plurality in the provincial elections in Sicily, the most conservative region of Italy, obtaining 24% of the vote as compared with 7.9% in June, 1946. They confidently expect to consolidate their grip on the labor movement, having elected 70% of the delegates to the Convention of the Labor Federation being held next month. The measure of their success is reflected by a greater display of confidence, a growing intransigence on important issues, more open use of intimidation and increasing threats of resort to violence if necessary to gain their ends.

"The Ramadier Experiment." In France, where Premier Ramadier has taken a firm stand against the Communists, the situation appears somewhat more favorable than in Italy. The party composition of the present government appears to be, under existing political conditions, the best that could be hoped for. It excludes both the Communists on the extreme left and reactionary elements on the right, and it combines the fundamentally democratic forces of the center and left which still command the support of the French Parliament and people despite a general public feeling of disillusionment with government fumbling and incoherence. Furthermore, its component elements are oriented toward us through a mutual belief in liberty and human decency and through deep fear and distrust of ruthless Soviet imperialism. Finally, there is the extremely important fact that the government is essentially Socialist and is headed by a Socialist. It therefore has the support of substantial elements of the vital trade union movement and if it succeeds, it will unquestionably gain increased working class support.

**Communists Move Cautiously.** Since the formation of the Ramadier Government the Communists have been acting with great circumspection, and they are not expected in the near future to resort to extreme action such as a general strike. Such a move would force the Socialists further away from them, would lay them open to charges of crippling French economic recovery solely for their own political ends, and might well throw real support to de Gaulle. While they are trying to intimidate the government by threatening a general strike, this threat appears less "frightening" than it was a year ago. Some observers who were convinced a year ago that the Communists were in a position to paralyze the national economy by stopping all essential industries and transport now seriously question whether the Communists would be able to carry
carry out an effective general strike for more than several days at the most. However, beneath the surface, the Communists are doing everything possible to torpedo the Ramadier government. Through their domination of labor they appear to be using tactics of limited sabotage of production. There have been a series of individual "spontaneous" strikes, which have no sooner been settled than others cropped up elsewhere to take their place. The Communists have also cleverly stepped up the tempo of their propaganda against the government policy of a strictly controlled economy, thereby capitalizing on the widespread resentment among all classes in France against fumbling, red-tape and the plethora of government controls and regulations.

Critical Economic Problems - It is in our very real interest for the Ramadier government to succeed. To do so it will need continued courage as well as shrewdness and luck, and it may at some point need outside support. It must maintain its cohesion despite internal differences on economic policies and continued Communist sniping. Ramadier is faced with critical economic problems which must be held to manageable proportions if the economic and political situation is not seriously to deteriorate. The hardship in the conditions of life of the average worker and salaried employee inevitably causes discontent and makes them vulnerable to exploitation by the Communists. Lack of coal and low labor productivity both tend to retard expansion of industrial and agricultural production, which is imperative. An ever present threat of an uncontrolled inflationary spiral, which is very likely to occur unless the wage level is held and production increased, hangs over the government. Among the most acute problems is the food shortage, which had led to a reduction in the bread ration and a natural deterioration in morale. Ramadier is fighting hard to avoid a further reduction.

Consequences of Failure. The consequences of a failure of the Ramadier Government on both the French internal and the international situation would be extremely grave. There is a serious division in the Socialist party on the question of participating in, let alone leading, a government without the Communists. If Ramadier's Government fails, the strong left-wing opposition to the policy of the present leadership will be greatly reinforced, and it is almost certain that in such an event the Socialist left-wing would take over direction of the party. In addition, the fall of the Ramadier Government would almost inevitably weaken the newly forged ties which at the moment link the forces of the center and left in the present government. But the major disaster attending collapse of the government would be the division of France into two hostile extremist camps -- the Communists on the one side and de Gaulle on the other -- with an inevitable struggle to the finish between them.

SETTLEMENT OF SOVIET NATIONALS IN EASTERN EUROPEAN AREAS

One Kremlin method of ensuring continued control over Eastern Europe apparently
apparently involves extensive colonization by Soviet citizens of certain politically strategic areas. A substantial number of Soviet families are being settled in eastern Germany and Austria, along the Black Sea Coast of Rumania, and in Bulgaria.

In Germany an estimated 300,000 Soviet nationals are being dispersed through the Polish-administered territories of Pomerania and Silesia. In Austria the settlers generally have occupied the farms along the Austro-Hungarian border; in Rumania and Bulgaria settlement has taken place principally in the coastal areas. Soviet nationals now constitute approximately half of Constantza's population of 100,000; in Bulgaria they now reportedly number 65,000 and may eventually total 200,000.

Especially significant is the geographic pattern which the colonization is following. In Germany and Austria the effect has been the establishment of an ideologically and ethnically solid population-barrier against the West. The settlements in Austria, moreover, form a Slavic corridor connecting the Slavic peoples of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia and separating the non-Slavic inhabitants of Austria and Hungary. In Rumania and Bulgaria, a bridge of Soviet nationals is being built in the direction of the Turkish straits, serving at the same time to cut off the natives of those countries from access to the Black Sea.

In addition to their more or less passive function of serving the Kremlin as ethnic barriers and bridges in vital areas, these settlers are in a position actively to promote Soviet purposes: (1) by joining with local communists in the formation of pro-Soviet underground organizations -- such organizations are already in existence in Austria and Rumania and are being armed and equipped by Soviet occupation commanders; (2) by forming political pressure groups which would seek to persuade local governments to follow pro-Soviet policies or would demand "plebiscites" either on "independence" or on incorporation of their areas into the USSR; (3) by creating "incidents" which would serve as pretexts for armed Soviet intervention in the "protection" of Soviet nationals.

PROSPECTS FOR DUTCH USE OF FORCE IN NEI

The rapid deterioration of Dutch-Indonesian Republic relations in the Netherlands East Indies and the widening area of disagreement which has developed in the two months since the signing of the Linggadjati Agreement have greatly increased the possibility that the Dutch will soon use force to break the deadlock in negotiations. Although Dutch military operations against the Republic might be successful in their initial phases, hostilities would degenerate into bitter, protracted guerrilla warfare, which would eliminate the possibility of achieving a peaceful solution for many years. This state of affairs would give further encouragement to the growth of anti-Western sentiment throughout the Far East and might result in the dispute being brought before the Security Council of the UN.
The present situation arises basically from the divergence of Dutch and Indonesian views on the degree of autonomy which the Republic will enjoy during the interim period before the establishment of the United States of Indonesia. The Dutch hold that Netherlands sovereignty shall apply over all the Indies in the interim period, while the Republic rejects Dutch sovereignty as inapplicable to itself in view of Dutch recognition in the Linggadjati Agreement of the de facto authority of the Republic in Java, Madura, and Sumatra.

US Policy in Southeast Asia. Recognizing the importance of developments in Southeast Asia to the security and to the economic and political interests of the United States, we have within the past fortnight instructed our Embassies in Paris and The Hague to express to the French and the Dutch our concern with the dangers which appear to us inherent in the situations developing in Indochina and the Netherlands East Indies respectively. We have maintained that the whole future relationship between the western democracies and the emergent nations of the Far East -- and in consequence, the character of these nations -- may be determined by the present attitude of the metropolitan powers toward the nationalist movements within their colonial possessions. In particular, we have stressed that developments in one country have immediate repercussions throughout the area. We have stated unequivocally that we recognize the danger that the nationalist movements may take a Pan-Asiatic direction or result in the establishment of totalitarian regimes. We have expressed the opinion that the interests of the western democracies and of the peoples of the area can best be served by close association, on a voluntary basis, between the peoples concerned and the western power which has traditionally been responsible for their welfare and with whose customs, laws, and languages they are familiar.

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COMMUNIST THREAT IN ITALY

Italian Communist leader Togliatti this week gave public warning that his party may abandon democratic methods for the conquest of power and resort to violence in its efforts to overthrow Premier de Gasperi's moderate government. In a meeting of partisans at Modena, Togliatti admitted that the Communists had 30,000 well-armed partisans at their disposal and threatened that if the government did not give "prompt proof of its democratic spirit" the Communists would "have to fight". The Italian Communists have hitherto been following tactics of "moderation", apparently confident that they will rise to power through legal methods. The imminent withdrawal of Allied troops from Italy has increased the possibility of direct Communist action to seize power and has rendered more effective other Communist methods for taking control of the country. Despite Togliatti's "call to arms", other Communist tactics appear more likely under present conditions. It may well be that Togliatti's statement was designed primarily to intimidate the government. In carrying out their offensive, the Italian Communists have open to them two main courses of action: 1) sudden overthrow of the De Gasperi Government by Communist-sponsored armed force, following withdrawal of Allied troops; and 2) Communist-inspired general strikes to paralyze the important north Italian industrial area, and thus seriously interfere with future implementation of the program for European recovery.

Indications of Possible Direct Action - By the employment of tactics similar to those used in Greece, the first course is within the realm of possibility. Although the Italian Army and Carabinieri have some 200,000 troops to oppose Communist guerrilla estimated to number as many as 50,000, the addition of partially-armed and trained Italian and Yugoslav Communists and fellow-travelers could appreciably increase the strength of the revolutionists. Furthermore, redeployment of Italian armed forces to protect the Yugoslav frontier following the withdrawal of Allied forces would remove certain troop units from important Communist-dominated centers in north Italy. Recent developments within the Communist Party in Italy may increase the likelihood of direct military action. There has long been a division within the party between...
the Togliatti faction, which has favored peaceful political infiltration, and the pro-revolutionary group headed by Luigi Longo, a member of the International Brigade during the Spanish civil war and partisan leader in Italy during World War II. The recent departure of eight members of the "direct action" group for Moscow may indicate closer coordination between this element and the USSR and consequent intensification of Communist para-military activity. Togliatti's last speech may mean that he will go along with the revolutionary faction.

Indications of More Moderate Line - Two factors militate against Communist revolution in Italy. The USSR is unwilling to support directly such a step because it might involve war with the US. An even more potent reason against it is that the failure of the European recovery program, or even failure of the US to provide Italy with emergency wheat and dollars during this critical interim period, might deliver Italy into the hands of the Communists by popular vote at the next national elections. It would therefore seem more logical for the Italian Communists to await the outcome of the elections, scheduled for April 1948, before using revolutionary tactics. The continuation of threats and intimidation is a permanent policy, and any Communist statements regarding the necessity for violence can be considered to be made partly for propaganda purposes. It will be remembered that Togliatti made a speech threatening "direct action" prior to the Sicilian elections in April, and it is certain that the leftist majority in that former stronghold of conservatism was created in part by the Sicilians terror of Communist reprisals.

Strikes Cause Economic Deterioration - Of the two courses of action, the second seems most likely. There is evidence that it has already been embarked upon. Paralysis of the north Italian industrial section, which is perhaps second only to the Ruhr in its importance to the European economy, through "spontaneous" general strikes could defeat the operation of the European recovery program and eventually throw not only Italy into the Soviet orbit, but possibly France as well. The strike of 600,000 agricultural workers in the Po Valley, which began on September 9 indicates that the Communists are now making every effort to bring production to a standstill. Communist-sponsored strikes are causing a further deterioration of the critical economic situation, which has already compelled the Premier to appeal for emergency wheat from the US in order
to restore Italy's essential pasta ration. The De Gasperi Government must cope in some way with the desperate economic crisis before the September 23 meeting of the Constituent Assembly, when a vote of no confidence proposed by Left Wing Socialist Nenni will be discussed. Whichever course the Communists follow, their chances of success are excellent unless the De Gasperi Government can ameliorate the economic crisis by procuring sufficient wheat or through successful operation of the European economic recovery program.

US View on Broadening of Government - Representatives of smaller Italian parties have recently given indications that they would favor a broadening of the Italian Government and reincorporation of the Communists, apparently believing that the Communists would genuinely cooperate in the government and failing to realize that the real issue in Italy today is between democracy and totalitarianism and not mere rivalry between individual political parties. We have informed Ambassador Dunn that we would welcome participation in the Italian Government of the greatest possible number of the moderate left, center and right groups prepared to work together for the best interests of the Italian people. Such representation in the government would give it the greater strength and stability that it needs at this critical time. We will not support extremists and we cannot support those who, while not themselves of the extreme left or right, make common cause with extremists. Bringing the Communists back so soon after forming a government without them would certainly add to their prestige in Italy and abroad, and they would exploit it as evidence of the inability of any Italian cabinet to govern without them. Recent international events such as the Soviet attitude on European reconstruction have tended to weaken the influence of the Communists—a trend which would only be reversed by bringing them back into the government. In our opinion collaboration between the real democratic forces in Italy and the Communists is impossible since their ultimate aims are entirely divergent.

ANOTHER CRISIS IN FRANCE

The French Government of Premier Ramadier has survived another crisis, receiving a vote of confidence from the Assembly by the narrow margin of 292 to 243, but there seems little doubt that its prestige has seriously declined. The latest vote of confidence came over the government's program of coal subsidies as a means of preventing a rise in industrial prices. None of the parties, including
Ramadier's own Socialist party, was satisfied with the government's program. Ramadier survived merely because leaders of the non-Communist parties did not want to overthrow him before the municipal elections scheduled for October, fearing that Ramadier's fall would play into the hands of the Communists on one side and of de Gaulle on the other.

Split Within Socialist Party - During the crisis Ramadier was threatened with a serious rift within his own party as a result of demands from the left wing of the party that he follow the economic directives of the recent Socialist Congress and introduce legislation for greater "direction" of the economy. The left-wing Socialist group attempted to persuade the directing committee of the party to call a special congress to "discipline" Ramadier and his Socialist Ministers for insubordination in failing to follow party directives. These efforts were unsuccessful, however, and the directing committee simply announced its desire that the economic policy of the government continue to "evolve" along the lines of the resolutions of the party congress, stating that a special congress would be held after the municipal elections. The overt struggle in the French Socialist Party concerns control over: 1) current economic and colonial policies, 2) the ideological orientation of the party, and 3) the party's mission in continental Europe. This struggle has divided the Socialists into two nearly equal factions. On the right of the cleavage are Leon Blum, Premier Ramadier, most of the Socialist ministers and parliamentarians, and about 40% of the party's local executives. The left wing, led by Guy Mollet, the party's secretary general, has the support of 49% of the local executives and a majority on the Socialist Executive Committee. Policy clashes between the factions have occurred over Socialist concessions to the MRP on Indochina and Algeria and to the Radicals and the MRP on price controls. Ramadier defends these actions as realistic compromises necessitated by the Socialist minority position in both the cabinet and the legislative body. Mollet's group insists on greater concessions to native nationalisms and on a planned domestic economy favoring the working class--or, failing the latter, withdrawal from the government.

The practical motivation of the left-wing stand is a desire to capitalize on worker discontent with Communist leadership in order to register Socialist gains in the October municipal elections.

Disillusionment Over Present System - Qualified observers believe that the Ramadier Government will probably be able to hang on until after the municipal elections.
but that it is not likely to last much longer than that as it is now constituted. While most of the French people admit that Ramadier has tried to meet the problems which his government has faced, the conviction is growing that he has neither sufficient authority to dominate his own party, let alone a coalition government, nor sufficient forcefulness or prestige to galvanize the people to make the sacrifices on which the country's very survival may depend. There is an increasing belief that France cannot be governed effectively under the present system with its division of political forces and the limitations of the constitution. More and more Frenchmen are agreeing with de Gaulle that a strong government with greater authority is imperative. A return to power by de Gaulle is now considered to be a definite possibility since Frenchmen who are disillusioned over the present governmental system see only two alternatives--de Gaulle or Communism--and most Frenchmen would infinitely prefer an unknown adventure with de Gaulle to a Stalinist police state. The Communists, however, still the strongest party in France, can be expected to use all the resources at their disposal to keep de Gaulle out.

Reaction to de Gaulle - French popular reaction to De Gaulle's recent charge that the US is giving preference to plans for German recovery over plans for France has increased his chances of returning to power and may endanger US objectives in Europe. Although most Frenchmen are pro-US and fundamentally anti-Communist, they are apparently beginning to fear that US policy threatens French security by proposing to re-build a strong Germany at the expense of France's prosperity and hence of France's safety. Because only the Communists had emphasized this view prior to DeGaulle's speech of September 7, his new tack will further weaken Communist appeal, while strengthening his own, and draw to him popular support now flowing away from the Ramadier Government. If DeGaulle accedes to power and the economic situation continues to deteriorate, he is capable of leading the French into a nationalistic adventure (opposed to both Soviet and US policy) which would make the implementation of the European recovery program virtually impossible.

COMMUNIST INTENTIONS IN WESTERN GERMANY

The Communists in the bizonal area of western Germany are accelerating their penetration of German labor organizations. The success of this penetration will enable the Communist Party in that part of Germany if it should later
be suppressed as a political organization, as its leaders apparently anticipate, to continue its activities as an underground movement through the workers. At present the Communists are attempting to infiltrate the unions while preserving simultaneously the appearance of non-Communist control by permitting Social Democrats to remain in prominent offices temporarily. The current Communist strategy is to win over the individual worker and thus assume command of the union through control of the rank and file. Marxist sentiment is particularly strong in the Rheinish-Westphalian industrial region and especially powerful in the Ruhr. In addition, a reliable American trade unionist reports extensive expansion of Communist influence in Greater Hesse. The overall plan is to gain sufficient strength to be in a position to shut off or seriously curtail bizonal production.

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COMMUNIST VIOLENCE IN ITALY AND FRANCE

The Communist campaign against European recovery took more violent form in both Italy and France during the past ten days as strikes and disorders spread over the two countries. While this Communist-inspired violence probably represents the beginning of a militant effort to create a "revolutionary situation" rather than the beginning of an immediate revolutionary coup, there have been several indications that the Italian Communists have begun a major effort to overthrow the moderate government of Premier de Gasperi, by violent methods if necessary. The evidence pointing toward this includes: 1) widespread Communist-inspired riots during the past 10 days; 2) a report that Communist military activity, preceded by increasing demonstrations, is imminent in Italy; 3) a report from Soviet satellite diplomatic sources of a decision by the Kremlin that the main efforts of the "Cominform" will be directed against Italy; 4) a threat by left wing Socialist leader Nenni, who is a close collaborator with the Communists, that unless de Gasperi is replaced by an independent there will be continued disturbances with no assurances as to the consequences; and 5) the recent use of delaying tactics by the Soviet representative on the four power naval commission for distribution of the Italian fleet.

Disorders Sweep Both Countries - During the past week a number of coal miners in northern France, employees of several French automobile factories and flour millers in several French cities went on strike. The port of Marseille was tied up by a strike of waterfront, transport and industrial workers. Riots lead by tough Communist shock troops broke out in Marseille. Communist-inspired disorders swept over northern Italy, later spreading to the south, as the Communists complained violently of the activities of alleged "neo-fascists" and belabored the government for permitting the continued existence of such groups. Offices of the right wing Uomo Qualunque and other rightist groups in several cities were wrecked. These tactics appear to be a natural outgrowth of the more-militant approach heralded by the "Cominform" announcement last month, representing another phase in the Communist efforts to undermine economic stability, foment popular unrest and create difficulties for the moderate governments in these two key western...
European countries. They may well be designed also to
test the Communists' own militant machinery and the re-
sistance to such tactics in order to prepare the ground
for an all-out effort to seize power. It is reported
that at this stage the main concentration of the Kremlin
is toward Italy rather than France, based on the belief
that the internal situation in France is "not yet ripe"
whereas in Italy it is viewed as very favorable.

Communist Moves in Italy - The Italian Communists
are evidently determined at all costs to get rid of Premier
de Gasperi, around whom anti-Communist sentiment is polar-
izing and who represents the major obstacle to their ob-
jectives. As one maneuver to this end, they have indicated
through their stooge, left wing Socialist leader Nenni,
that they would be prepared to sign a truce, with a new
coalition government provided de Gasperi stepped down and
an independent became Prime Minister, and that the alter-
native to such an arrangement would be continued distur-
bances regardless of consequences. It is to be expected that
removal of de Gasperi would constitute a resounding victory
for the Communists with Italian public opinion, would lead
to further steps toward bringing the Communists and left
wing Socialists back into the government before the elec-
tions next spring, and would create confusion and chaos
in the anti-Communist ranks which would be useful in any
attempt at violent seizure of power.

Soviet Tactics on Naval Commission - Recent tactics
by Soviet representatives on the Four Power Naval Com-
misson for distribution of the Italian fleet have given a
further indication of the Kremlin's intentions toward Italy.
While the Soviet representative initially displayed a desire
to expedite the work of the Commission, he has of late been
adopting delaying tactics and trying to restrict the powers
of the Commission. Although it was agreed that the Com-
misson should meet in Rome the first day after ratification
of the Italian peace treaty, the Soviet representative did
not appear in Rome until after the announcement by the US
of the renunciation of its share of the Italian fleet. The
Soviet representative has consistently blocked notification
of the allocations to the Italian Government until last
week when his position became untenable. He then insisted
that the notification be on a top secret basis. Possible
motives for these tactics may be 1) a desire that Italy
retain the entire navy in expectation of eventual Communist
control, 2) the prevention of unfavorable publicity toward
the USSR in connection with Communist efforts to gain
control during the next few months, and 3) concern over the possibility that the Soviet-allocated ships may be scuttled by the Italians.

Ramadier Government Falls in France - The acute economic situation in France, brought to a head by the wave of strikes, has already led to the resignation of Premier Ramadier. Ramadier's move, following several days of negotiations looking toward the formation of a stronger "caretaker government" to bridge the gulf between de Gaulle and the Communists, was forced by the hostility of the Radical Socialists to the strict Socialist economic program and by basic disagreements between the MRP and the Socialists on measures needed to halt the wage-price spiral. The Assembly failed to give a vote of confidence to the veteran Socialist Leon Blum, but has now endorsed the efforts to the MRP Minister of Finance Robert Schuman to form a new cabinet. However, any coalition government which is formed will face the same economic and political problems which confronted Ramadier, and will have to deal with them more effectively if it is to survive. Meanwhile the spreading Communist-inspired strikes in France may develop into a series of regional strikes which will be identical in effect, with a national general strike. The Communists probably wish to avoid the appearance of a general strike in order to prevent a definite showdown with the government at this time. Such widespread strikes, however, are in line with the "Comminform" directive for the increase of "revolutionary mass action" on all fronts, regardless of adverse consequences to local Communist parties, and the disruption of economic and political structures in order to defeat the European recovery program.

COMMUNIST SETBACK IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

The moderate parties in Czechoslovakia have managed temporarily to halt Communist advances toward increased domination. The Communists suffered a setback in their efforts to reconstruct the Slovak Board of Commissioners, the highest administrative organ in Slovakia, and the moderate parties have also drawn new hope as a result of the custer of strongly pro-Communist Zdenek Fierlinger as chairman of the Social Democratic Party.

Fierlinger has been replaced by Bohumil Lausman who strongly believes in democratic practices of government and has courageously decried Communist abuses. Under his leadership the Social Democratic Party may be expected
to agree with the moderates more often than with the Communists, thus making a strong anti-Communist majority in the National Assembly and cabinet.

Soviet Position Still Strong - The gains of the moderates are, however, not unequivocal. The entire Slovak issue is still far from settled, and Fierlinger, who still retains the favor of the Soviet leaders, can become a strong influence in the country without his party's support. The significance of the moderate gains lies chiefly in the time lost by the Communists in establishing effective control over the country. The preoccupation of the moderates is to hold the line as well as possible, hoping for an improvement in the international situation which would enable them to go over to the offensive. However, the setbacks suffered by the extreme left may now force the Communists to abandon parliamentary procedures in favor of the tactics employed by the Communists in Poland, Rumania and Bulgaria.

GOOD OFFICES COMMITTEE IN INDONESIA

The recently-organized UN Security Council's Good Offices Committee (GOO) has encountered formidable obstacles in the execution of its two major objectives: 1. putting into effect the Security Council's cease-fire order; and 2. creating an atmosphere conducive to renewed political negotiations between the Netherlands and the Indonesian Republic.进展 of the first objective has been seriously hampered by the announced Dutch intention to resume polices in order to evacuate populations of villages allegedly by Republican forces. The GOO has turned down a request to send observers to cover these actions on the part of the GOC might thereby appear to sanction continued Dutch action and thus destroy the basis for current fire talks. Efforts to reopen political negotiations similarly hampered by the fact that the expressions of the parties to the dispute remain widely divergent. Preliminary talks Republican officials have made indicate that they still expect immediate, unqualified political independence rather than to gain independence gradually as envisioned by the Linggadjati Agreement. Official Dutch opinion is that the Republican leaders are incompetent, unscrupulous, and Dutch authorities continue to ensure the creation of pro-Dutch states within former Republican territory.
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TOP-SECRET

Top-Secret Summary
For the Secretary
January 19, 1948

POSITION OF ITALIAN COMMUNISTS

Although there is no reason to believe that Communist plans for violent action in Italy have been abandoned, it appears likely that the strong US reaction to the threat of violence in Italy, the unpopularity of the recent trial strikes, and Communist reversals in France have caused the Kremlin and the Italian Communists to review their program. Qualified observers consider that unless they receive Kremlin orders to the contrary, the Italian Communists would prefer to try to gain power through the elections scheduled for April before making any insurrectionary attempt. One factor reinforcing this conclusion is that with the strengthening of the Italian police and armed forces, the firmer attitude of the Italian Government and its broader political base, the present government now appears capable of defeating any Communist campaign of violence or revolution not overtly reinforced by the Soviets or their satellites.

Communist Election Prospects - Observers estimate that although the Communists have lost ground in terms of popular support, they could still under present conditions, along with their left wing Socialist stooges, win 35% of the vote in the coming national elections. If a considerable portion of the electorate could be kept away from the polls through intimidation or otherwise, this percentage would be substantially increased, perhaps to the point where even if the Communists did not win a majority, any government formed without them would lack sufficient parliamentary support to govern effectively. Furthermore, if the Italian Government is forced to reduce the bread ration, the Communist position would be tremendously enhanced and the scales might well be tipped in their favor. Communist strategy may therefore be to secure a postponement of the elections in the hope that the government will be forced to make the ration cut before elections are held.

Communist Congress at Milan - The threat of violence or insurrection, however, has by no means disappeared and such an attempt will be made at any time it is dictated by the interests of the Kremlin. The training and organizing of Communist direct action forces is continuing, and the Communist apparatus has quietly rehearsed movements of 20 to 30 thousand of its members to the major cities of northern and central Italy, including Rome, by rail and truck. The seriousness of the Communist threat is confirmed by reports on the Communist congress in Milan, which was attended by delegates from numerous other European countries. Italian Communist leader Togliatti is said to have told the congress that parliamentary procedure was unnecessary in its present form and that force should not be excluded as a means to the establishment of a "new democracy". The chief committee of the congress, divided into military and political sub-
committees, is reported to have considered plans for insurrection in Italy and France. It is also reported that Spanish Communist representatives who entered Italy clandestinely for the meeting stated that the Spanish Communists were prepared to set in motion a series of disorders in Spain coordinated with developments in other countries; that the question of a serious Communist offensive to lower production and create discontent in western Germany was discussed; and that it was decided the French Communists would proceed with the strengthening of their organization and illegal apparatus.

**Italy Primary Target of Kremlin** - Reports on the congress in Milan give further indication that Italy rather than France is for the present the Kremlin's primary target in western Europe. Observers consider that while the Communists will continue to try to prevent economic stabilization in France, they do not intend to foment disorders until the economic situation further deteriorates. It is believed that for the immediate future the French Communists will use tactics of encouraging downfalls and secretly sabotaging French industry with a view to creating popular misery which can later be exploited, while striking at the government "legally" through propaganda and parliamentary attacks.

**COMMUNIZATION OF HUNGARY**

Although the political control of the Communist-dominated government in Hungary is complete in fact, if not in appearance, the situation in Hungary has not yet deteriorated to the extent that it has in the Balkan states. Factors which have thus far combined to slow the process of communization are the essentially western orientation of the Hungarian people, the greater and more enlightened strength of the Roman Catholic and Protestant churches in Hungary as compared with the Orthodox church in Bulgaria and Rumania, the advanced stage of Hungarian culture and education, the basic individualism and conservatism of the Hungarian peasant, a greater industrialization and, especially, the popular consciousness of Hungary's geographic location as a racial island in a Slavic sea. However, since the flagrantly fraudulent Hungarian elections of August 31, 1947, which the Communists manipulated to confirm their position of power, all effective political opposition to complete Communist control has been disorganized, imprisoned, intimidated into silence or has fled abroad, and it appears that the process of economic and social sovietization can henceforth go forward more or less at will. The police and army are being brought effectively under Communist control, civil liberties have been suppressed, and the groundwork for the eventual sovietization of the Hungarian economy has been laid through outright Soviet control of the extensive former German assets in Hungary and the nationalization of heavy industry and banks.

**Future Prospects** - The vast majority of Hungarian people of all ranks and classes still look toward the west and hope for eventual liberation from Soviet and Communist domination. Communist consolidation of the positions gained with the support of the Soviet occupation authorities
is, however, steadily progressing, and the possible means to halt this process, either through the implementation of the Hungarian peace treaty or through effective UN action, appear to be extremely limited at this time. The Hungarian people, fearing a new war and realizing the limited extent of possible remedial measures in their behalf, are nevertheless believed to be most desirous of continuing evidence of western interest in and support for their problems. Historically they have always feared and opposed Russian totalitarianism and imperialism, be it under old or new Czars. On the other hand, having experienced rule by a right-wing authoritarian regime which was characterized by certain feudal aspects, they emerged from the war with new hope of achieving a government based on democratic principles and processes, and have a deep interest in the efforts of western governments to create a peaceful and economically sound Europe. Unless there is continuing evidence of our interest in the welfare of the Hungarian people and of progress in our efforts to aid in European recovery, which the average Hungarian feels will counteract the objectives of his Communist masters, all hope and morale will eventually disappear and the vast majority of Hungarians, like the Bulgarians, may in their own self-interest resign themselves to the inevitability of Communist dictatorship in southeastern Europe.

BRITISH RELATIONS WITH ARAB STATES

Although Arabs have long felt that the dominant position of the UK in the Near East made the British the archenemy, many Arabs are now beginning to feel that the refusal of the UK either to support or to enforce partition in Palestine indicates that the British may prove valuable friends in the fight to prevent the establishment of a Jewish state. Meanwhile, the UK is quietly improving its relations with the Arab nations while outwardly maintaining a pretense of complete impartiality in Palestine. Despite sincere attempts by the UK to keep the peace in Palestine until the termination of the mandate, there is little doubt that the British have already decided that partition is hopeless solution for the Palestine problem. They are, consequently, attempting to safeguard their vital economic and strategic interests by strengthening their influence with the governments and peoples of the Arab world.

Evidence of British Policy - Several recent developments have indicated improved understanding between the UK and several of the Arab States. An Anglo-Iraqi sterling agreement, providing that Iraq remain within the sterling bloc, was concluded in December. More recently, the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of alliance was renewed. Egypt and the UK have recently concluded a mutually satisfactory financial agreement and may soon re-open negotiations on the Anglo-Egyptian treaty. British efforts to improve relations with Saudi Arabia are to be seen in the recent invitation extended to Prince Feisal, the Foreign Minister, to visit London in February and in Anthony Eden's current visit to Ibn Saud in Riyadh. The UK is giving military aid to the Arabs by fulfilling its long-standing arms contracts with Iraq, Transjordan, and Egypt. The
British in Palestine appear to be covertly selling arms and ammunition to the Syrian Government. Several hundred British ex-army officers are reported to have volunteered for military service with the Arabs, and the Foreign Office has indicated that there is no effective means of preventing them from enlisting.

MILITARY SITUATION IN CHINA

The current Chinese Communist offensive in Manchuria, seventh in a series which began a little more than a year ago, demonstrates strikingly the extent to which the Nationalist military position has deteriorated during the year. The focus of Manchurian operations has shifted gradually southward, with Communist forces driving deeper into Nationalist territory. The seventh offensive has brought the civil war for the first time to the outskirts of Mukden, major Nationalist bastion in Manchuria, and has resulted in the interdiction of all rail lines into and within Manchuria. The recent declaration by the Communists of their intention to conquer all Manchuria during 1945 appears to be a realistic estimate of their capabilities.

Broad Communist strategy over the past year has been to contain Nationalist forces within separate geographic areas, to confine the Nationalist units in their areas to the large cities, and then to deny them sufficient supplies of food and fuel. Resultant military and economic attrition is reducing the amount of men and material which the Communists need to take these cities. Currently, this process of regional containment and attrition has reached a very advanced stage in Manchuria; it is well advanced in North China and is beginning to develop in Nationalist areas along the Lunghai railroad. If the Communist units in Central China succeed in isolating the Nationalists to the north, a Communist penetration into China south of the Yangtze can be expected to follow a similar pattern. The Nationalists at this time do not appear to possess adequate material or manpower to cope with the increased scope of Communist operations.

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TGP—SECRET
REATIONS TO PRESIDENT'S SPEECH

Reactions to President Truman's address to Congress March 17 on the international situation have been extremely favorable throughout the non-Communist world. There is every reason to believe that the speech has greatly encouraged the free nations of Europe and has bolstered their determination to resist any further expansion of totalitarian Soviet Europe. Official comment from the Foreign Ministers of such countries as the UK, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria, and Turkey has been uniformly enthusiastic. The Foreign Ministers of the five countries participating in the Western European Union all felt that the President had done everything within his power to assist the union. Bevin and Belgian Premier Spaak have both indicated that they did not expect much more at this time than full moral and material support for the western European Union along with unofficial consultations. The non-Communist press has also applauded the speech. Typical comments were to the effect that it demonstrates a realization of world responsibility on the part of the US; that it was a solemn warning to the USSR that further expansion will not be tolerated; that by deterring the USSR from further aggression it will serve to prevent war; and that it underwrites the Brussels treaty for a western European Union and implies military support for the free nations of Europe. It is interesting to note that the speech produced a definite wavering on the part of two powerful Swedish newspapers which have in the past supported Sweden's stubborn policy of "neutrality" between east and west. About the only unfavorable non-Communist reaction came from the Chinese press which criticized the President's failure to mention China or the Far East. There was a mild note of disappointment in some quarters over the fact that the speech did not go as far as preliminary rumors predicting a military guarantee of the free European nations.

Communist Reactions - There has so far been no indication as to what effect the speech will have on the Kremlin. There is some reason to believe, however, that it hit home in Moscow. In an interview with Molotov on the afternoon of the day after the speech was delivered, Ambassador Smith found Molotov looking unusually pale and more tired than he had ever seen him, and Smith conjectured that President Truman's speech had been the subject of an all-night session of the Politbureau the previous night. Molotov, while not cordial, was very polite, was in an unusually conciliatory frame of mind, and was apparently prepared to make concessions on the housing and customs problem that has been plaguing our Embassy. Behind the iron curtain, portions of the speech were

[The document contains a top-secret stamp and is not fully transcribed due to the limited visibility of the text on the image.]
cooperation will be difficult to achieve. The development of such an organization will depend in large measure on whether the UK alters its present basic attitude toward the CEEC.

CRUCIAL ELECTIONS IN ITALY

On April 18 the Italian people will go to the polls in a national election the results of which will be of vital importance to all the free countries of western Europe. There is only one real issue involved in the elections—whether Italy will remain a free country or will be subjected to a totalitarian dictatorship controlled from Moscow. The Communists, with a powerful organization, strong financial backing and shrewd leadership, are making a determined effort to come to power by "legal" electoral means. At the present time the political situation in Italy is so fluid that it is impossible to make any accurate estimate of the results of the elections or the nature of the new government which will be formed after the elections. Much will depend on developments between now and April 18 not only in Italy but in the international arena. According to present predictions, the Communist controlled "people's bloc", which includes the Communists and left wing Socialists under Nenni, is likely to obtain between 35 and 45% of the votes with Premier de Gasperi's Christian Democrats receiving 35 to 40% and the moderate left parties now in the government—the Republicans and right wing Socialists under Saragat—polling 10 to 15%.

Danger of Communist Control - In view of the fact that the smaller parties are staunchly anti-Communist, the chances now appear to be that de Gasperi will form the new government and that the Communists will again be excluded. On the other hand, there is a definite possibility that the Communists will receive such a strong vote that it will be impossible for any government to function without them. If they are admitted to the government at all, there is a strong likelihood that through the familiar methods of sabotage and infiltration, they would in the course of time obtain complete control of the government. If the Communists are convinced before the elections that they will be defeated, it seems quite likely that they will try to seize power by violence, and if they are defeated in the elections, there are definite indications that they will make such an attempt. Communist control of Italy would be extremely serious for the free nations of Europe and for our policy of support for free Europe. It would facilitate Communist penetration of France, Spain and North Africa, would weaken the position of Greece and Turkey in their resistance to the USSR, would turn the southern flank of the western forces in central Europe, and would give the USSR a powerful strategic position astride the Mediterranean.

US Support for Democratic Elements - We are doing everything possible to support the moderate democratic elements in Italy without giving the impression of interfering in Italian internal affairs. We have
have made it clear to the Italians that if they choose to vote into power a government in which the dominant political force would be a party whose hostility to ERP has been frequently proclaimed, we could only consider this as evidence of Italy’s desire to disassociate itself from ERP and we would have to conclude that Italy had removed itself from the benefits of ERP. In our information program we are doing everything possible to let the Italian people know that while the choice is theirs, in our opinion it is the choice between freedom and dictatorship. We have demonstrated our support for a democratic Italy by proposing, in concert with the British and French, that the Big Four and Italy negotiate a protocol to the Italian peace treaty providing for the return of the Free Territory of Trieste to Italian Sovereignty. We are now considering taking the initiative in reopening the question of Italy’s admission to UN, which has hitherto been prevented by Soviet opposition.

FINANCIAL CRISIS IN CHINA

The threat of an unprecedented financial crisis has greatly complicated the critical military and political problems now facing the Chinese National Government. Deterioration in the government’s economic position, as measured by soaring commodity prices and black market exchange rates for foreign currencies, has accelerated at an ominous rate since February 10. In the ensuing six weeks, general commodity prices have doubled, and US dollars on the Shanghai black market have trebled in terms of Chinese currency. The government’s official holdings of foreign exchange are believed to be nearing exhaustion. With the possible exception of an immediately implemented US aid program, there are no economic or other factors now in evidence which can halt this accelerated movement toward complete financial collapse. Basically, the deterioration in the government’s economic position reflects the general lack of confidence—now approaching panic—in the government’s ability to contain the Communist military forces. Important interests in Chinese financial circles appear to be extremely skeptical about the possibility that US aid can be effective. A single major military defeat sustained by Nationalist armies may be sufficient to cause a general refusal to accept the Chinese national dollar as a medium of exchange and a consequent return to barter.

Consequences of Financial Collapse - A financial collapse will have immediate and serious implications with respect to the National Government’s military effort. The government’s ability to maintain its armies in the field will be jeopardized and the possibility of a complete military and political debacle will be imminent if the economic situation continues to deteriorate at its present rate. There is no evidence of either official Chinese determination or a government plan to cope with the mounting inflationary pressures. The apathy with which the National Government is viewing the approaching collapse of its financial structure demonstrates how much more serious and pressing are the military and political problems which currently monopolize the government’s attention.
were quoted in the press so as to produce a distorted effect. For example, a Belgrade newspaper consistently eliminated the phrase "free countries of Europe", indicating that these words touched a particularly sensitive spot in the Communist nervous system. Comment in the Communist press characterized the speech as an attempt to create a war psychosis for election purposes, pressure on ERP countries to join a military bloc, blackmail against the USSR, and US intimidation of other countries and interference in their affairs.

COMMITTEE OF EUROPEAN COOPERATION

Although the current meeting of the Committee of European Economic Cooperation reflects a growing recognition by all 16 participating countries of the urgent need of western European economic integration, the majority still appear reluctant to set up the strong continuing CEEC organization desired by the US. The closest approach to the US concept is the French proposal, supported by Italy, for an organization with specific detailed powers and a strong secretariat capable of independent action. Several nations, however, are still reluctant to commit themselves: 1) to support an organization which has sufficient power to unify European recovery efforts; or 2) to join fully in the cooperative measures necessary for European recovery.

UK Opposes Strong CEEC - Despite its assertions to the contrary, the UK in particular still does not wish a strong CEEC, apparently preferring a weak organization in which final authority on economic cooperation remains in the hands of the individual governments. Many of the smaller nations, like Switzerland and Sweden, tend to favor the British approach, as infringing least upon their own sovereignty. The UK attitude, apparent in its cautious approach to such projects as customs unions and multilateral clearing arrangements, is based largely upon the fact that Britain, more than any other participating CEEC country, has extensive non-European economic and political ties. Consequently, Britain considers its recovery to be much more dependent upon direct US aid than on closer economic integration with western Europe, and it fears that such integration might involve weakening its Commonwealth bonds. The UK, therefore, would prefer to preserve its freedom of action rather than commit itself to a strong CEEC.

Dangers of Weak Organization - Unless the continuing CEEC organization is made stronger than appears likely at present, it may be unable to achieve the economic integration of western Europe essential to recovery. Many of the participants at the Paris Conference have recognized that the CEEC must develop full economic cooperation and not confine itself to the mere programming and reviewing of US aid. Without a strong CEEC capable of taking an overall approach to the European recovery problem and resolving or overriding conflicting national views such cooperation

-TOP-SECRET-
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GERMANY

Both the Soviet walkout from the Allied Control Council (ACC) and recent Soviet interference with transporta-
tion into Berlin indicate that the USSR: 1) has abandoned hope of using
the ACC to hinder the present western European reconstruction pro-
gram, and 2) intends to accelerate preparations for the establishment
of an eastern "German state" whenever the Kremlin decides that the
western powers can be successfully blamed for partitioning Germany.
In this preparatory phase, the USSR may place the Soviet zone under
a "democratic" and "loyal" German administration, created from the
Communist-dominated Peoples' Congress and strengthened by trained
Germans from the former Moscow "Free Germany Committee". Both
the presence of the western powers in Berlin and the functioning of
the ACC hamper the realization of the Soviet objectives and, unless
allied determination remains obviously strong, further Soviet attempts
to eliminate these hindrances can be expected.

RUHR

Soviet preparations for possible clandestine activity against
US-UK occupation authorities in the Ruhr are indicated by
current replacement of known Communist leaders with new party men
from the Soviet zone and with thoroughly indoctrinated former prisoners
of war. Probable reasons for the replacements are: 1) comparative
failure of the present leadership of the Communist Party (KPD) in the
Ruhr; 2) Soviet dissatisfaction with the opposition of many old KPD
leaders to pro-Soviet policy dictates from Moscow; 3) preparations
to go underground in the event of US-UK action against the party; and
4) the danger of using well-known and easily-identified party leaders
in clandestine and illegal operations.

ITALY

Prospects that the Italian Communist Party will obtain a
sufficiently large plurality in the April 18 elections to
ensure Communist or left-wing Socialist representation in the next
Italian Government have sharply diminished. Concurrently, the party's
capabilities for successful large-scale insurrection without active
military assistance from Yugoslavia, have been considerably reduced.
Unless the Communists receive substantial outside aid, the government
now appears sufficiently strong to prevent its overthrow by force and to put down large-scale rebellion. Whether the Kremlin, even under these circumstances, will direct an insurrection either before or after the elections cannot be predicted. If, as seems probable, the Communists fail to secure representation in the new government, they will then launch a new program of strikes and sabotage to wreck the recovery program and discredit the government.

In the past few months the Italian armed services and security forces have been greatly strengthened, not only by new equipment but also by a considerably improved morale. At the same time the Communist para-military forces have been weakened and to some extent disrupted by government seizure of clandestine munitions dumps and caches and the interception of arms shipped in from abroad. No evidence available indicates that Yugoslav forces—the most logical source of outside assistance—are being prepared for action in Italy. Finally, and probably most important, the Italian masses appear less inclined than ever to support a Communist uprising and have become increasingly anti-Communist in their attitude.

FINLAND Although Finland gained substantial concessions from the USSR during negotiations on the recently signed treaty of mutual assistance, the treaty will provide the USSR with an excuse for further moves against Finland whenever the Kremlin considers it necessary. Future Soviet action toward Finland will depend on the course of events within Finland and on international developments. An intensification of the "cold war" would prompt the Kremlin to hasten the campaign for Communist domination of Finland. Similarly, a pronounced rightist swing within Finland or increased Finnish cooperation with the west might also persuade the USSR to move more quickly. Finnish non-Communists, therefore can be expected to vote for ratification of the treaty, to maintain superficially friendly relations with the Communists and the USSR, and to move cautiously in their relations with the west.

GREECE Recent Greek Army successes have probably been sufficiently dislocating to the guerrilla forces to necessitate postponement of the large-scale offensive reportedly
planned by Markos for the latter part of April. It is possible that the army, by retaining the initiative, can prevent the successful launching of any concerted guerrilla offensive in the near future. Nevertheless, the army victories are limited in extent, and a decisive defeat of the guerrillas is not yet in prospect.

EGYPT The short-lived strike of the Egyptian police, although brought on by purely economic grievances, may indirectly lead to a settlement of Egypt's long-standing differences with the UK over the Sudan and British military rights in Egypt. The Egyptian Government's inability to cope with the strike has seriously impaired Prime Minister Nokrash's prestige and may bring about his downfall. His most likely successor is Senate President Heykal, who has consistently maintained that successful termination of the Anglo-Egyptian deadlock is essential to Egypt's future.

CHINA Despite Chiang Kai-shek's announced unwillingness to be a candidate for the presidency of the Chinese National Government, he will undoubtedly be elected to this position by an overwhelming majority of the National Assembly on April 12. Party leaders are unanimous in stating that Chiang is China's indispensable man for the presidency. Thus, the effects of Chiang's action have been to assure him the presidency, to rally the full support of the Kuomintang to his leadership, and to enhance his authority. In view of the basic and growing weaknesses of the Kuomintang and the National Government, however, this strengthening of Chiang's political position may prove to be temporary. Chiang's maneuver was undoubtedly prompted as a measure to offset these weaknesses. The Kuomintang had become disrupted by increasing factionalism and by mounting discontent with Chiang's leadership to such an extent that there was danger that the National Assembly would be the scene of public attacks on his policy by party members, thus leading to an open split.

"For the moment, Chiang has secured from Kuomintang leaders a clear mandate to continue his rule, and consequently he will be under less pressure to alter his policies or reorganize the government. Unless the government demonstrates under his leadership more success than hitherto in coping with its enormous military and economic problems, dissatisfaction and criticism will inevitably
mount and will be more difficult to silence.

SIAM  Control of the Siamese Government by a group of military extremists now appears assured. Once foreign recognition of the Abhaiwong Government had been obtained, the extremist military group demanded the resignation of the government because of its inability to bring about the return of normal economic conditions. The military group then declared to the Regency Council that only Marshal Phibun would be acceptable as the new premier. In view of the determination of the members of the Abhaiwong Government to boycott a Phibun Government, it is expected that Phibun will experience difficulty in forming a new cabinet of any significant strength and that its tenure of office will be solely dependent on army support. Every effort will be made during the assumption of office by the new government to observe all legal forms in order to avoid jeopardizing recently-obtained recognition, but the essential character of government control as based on military force will remain unchanged.

KOREA  A developing split among South Korean rightists over the choice of candidates for the forthcoming UN-observed election and over the form a provisional government should take when the assembly convenes has made Syngman Rhee's chances of emerging as chief of the South Korean Government almost certain. Rhee's autocratic policies as head of this government would probably assist the USSR in its efforts to win away South Korean leaders. Future Soviet moves will probably include demands for the withdrawal of occupation troops both from North and South Korea and pressure for recognition by the UN of a Soviet-sponsored People's Republic.

Sources:
Weekly Review of State Department
Weekly Summary of Central Intelligence Agency
Current Economic Developments of State Department
State Department Telegrams
Intelligence Digest

S/S-R:11q
Top Secret Summary
For the Secretary
April 26, 1948

Prospective Communist Strategy

The defeat suffered by the Communists in the Italian election has further reduced Communist capabilities for assuming power and has vastly improved the morale and confidence of the anti-Communists in both Italy and France. An increasing number of left-wing European Socialists and fellow-travellers may now abandon their Communist association. The Communists in western Europe thus are confronted with a considerable loss in political influence in addition to their already reduced capabilities for revolutionary action.

Possible Lines of Soviet Action - Italy and France may consequently enjoy a brief respite while the Communists regroup their forces and revise their strategy. The USSR, however, can be expected to maintain its pressure in Germany. Moreover, it will probably continue its aggressive tactics in the Near East. In Iran, continuing Soviet pressure may eventually lead to actual intervention, professedly based on the 1921 Soviet-Iranian Treaty. The deteriorating situation in Palestine may soon present the Kremlin with an irresistible opportunity for greatly expanded covert intervention. Although the satellites continue to exercise caution in their support of the guerrilla forces in Greece, they are capable of vastly increasing the scale of their covert aid. In Latin America, the USSR can be expected to seize upon any favorable opportunities for exploiting local unrest or violence.

Communist Tactics in Western Europe - For the immediate future, Communist activities in western Europe are likely to be directed toward rebuilding the popular front rather than an early or determined bid for power. A Communist drive to recover the allegiance of the non-Communist left is indicated by these recent developments: 1) French Communist Leader Thorez on April 18 called upon Communists, Socialists, and Catholics to unite in defense of French "liberty and independence"; 2) the Cominform Journal, reversing its original position, is now professing to represent all workers' parties, not merely the Communists; 3) the German Communists recently voiced approval of a "Middle-Class Auxiliary" of the Socialist Unity Party, which might conceivably develop into the long-expected "nationalist" movement based on the Bismarckian concept of Russo-German
cooperation; and 4) the Kremlin reportedly has issued a directive to the French Central Communist Committee calling for a program of non-violence in western Europe and intensified activity in Germany and the Near East.

Defeat of ERP a Main Goal - Defeat of the European recovery program remains a prime objective of Communist strategy. Strikes and industrial sabotage, conducted ostensibly on the basis of local economic issues rather than political considerations, can be expected. Although Communist propaganda will continue to impugn US motives in promoting recovery, the Kremlin may henceforth moderate its attacks upon present western European governments. However, Communist propagandists may intensify their efforts to contrast "peaceful" Soviet intentions with US "warmongering" and "imperialist designs." Such a drive would be designed to win the support of those western Europeans who are prepared to seek "peace at any price" and to encourage a relaxation of western, and particularly US, military preparedness.

Situation in Greece - In Greece, the Kremlin is also faced with a possible reduction of Communist capabilities. Differences between Greek Communists and Soviet-satellite Communists have apparently arisen over problems concerning Soviet aims in Greece and the conduct of the civil war. Greek Communist leaders are reportedly disturbed by the failure of the satellites to provide the guerrillas with enough aid to halt the continuing successes of the Greek Army, and the Minister of Interior in the Markos government is said to be distrustful of the "selfish" policy of the USSR and fearful that Yugoslavia may be planning to seize Greek Macedonia. Moreover, certain Greek Communist leaders believe that the primary Soviet intention in the civil war is to wage a long campaign of economic attrition against the US and not to effect the rapid military defeat of Greece. In view of the successful operations of the Greek Army, it is apparent that the Kremlin must decide soon whether to authorize a drastic increase in aid to the guerrillas or allow their gradual defeat by the Greek Army.

May Day Strikes in Latin America - Although Communist May Day demonstrations in Latin America may result in local disturbances, present indications are that the Latin American governments will be fully capable of controlling any outbreaks. In Mexico, the electrical workers have threatened to call a May Day strike. If they are joined by the petroleum workers, miners, and railway workers (all closely allied with the electrical workers by inter-union agreements), the
resulting strike could cause a general paralysis of the
country and threaten the stability of the Mexican Govern-
ment. Sporadic violence may break out in Cuba, and pos-
sibly in a few other countries, though there are no indi-
cations at present of coordinated plans for strikes or
public disturbances.

USSR

Several measures recently adopted by the
USSR are designed apparently to increase
the Soviet Union's military and economic capabilities
and to facilitate a transition from a civilian to a mili-
tary economy. By a recently-published decree, military
ranks are established for all administrative, engineering,
and technical personnel now in industries under jurisdic-
tion of the Ministry of Non-Ferrous Metallurgy and the
Ministry of Internal Affairs. This decree, which is al-
most identical with the one issued in 1947 to govern the
coal ministries, may indicate the formation of quasi-mili-
tary organizations. In addition, civilian defense groups
are reportedly being established for each city block in
Moscow, and air raid systems are being reorganized.

GERMANY

Increased military activity by the USSR in
eastern Germany, particularly in Berlin, dur-
ing the past 30 days can probably be regarded primarily as
measures to consolidate the Soviet postwar position in
western Europe and to continue the war-of-nerves against
the western powers. Such military activity is estimated to
have the following objectives: 1) a further sealing of
the western border of the Soviet sphere; 2) normal replace-
ments for Soviet armed forces in Germany; 3) participation
in the program of maneuvers now being conducted in all ter-
ritories occupied by the USSR; and 4) a contribution to the
war-of-nerves designed to decrease or eliminate western re-
presentation in Berlin and the Allied Control Council. Al-
though increased military activity may be expected to con-
tinue for some time, it is probably not a preparation for
movement against western Europe.

CHINA

Political disintegration in Nationalist
China, both in the provinces and the central
regime at Nanking, appears to have reached a relatively
advanced stage. In addition to well-established separatist
tendencies in south China, a feeling of regional independence
is apparently growing among Nationalist civil and military
officials in north China, largely as a result of the inability
or the unwillingness of the National Government to extend
realistic military support. Some direct overtures from
local military commanders for US military aid, a tendency
among provincial governments to raise and support their own levies (in at least one case in contravention to National Government ordinances), and evidence of increasing liaison among North China leaders -- all indicate that while north China officials still hope for assistance from Nanking, they have ceased to expect it.

Sources:

Weekly Review of State Department
Weekly Summary of Central Intelligence Agency
Current Economic Developments of State Department
State Department Telegrams
Intelligence Digest

S/S-R:1wn
Psychological and Political Warfare


NSC 10/2

Washington, June 18, 1948.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC 10/2. Top Secret. Although undated, this directive was approved by the National Security Council at its June 17 meeting and the final text, incorporating changes made at the meeting, was circulated to members by the Executive Secretary under a June 18 note. (Ibid.) See the Supplement. NSC 10/2 and the June 18 note are also reproduced in CIA Cold War Records: The CIA under Harry Truman, pp. 213-216.

1. The National Security Council, taking cognizance of the vicious covert activities of the USSR, its satellite countries and Communist groups to discredit and defeat the aims and activities of the United States and other Western powers, has determined that, in the interests of world peace and US national security, the overt foreign activities of the US Government must be supplemented by covert operations.

2. The Central Intelligence Agency is charged by the National Security Council with conducting espionage and counter-espionage operations abroad. It therefore seems desirable, for operational reasons, not to create a new agency for covert operations, but in time of peace to place the responsibility for them within the structure of the Central Intelligence Agency and correlate them with espionage and counter-espionage operations under the over-all control of the Director of Central Intelligence.

3. Therefore, under the authority of Section 102(d)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947, the National Security Council hereby directs that in time of peace:

a. A new Office of Special Projects shall be created within the Central Intelligence Agency to plan and conduct covert operations; and in coordination with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to plan and prepare for the conduct of such operations in wartime.

b. A highly qualified person, nominated by the Secretary of State, acceptable to the Director of Central Intelligence and approved by the National Security Council, shall be appointed as Chief of the Office of Special Projects.

c. The Chief of the Office of Special Projects shall report directly to the Director of Central Intelligence. For purposes of security and of flexibility of operations, and to the maximum degree consistent with efficiency, the Office of Special Projects shall operate independently of other components of Central Intelligence Agency.

d. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for:

(1) Ensuring, through designated representatives of the Secretary of State/1/ and of the Secretary of Defense, that covert operations are planned and conducted in a manner consistent with US foreign and military policies and with overt activities. In disagreements arising between the Director of Central Intelligence and the representative of the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense over such plans, the matter shall be referred to the National Security Council for decision.

//1//According to an August 13 memorandum from Davies to Kennan, Kennan was subsequently appointed as the representative of the Secretary of State. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Policy Planning Staff Files 1947-53: Lot 64 D 563) See the Supplement.

(2) Ensuring that plans for wartime covert operations are also drawn up with the assistance of a representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and are accepted by the latter as being consistent with and complementary to approved plans for wartime military operations.

(3) Informing, through appropriate channels, agencies of the US Government, both at home and abroad (including diplomatic and military representatives in each area), of such operations as will affect them.

e. Covert operations pertaining to economic warfare will be conducted by the Office of Special Projects under the guidance of the departments and agencies responsible for the planning of economic warfare.

f. Supplemental funds for the conduct of the proposed operations for fiscal year 1949 shall be immediately requested. Thereafter operational funds for these purposes shall be included in normal Central Intelligence Agency Budget requests.

4. In time of war, or when the President directs, all plans for covert operations shall be coordinated with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In active theaters of war where American forces are engaged, covert operations will be conducted under the direct command of the American Theater Commander and orders therefor will be transmitted through the Joint Chiefs of Staff unless otherwise directed by the President.

5. As used in this directive, "covert operations" are understood to be all activities (except as noted herein) which are conducted or sponsored by this Government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and executed that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them. Specifically, such operations shall include any covert activities related to: propaganda, economic warfare; preventive direct action,
including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberation groups, and support of indigenous anti-communist elements in threatened countries of the free world. Such operations shall not include armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage, counter-espionage, and cover and deception for military operations.

6. This Directive supersedes the directive contained in NSC 4-A, which is hereby cancelled.
LA "FORZE SPECIALI" DEL NATO E L'OPERAZIONE "FLAMO"

1. L'eventualità di una situazione di emergenza che coinvolga, in tutto o in parte, i territori dei Paesi della NATO presso l'acqua orizzontale interna o di forze militari di invasione da tempo oggetto di studio e di conseguenti predisposizioni, alcune sul piano NATO, altre sul piano nazionale.

Sul piano NATO si registrano:

1. L'attività del C.P.G di Parigi (Clandestine Planning Committee) operante da BRUP, con funzione consultiva per il tempo di pace, rivolta a definire le possibilità di concreto, in tempo di guerra, alle operazioni di SGAF da parte dei servizi speciali delle Nazioni Unite nel settore delle operazioni speciali;

2. alcuni incontri tra lo S.M.D. italiano e AFS e la MAF in vista di studiare le possibilità di pianificazione sulle forze clandestine in Italia;

3. l'invito rivolto anni addietro da BBZ e BBZ, na
All'attività di cui al comma 1) il SISMI è partecipe
per mezzo del suo rappresentante nella persona del Cape
Ufficio "c".

All'attività di cui al comma 2) il SISMI ha partecipa-
to favorendo elementi di raggiri o di indicazione pro-
gressiva.

L'attività di cui al comma 3) interesse principali-
te gli Stati Majori delle varie M.A., trattandosi eg.
semilmente di guerra "non ortodossa" da condursi da for-
razioni militari regolari.

Nel complesso, tali attività inserito nel quadro M.A.
rinengono, almeno per ora, prevalentemente nel campo del
lo studio e della pianificazione.

II. Sul piano nazionale, l'eventualità dell'emergenza più ap-
pra delineata è stata ed è oggetto di una specifica atti-
vità da parte del SISMI.

A tale attività è proposta la Sezione "SIP" dell'Uffici-
cio "c" costituita sotto la data del 10 ottobre 1954, con
il compito indicativo "studi speciali e assegnamenti di
personale per particolari situazioni".

Avvertita la necessità di assicurare opportune predispo-
zioni per l'eventualità di un'emergenza comprometten-
e l'integrità del territorio e dell'autorità nazionale, sul-
la base di quanto precedentemente già compiuto dai suoi
predecessori, l'attuale Cape Servizio decideva infatti,
con la costituzione della nuova Sezione "SAP", di affrontare ad avviare a soluzione il delineato problema.

Parallelamente a tale decisione presa nell'ambito del Servizio, il Capo del SIPAL decise, con l'appoggio delle decisioni del Capo di S.F. della Difesa, di confluire i precedenti accordi intercorsi tra il Servizio Italiano e quello Americano riguardo alla reciproca collaborazione nel campo delle operazioni S/B ("SAP BEHIND = SOSTENERE IN DIETRO"); per la realizzazione di una operazione comune.

Il documento che attesta tale intesa stipulata in data 26.11.1956 (vedi allegato n. 1) reca il titolo "Accordo fra il Servizio Informazioni Italiano ed il Servizio Informazioni U.S.A. relativamente all'organizzazione e all'attività della rete clandestina post-occupazione (Stay Be hind) italo-statunitense" e costituisce il documento base della "GLAMO" (nome assegnato alla operazione sviluppata dai due Servizi).

L'accordo stabilisce gli impegni dei due Servizi per la realizzazione della "GLAMO" e la conducta dell'operazione come ed è stato, a favore statunitense, sul presupposto che "i piani dello Stato Maggiore della Difesa Italiano prevedono l'attuazione di tutti gli sforzi per mantenere l'isola della Sardegna" dove si situata la base dell'operazione. In particolare, il Servizio Informazioni U.S.A. ha ulteriormente precisato, in data 7 ottobre 1957, che il suo soppoggio alla "GLAMO" è considerato nei piani di guerra degli Stati Uniti d'America.

L'operazione "GLAMO" oltreché sulla generali esigenze derivanti dalla minaccia di una emergenza o occupazione,
si basa sui concetti codificati dalla teoria e dalla tecnica delle operazioni 5/3 (vedi allegato n.2 dal titolo "Finalità e principi organizzativi delle operazioni "Stay Behind", nonché l'allegato n.1 contenente la bossa del "Manuale 5/3")

Documenti fondamentali dell'operazione "GLAMO" sono:

- lo schema di massima delle operazioni 5/3 (vedi all.n.4)
- il piano organizzativo 5/3 (vedi all.n.5)
- il piano di sicurezza 5/3 (vedi all.n.6)
- il programma di reclutamento 5/3 (vedi all.n.7)
- il piano degli addestramenti 5/3 (vedi all.n.8)

III. L'importanza delle predisposizioni "GLAMO" è duplice:

1. la prima è di ordine soggettivo e concerne cioè i territori e le popolazioni che dovessero malamente concettare l'occupazione o il sovvertimento, territori e popolazioni che dall'operazione "GLAMO" riceverebbe re impietito e appoggio alla resistenza;

2. la seconda è di ordine soggettivo e concerne cioè l'autorità legittima dello Stato, la quale per l'eventualità di gravi offese alla sua integrità si troverebbe ad aver adottato, con tali tempestive opportune predisposizioni, provvedimenti atti ad assicurarle il prestigio e l'ulteriore capacità di azione e di governo.

Ne deriva con evidenza, l'alto significato politico (nel senso superiore della parola) che assume un'iniziativa del tipo 5/3 nelle mani del SIPAL, capace di assicurare al Capo dello Stato Maggiore della Mise, per l'eventualità del momento di emergenza, una leva di lungo braccio e di grande portata per incoraggiare la liberazione del territorio e per stabilire i poteri legali e le istituzioni
il SIFLE mancherbbe ad una sua funzione peculiare che non assolleva a questa delicate presenza e lascia o ad altre organizzazioni incoscienti o al servizio di interessi di partito, l'iniziativa in tale campo.

IV. La Sezione "SIF", proposta, come si è detto, al consiglio in continenza, è un organismo ancora in fase di consolidamento, ma ormai nettamente definito e funzionante. Essa si articolà come segue:

- **Caso Sezione**, in funzione di coordinatore dell'operazione "GLANCO";

- **1° gruppo**, per l'"organizzazione generale", in funzione di supporto generale e di attivazione della STELLA ALPINA e della STELLA MARINA, organizzazioni inglobate nel "GLANCO";

- **2° gruppo**, per le "organizzazioni speciali" in funzione di segreteria permanente dell'organizzazione "GLANCO" e di attivazione delle branchi operative al "GLANCO" (Informazioni - Sabotaggio - Propaganda - Evasione e Fuga - Guerriera) e delle unità di pronto intervento (Rododendro, Azalea, Ginestra);

- **3° gruppo**, per la "tecnica e le trasmissioni", in funzione di supporti per i collegamenti "GLANCO" a grande e piccola distanza e di attivazione del Centro Radio da tutore "GLANCO";

- **4° gruppo**, per l'"attività aerea", in funzione di supporto aereo logistico-operativo dell'operazione "GLANCO";

**A DIVULGAZIONE**

- **C. A. G.**, (Centro Addentramento Ostacolatori "GLANCO") per l'addestramento e l'attività operativa, in funzione di base operativa addentramento dell'operazione "GLANCO".
Trattasi di un'organizzazione attraverso la quale SIFAK esplica il comando delle "forze speciali", nonché dell'apparato organizzativo-didattico e di supporto ad esse necessario.

Nel complesso, l'organizzazione si è sviluppata e si sviluppa lungo le seguenti direttive:

1. Costituzione dell'apparato direttivo centrale (la Sezione SAD nel suo insieme) e pianificazione generale dell'operazione;

2. Costituzione e messa a punto della base addestrativa, del corpo istruttori, della disciplina, delle attrezzature didattiche (il Centro Addestramento Guastatori (CAG)) in funzione anche del suo eventuale futuro impiego come base operativa;

3. Costituzione del Centro Trasmissioni, in appoggio alla base operativa, capace di mantenere i collegamenti a grande distanza con le reti operanti, nonché di svolgere attività radio di propaganda e di disturbo (CIT);

4. Pianificazione degli elementi fondamentali dell'organizzazione, ossia:
   - piano di adeguamento dell'operazione;
   - piano di reclutamento del personale;
   - piano degli addestramenti;
   - piano organizzativo (via via adattate alle effettive possibilità di realizzazione);
   - piano della documentazione sui terreni, l'ambiente, gli obiettivi;

5. Effettuazione di corsi addestrativi di elementi della Sezione SAD presso la scuola del Servizio Amoriano e periodi di attività combinata presso le basi addestrative.
tivo-operativa;

6. Attivazione delle branche operative mediante la costituzione di quaranta nuclei (ognuno su 2-3 uomini "operativi" e 2 maronisti) e precisamente:
   - 6 nuclei informativi ("I")
   - 10 nuclei di sabotaggio ("S")
   - 6 nuclei di propaganda ("P")
   - 6 nuclei di azioni o fuga ("F")
   - 12 nuclei di guerriglia ("G")

aventi tutti il carattere di "missioni operative e di collegamento" preconstituite fin dal tempo di pace, attese riservate il lancio o l'infiltrazione in tempo di emergenza o di occupazione;

7. Costituzione di unità di guerriglia di pronto impiego, in regioni di particolare interesse, e precisamente:
   - la "STELLA ALPINA" nel Friuli, riallacciandosi alla preesistente organizzazione "OSOPPO", della consistenza attuale di circa 600 uomini e tendente a 1.000 unità di pronto impiego, più altre 1.000 mobilitabili;
   - la "STELLA MARINA" riallacciandosi alle preesistenti organizzazioni "GIGLIO" e "GIGLIO II", della forza programmata di 200 unità;
   - la "RODOVENETO" della forza programmata di 100 + 200 unità;
   - la "ARRIVA" della forza programmata di 100 + 200 unità;
   - la "CIMESTRA" della forza programmata di 100 + 200 unità. ./.
6. approntamento, dislocazione periferica in magazzini del servizio e predisposizioni di m antiquamento dei materiali necessari ai vari elementi operativi, e precisamente:
- per i nuclei "F", "G", "Z", "Z" e "S", materiali speciali confezionati in contenitori idonei al m antiquamento, ed apparati radio riceventi e trasmettenti per i collegamenti a grande distanza;
- per le unità di pronto impiego, materiali di equipaggiamento, armamento e munizioni di tipo tipico militare, seppure selezionati per il particolare impiego, nonché apparati radio per i collegamenti a breve e a grande distanza;

9. addestramento e qualificazione alle funzioni direttive ed esecutive di elementi dei nuclei e delle unità di pronto impiego;

10. ricognizioni terrestri e aeree delle zone di particolare interesse;

11. raccolta della documentazione cartografica e fotografica del terreno, dell'ambiente, degli obiettivi, nonché della documentazione sulle operazioni speciali svolte durante la seconda guerra mondiale;

12. attività sperimentali svolte principalmente presso il Centro addestramento funzionale nei tre ambienti di possibile impiego:
- aria (attività aerea e paracadutismo)
- acqua (attività acqua e subacquea)
- terra (attività in terreni difficili).
v. Alle state attuali l'operazione "GLADIO", posta ormai salda presso organizzazioni centrali, si sta sviluppando nel campo periferico per la realizzazione dei co-
prendenti nuclei "Informazioni" - "Suboteggi" - "Pro-
pagone" - "Evasione e Fuga" - "Guerriglia" e unità di
prato impiego.

Il piano organizzativo è rivolto soprattutto ad attuare predisposizioni per l'Alta Italia (I e II Zona) sebbene, in ordine di successiva importanza, prevista di
estendersi anche alle regioni centrali e meridionali (III e IV Zona).

La ripartizione del territorio italiano in zone non
ha una finalità programmatica vincolativa: trattasi di
un esilio organizzativo.

Il piano organizzativo dell'operazione "GLADIO"
prevede in sintesi i seguenti contingenti di uomini:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Piano Teorico</th>
<th>Organizzatori</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Centrali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. per i nuclei &quot;guerreggio&quot;</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. per i nuclei &quot;fuga&quot;</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totale</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Con un rapporto di rendimento organizzatori
elaborati dai nuclei 172 1:38

VISTATA DIVULGAZIONE
In pratica, tenendo conto anche delle esigenze organizzative delle unità di pronto intervento, e in vista di risparmiare ogni possibile economia, il piano teorico si realizza come segue:

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con i seguenti rapporti di rendimento:

- organizzatori: \( \frac{13}{2} = 6.5 \)  
- elementi dei nuclei: \( \frac{112}{112} = 1 \)  
- organizzatori: \( 2:1 \)  
- elementi delle unità di pronto intervento: \( 1500:750 \)  

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(*) Altri 10 nuclei sono previsti in posizione indefinita nell'eventualità di un ulteriore sviluppo del programma.

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A UNULGAZIONE
vi. Nel complesso l'organizzazione affidata alla Sezione

attua operazione ad una consistenza a valore, in immobili,
installazioni, materiali ed equipaggiamenti, di circa
lire 1.500.000.000 come indicato dall'allegato n° 1.

Il bilancio di previsione dell'operazione si aggii-
rea in complesso in 225 milioni annui di cui oltre 127
milioni a bilancio riservato e 100 milioni a bilancio
ordinario, escluse le spese per il personale militare.
La vasta quantità di beni che vengono

conclusione

L'operazione "CLAMO" risponde ad una esigenza che si
imposta oggi giorno come fattore di primaria importanza nel-
le predisposizioni per la difesa del Paese.

Tale esigenza, benché non conosciuta del pubblico, soltanto
in questi ultimi anni è stata sistematicamente affrontata
ed avviata alla conclusione.

Allo stato attuale, l'organizzazione è giunta ad un buon
livello sia nel campo della pianificazione sia in quello
della realizzazione, passato da tempo predisposto come era in
corso per l'incremento dell'organizzazione periferica.

Un elemento caratteristico dell'organizzazione è costi-
tuito dalla base operativo-addestrativa dell'operazione (n
addestrativa). Essa, in qua-
to base addestrativa, rappresenta una novità nella storia
del Servizio Informazioni Italiano poiché mai per il passa-
to il Servizio aveva posseduto una unità addestrata specializzata,
sia per soggetti, sia per ambito, anche se non li troviamo con dati

conclusione

SEGRETO

SEGRETÒ
ne, mediante la quale provvedere all'attività operativa e alla qualificazione di agenti destinati ad operazioni clandestine. In questa base operativa, il centro A.d.d. rientrato qui sopra, viene protetto da un sistema di sicurezza particolarmente vigile ed è provvisto di installazioni ed attrezzature destinate ad intervenire in caso di emergenza. Il completamento essenziale della base è il centro trasmissioni operativo (posto

A costruzione avvenuta, quest'ultimo sarà un impianto di primaria importanza.

Questa strumentazione dell'operazione "DAMOCLE" stanno a rispondere all'alto livello tecnico sul quale essa agisce.

Ritorna qui prossima rifiuta il fattore umano, sia per le dati che devono caratterizzare gli elementi direttivi dell'operazione, sia per il significato ideale che deve contenute nell'adesione al programma S/E della parte degli elementi operativi.

Nell'indicare le ragioni che hanno condotto alla realizzazione dell'operazione, si è fatto come sempre in una pagina precedente, al rilancio ruole che essa potrebbe giocare, sulle mani del D.M. della Difesa sul piano della guerra e di emergenza.

In effetti, l'operazione "DAMOCLE" contiene in se stessa, di fronte alla ultima situazione internazionale e per le eventualità di avvenimenti che dovessero compromettere l'integrità del nostro Paese, il seme della lotta sempre viva per la libertà e l'indipendenza.
FM 31-15
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL

PA 21, 165

OPERATIONS AGAINST IRREGULAR FORCES

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HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
MAY 1961

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# WASHINGTON 25, D.C., 31 May 1961

## OPERATIONS AGAINST IRREGULAR FORCES

### CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

#### Section I. General

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Purpose and scope</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terms</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic precepts</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Section II. Operational Environment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideological basis for resistance</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irregular force organization</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irregular force activities and tactics</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political factors</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographical factors</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship of forces</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### CHAPTER 2. CONCEPT AND CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

#### Section I. Command and Control

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active war</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold war situations</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Section II. Planning

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning factors</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Section III. Propaganda and Civic Action

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Propaganda</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic action</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Section IV. Police Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roadblocks</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search and seizure operations</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Block control</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Installation and community security</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security of surface lines of communication</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apprehended irregular force members</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Section V. Combat Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reaction operations</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harassing operations</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denial operations</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elimination operations</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat in urban areas</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### CHAPTER 3. ORGANIZATION AND EMPLOYMENT OF FORCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military forces</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil forces and local individuals</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This manual supersedes FM 31-15, 7 January 1953, including C 1, 5 November 1954.*

505302*—61—1
CHAPTER 4. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS

Section I. Intelligence

General ........................................ 32 36
Overt collection ................................ 33 38
Covert collection ............................ 34 38
Counterintelligence ........................ 35 38

II. Logistics

Supply and maintenance ...................... 36 39
Transportation ............................... 37 40
Evacuation and hospitalization .......... 38 41
Construction .................................. 39 42

III. Signal Communication

General ....................................... 40 42
Communication equipment ................. 41 43
Communication procedures ............... 42 43
Electronic countermeasures .............. 43 44

IV. Support by Other Services

Air Force support ............................. 44 44
Navy and Marine support ................. 45 45

CHAPTER 5. TRAINING

General ....................................... 46 46
Morale and psychological factors ....... 47 47
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Section 1. GENERAL

1. Purpose and Scope

a. This manual provides guidance to the commanders and staffs of combined arms forces which have a primary mission of eliminating irregular forces.

b. The text discusses the nature of irregular forces comprised of organized guerrilla units and underground elements, and their supporters; and the organization, training, tactics, techniques, and procedures to be employed by a combined arms force, normally in conjunction with civil agencies, to destroy large, well-organized irregular forces in active or cold war situations.

c. These operations may be required in situations wherein an irregular force either constitutes the only enemy, or threatens rear areas of regular military forces which are conducting conventional operations.

d. The material contained herein is applicable to both nuclear and nonnuclear warfare.

2. Terms

a. The term irregular, used in combinations such as irregular forces, irregular activities, and counterirregular operations, is used in the broad sense to refer to all types of nonconventional forces and operations. It includes guerrilla, partisan, insurgent, subversive, resistance, terrorist, revolutionary, and similar personnel, organizations and methods.

b. Irregular activities include acts of a military, political, psychological, and economic nature, conducted predominantly by inhabitants of a nation for the purpose of eliminating or weakening the authority of the local government or an occupying power, and using primarily irregular and informal groupings and measures.

3. Basic Precepts

a. An irregular force is the outward manifestation of a resistance movement against the local government by some portion of the population of an area. Therefore, the growth and continuation of an irregular force is dependent on support furnished by the population
even though the irregular force also receives support from an external power.

b. When an irregular force is in its formative stage it may be eliminated by the employment of civil law enforcement measures and removal of the factors which cause the resistance movement. Once formed, an irregular force is usually too strong to be eliminated by such measures. A stronger force, such as a military unit, can destroy the irregular force, but the resistance movement will, when convinced that it is militarily feasible to do so, reconstitute the irregular force unless the original causative factors are also removed or alleviated.

c. The ultimate objective of operations against an irregular force is to eliminate the irregular force and prevent its resurgence. To attain this objective the following tasks must be accomplished:

1. The establishment of an effective intelligence system to furnish detailed, accurate, and current knowledge of the irregular force.
2. The physical separation of guerrilla elements from each other, their support base in the local population, underground elements, and any sponsoring power.
3. The destruction of irregular force elements by the defection, surrender, capture, or death of individual members.
4. The provision of political, economic, and social necessities and the ideological reeducation of dissident elements of the population to prevent resurgence of the irregular force.

d. Principles of operation:

1. Direction of the military and civil effort at each level is vested in a single authority, either military or civil.
2. Military actions are conducted in consonance with specified civil rights, liberties, and objectives.
3. Operations are planned to be predominantly offensive operations.
4. Police, combat, and civic action operations are conducted simultaneously.
5. Task forces employed against guerrilla elements are organized to have a higher degree of aggressiveness and mobility than the guerrilla elements.

Section II. OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

4. Ideological Basis for Resistance

a. The fundamental cause of large-scale resistance movements stems from the dissatisfaction of some portion of the population, whether real, imagined, or incited, with the prevailing political, social, or economic conditions. This dissatisfaction is usually centered around a desire for one or more of the following:
(1) National independence.
(2) Relief from actual or alleged oppression.
(3) Elimination of foreign occupation or exploitation.
(4) Economic and social improvement.
(5) Elimination of corruption.
(6) Religious expression.

b. “In-country” factors may cause a resistance movement to form locally or a resistance movement may be inspired by “out-of-country” elements who create and sponsor such a movement as a means of promoting their own cause. Often, another country will lend support to a local resistance movement and attempt to control it to further its own aims.

c. Resistance movements begin to form when dissatisfaction occurs among strongly motivated individuals who cannot further their cause by peaceful and legal means. Under appropriate conditions, the attitudes and beliefs of these individuals, who are willing to risk their lives for their beliefs, spread to family groups and neighbors. The population of entire areas may soon evidence widespread discontent. When legal recourse is denied, discontent grows into disaffection and members of the population participate in irregular activities.

d. Small dissenting groups living and working within the established order gradually organize into underground elements that conduct covert irregular activities. As members of underground organizations are identified and as the spirit of resistance grows, overt guerrilla bands form in secure areas and become the military arm of the irregular force. Characteristically, the scope of irregular activities progress in this order: Passive objection, individual expression of opposition, minor sabotage, major sabotage, individual violent action, and organized group violent action.

e. Once individuals have participated in irregular activities, should there be any change of heart, they are usually forced to continue, either by pressure from their comrades or by being designated criminals by local authority.

5. Irregular Force Organization

a. The organization of irregular forces varies according to purpose, terrain, character and density of population, availability of food, medical supplies, arms and equipment, quality of leadership, amount and nature of external support and direction, and the countermeasures used against them. Units or elements may vary in size from a few saboteurs to organized paramilitary units of division size or larger with extensive support organizations.

b. A large irregular force normally consists of two organized elements: a guerrilla element which operates overtly, and an underground element which operates covertly. Members of large guerrilla units
are usually severed from their normal civilian pursuits while mem-
bers of small guerrilla bands may alternately be either guerrillas
or apparently peaceful citizens. Members of the underground usually
maintain their civilian pursuits. Both elements are usually supported
by individuals and small groups who may or may not be formal
members of either element but who furnish aid in intelligence, evasion
and escape, and supplies. Such supporters are often considered to
be a part of the underground. A given individual may be a member
of two or more organizations and may participate in many forms
of irregular activity.

c. The underground elements of an irregular force must conduct
the majority of their activities in a covert manner because of the coun-
termeasures used against them. They are usually found in all resist-
ance areas. Successful organizations are compartmented by cells for
security reasons. The cellular organization prevents one member,
upon capture, from compromising the entire organization (fig. 1).

d. Organized guerrilla units are usually found in areas where the
terrain minimizes the mobility, surveillance, and firepower advantage
of the opposing force. They vary from small groups who are lightly
armed, to large paramilitary units of division size or larger with exten-
tive support organizations (fig. 2). Large organizations normally
include elements for combat, assassination and terrorism, intelligence
and counterintelligence, civilian control, and supply. Guerrilla units
are composed of various categories of personnel. Members may in-
clude—

(1) Civilian volunteers and those impressed by coercion.
(2) Military leaders and specialists.
(3) Deserters.
(4) In time of active war, military individuals or small groups
such as those who have been cut off, deliberate stay-behinds,
escaped prisoners of war, and downed airmen.

6. Irregular Force Activities and Tactics

a. An irregular force presents an elusive target, since it will usually
disperse before superior opposition, and then reform to strike again.
However, as the guerrilla elements of an irregular force grow and
approach parity with regular units in organization, equipment, train-
ing, and leadership, their capabilities and tactics likewise change and
become similar to those of a regular unit.

(1) Overt irregular activities include—acts of destruction against
public and private property, transportation and communications systems; raids and ambushes against military and police
headquarters, garrisons, convoys, patrols, and depots; ter-
rorism by assassination, bombing, armed robbery, torture,
mutilation, and kidnaping; provocation of incidents, re-
Figure 1. Type underground organization.

1 Closely controlled psychological attack of the entire area.
2 Direct reporting to chief and council on directed assignments, usually high level agents.
FOX Cutouts. (Security measures which permit communication but prevent physical association.)

prisals, and holding of hostages; and denial activities, such as arson, flooding, demolition, use of chemical or biological agents, or other acts designed to prevent use of an installation, area, product, or facility.

(2) Covert irregular activities include—espionage, sabotage, dissemination of propaganda and rumors, delaying or misdirecting orders, issuing false or misleading orders or reports, assassination, extortion, blackmail, theft, counterfeiting, and identifying individuals for terrorist attack.
65 Percent of Regt HQ Personnel Armed

REGIMENT

Political Commissioner 1

Regimental Commander

Chief of Staff

Medical Group

Supply Group

Scouting and Intelligence

Communications

Personnel

Operations and Education

760 men

50 Percent of Bn HQ Personnel Armed

BATTALION

Battalion Chief

Political Commissioner 1

Deputy Battalion Chief

Machinegun Platoon

Intelligence Platoon

Medical Platoon

Service Squad

Secretary

180 men

75 Percent Armed

COMPANY

Company Chief

Deputy Chief Political Director 1

36 men

Secretary

Service Squad

Platoon

Medical Squad

Intel Squad

11 men

Squad

Figure 2. Type guerrilla organization.

1 Responsible for propaganda. All figures are representative.

LEGEND

Command

Political Control
b. Irregular force tactics vary; however, the following tactics are common to all irregular forces:

(1) Guerrilla tactics. The tactics used by the guerrilla are designed to weaken his enemy and to gain support of the population. Guerrilla tactics follow well-known precepts: If the enemy attacks, "disappear"; if he defends, "harass"; and if he withdraws or at any time he is vulnerable, "attack."

(a) Guerrilla tactics are primarily small unit, infantry-type tactics which make full use of accurate intelligence, detailed planning and rehearsal, simple techniques of maneuver, speed, surprise, infiltration, specialization in night operations, and the undermining of enemy morale. Speed is a relative thing and is usually accomplished by such actions as marching rapidly 2 or 3 nights to reach the area of attack. Surprise is gained by the combined elements of speed, secrecy, selection of unsuspected objectives, and deliberate deception. Infiltration is a basic tactic of successful guerrilla units and they quickly develop great skill in infiltrating areas occupied by military units. By specializing in night operations, a guerrilla force effectively reduces its vulnerability to air and artillery attack. Enemy morale is undermined by constant harassment, exhibition of a violent combative spirit, fanaticism, self-sacrifice, and extensive use of propaganda, threats, blackmail, and bribery.

(b) Artillery and armor are seldom available to guerrilla units. This frees the guerrilla force from extensive combat trains, permits excellent ground mobility in rugged terrain, and facilitates infiltration techniques. When artillery is available, individual pieces are usually emplaced at night, dug-in, and expertly camouflaged.

(c) When surrounded or cut off, guerrillas immediately attempt to break out by force at a single point or disband and exfiltrate individually. If both fail, individual guerrillas attempt to hide or mingle with the peaceful civilian population.

(d) Guerrilla base areas are carefully guarded by a warning net consisting of guerrillas and/or civilian supporters. Warning stations, which are relocated frequently, cover all avenues of approach into the guerrilla area.

(2) Underground element tactics. The tactics employed by underground elements are designed to gain the same results as guerrilla tactics.

(a) Underground organizations attempt, through nonviolent persuasion, to indoctrinate and gain the participation of
groups of the population who are easily deceived by promises and, through coercion by terror tactics, to force others to participate.

(b) Espionage and sabotage are common to all underground groups.

(c) Terroristic attack such as assassination and bombings are used to establish tension and reduce police or military control.

(d) Propaganda is disseminated by implanting rumors, distributing leaflets and placards, and when possible, by operating clandestine radio stations for broadcasting purposes.

(e) Agitation tactics include fostering of black markets, and promoting demonstrations, riots, strikes, and work slowdown.

(3) **Overt and covert activities.** Both overt and covert activities are employed in active war or occupation situations to intentionally draw off enemy combat troops from commitment to their primary mission.

7. **Political Factors**

   a. Operations against irregular forces are sensitive politically, particularly during cold war operations. The scope and nature of missions assigned and commanders' decisions will emphasize political aspects to a greater extent than in normal military operations.

   b. The presence of a foreign military force operating against irregular forces will invariably be exploited by hostile political propaganda.

8. **Geographical Factors**

   a. The vastness of an area over which such operations may be conducted can result in large areas which cannot be closely controlled. When such areas are sparsely populated or when they contain unfriendly elements of the population, they become likely areas for the development of a hostile resistance movement.

   b. Areas of rugged or inaccessible terrain, such as mountains, forests, jungles, and swamps, are extremely difficult to control, and the guerrilla elements of an irregular force are most likely to flourish in such areas.

9. **Relationship of Forces**

   a. Under the Geneva Conventions, as discussed in FM 27-10, "The Law of Land Warfare," a guerrilla may, in time of war, have legal status; when he is captured, he is entitled to the same treatment as a regular prisoner of war if he—
(1) Is commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates.
(2) Wears a fixed and distinctive sign recognizable at a distance.
(3) Carries arms openly.
(4) Conducts operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.

b. The underground elements of an irregular force normally do not hold legal status.

c. Groups of civilians that take up arms to resist an invader have the status of belligerents, but inhabitants of occupied territory who rise against the occupier are not entitled to belligerent status. However, the occupier has the responsibility of making his occupation actual and effective by preventing organized resistance, and promptly suppressing irregular activities. The law of land warfare further authorizes the occupier to demand and force compliance with countermeasures (FM 27-10).

d. Historically, legal status has been of little concern to members of an irregular force and has had little effect on their decision to participate in irregular activities.
CHAPTER 2
CONCEPT AND CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

Section 1. COMMAND AND CONTROL

10. Active War
   a. The measures which U.S. military commanders may take against irregular forces during hostilities and in occupied enemy territory are limited to those which are authorized by the laws of land warfare (FM 27-10).
   b. Army operations against irregular forces in a general or limited war will be conducted within the command structure established for the particular theater. The senior headquarters conducting the operation may be joint, combined, or uniservice. If an established communication zone exists, control of operations against an irregular force in this area will normally be a responsibility of the Theater Army Logistical Command or the appropriate section headquarters.
   c. Continuity of commanders and staff officers and retention of the same units within an area are desirable to permit commanders, staffs, and troops to become thoroughly acquainted with the terrain, the local population, the irregular force organization, and its techniques of operations.

11. Cold War Situations
   a. In liberated areas in which a friendly foreign government has been reestablished and in sovereign foreign countries in time of peace, the authority which U.S. military commanders may exercise against irregular forces is limited to that permitted by the provisions of agreements which are concluded with responsible authorities of the sovereign government concerned.
   b. The chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission in each country, as the representative of the President, is normally the channel of authority on foreign policy and the senior coordinator for the activities of all representatives of U.S. agencies and services in such a country. In some instances, diplomatic representation may not be present, or the relationship between the diplomatic representative and the military commander may be further delineated by executive order (fig. 3).
c. Uniservice headquarters, or joint or combined commands may control operations against irregular forces in a cold war situation. Participation by the host country is normal and usually makes a combined command mandatory.

d. Responsibility for civil control and administration is specified in agreements reached with the host country and usually is vested in the legally constituted government to the maximum extent possible. If the military force commander has been given civil responsibilities, agreements usually will state that full responsibility for liberated or secured areas be transferred to local authorities as soon as the military situation permits.
12. General

a. Operations against irregular forces are designed to establish control within the resistance area, eliminate the irregular force, and assist in the reconstruction, rehabilitation, and reeducation required to provide a suitable atmosphere for peaceful living. These goals are sought concurrently, but in specific instances priorities may be established. The specific actions required to attain each goal are often the same, and even when different, are usually planned and conducted concurrently.

b. Operations against irregular forces are planned according to these basic considerations.

(1) The majority of operations consist of small unit actions.

(2) Operations are primarily offensive in nature; once initiated, they are continued without halt to prevent irregular force reorganization and resupply. Lulls in irregular activities or failure to establish contact with hostile elements may reflect inadequate measures in the conduct of operations rather than complete success.

(3) Operations are designed to minimize the irregular force’s strengths and to exploit their weaknesses.

(a) The greatest strength of an irregular force lies in its inner political structure and identification with a popular cause, its ability to conceal itself within the civil population, the strong motivation of its members, and their knowledge of the resistance area.

(b) The greatest weakness of an irregular force lies in its dependence upon support by the civil population; its lack of a reliable supply system for food, arms, and ammunition; and its lack of transportation, trained leadership, and communications.

(4) The close relationship between the civil population and the irregular force may demand enforcement of stringent control measures. In some cases it may be necessary to relocate entire villages, or to move individuals from outlying areas into population centers. It may be necessary to relocate those who cannot be protected from guerrilla attack, and those who are hostile and can evade control.

c. Terrain and the dispositions and tactics of guerrilla forces usually limit the effectiveness of artillery. However, the demoralizing effect of artillery fire on guerrillas often justifies its use even though there is little possibility of inflicting material damage. Ingenuity and a departure from conventional concepts often make artillery support possible under the most adverse circumstances.
d. The rough terrain normally occupied by guerrilla forces often limits the use of armored vehicles. However, armored vehicles provide protected communications, effective mobile roadblocks, and convoy escort. Planning should therefore include the employment of armor whenever its use is feasible. When used against guerrillas, armored vehicles must be closely supported by infantry, as guerrillas are skilled at improvising antitank means and may be equipped with recoilless weapons and light rockets.

e. The helicopter has wide application when used against irregular forces, subject to the usual limitations of weather and visibility. Its capability for delivering troops, supplies, and suppressive fires, and its ability to fly at low speed, to land in a small clearing, and to hover make it highly useful.

f. Morale of forces engaged in operations against irregular forces presents some planning considerations not encountered in other types of combat. Operations against a force that seldom offers a target, disintegrates before opposition, and then re-forms and strikes again where it is least expected may induce strong feelings of futility among soldiers and dilute their sense of purpose.

g. Activities between adjacent commands must be coordinated to insure unity of effort. If a command in one area carries out vigorous operations while a neighboring command is passive, guerrilla elements will move into the quiet area until danger has passed. Underground elements will either remain quiet or transfer their efforts temporarily.

h. Definite responsibilities for the entire area of operations are specified, using clearly defined boundaries to subdivide the area. Boundaries should not prevent hot pursuit of irregular force elements into an adjacent area. Coordination should, however, be accomplished between affected commands at the earliest practicable opportunity. Boundaries should be well defined and should not bisect swamps, dense forests, mountain ridges, or other key terrain features used by guerrilla elements for camps, headquarters, or bases. Similarly, well-defined boundaries should be used to divide urban areas to insure complete coverage.

i. Terrain and the dispositions and tactics of guerrilla forces furnish excellent opportunity for the employment of chemical and biological agents and riot control agents. Operations against irregular forces should evaluate the feasibility of chemical and biological operations to assist in mission accomplishment.

13. Planning Factors

a. Planning for operations against irregular forces requires a detailed analysis of the area concerned and its population. Close attention is given to both the civil (political, economic, social) and the military situations.
b. The following specific factors are considered in the commander's estimate:

(1) The motivation and loyalties of various segments of the population, identification of hostile and friendly elements, vulnerability of friendly or potentially friendly elements to coercion by terror tactics, and susceptibility to enemy and friendly propaganda. Particular attention is given to the following:

(a) Farmers and other rural dwellers.
(b) Criminal and tough elements.
(c) Adherents to the political philosophy of the irregular force or to similar philosophies.
(d) Former members of armed forces.
(e) Existence of strong personalities capable of organizing an irregular force and their activities.

(2) The existing policies and directives regarding legal status and treatment of civil population and irregular force members.

(3) The terrain and weather to include—

(a) The suitability of terrain and road and trail net for both irregular force and friendly force operations.
(b) The location of all possible hideout areas for guerrillas.
(c) The location of possible drop zones and fields suitable for the operation of aircraft used in support of guerrilla units.

(4) The resources available to the irregular force, including—

(a) The capability of the area to furnish food.
(b) The capability of friendly forces to control the harvest, storage, and distribution of food.
(c) The availability of water and fuels.
(d) The availability of arms, ammunition, demolition materials, and other supplies.

(5) Irregular force relations with any external sponsoring power, including—

(a) Direction and coordination of irregular activities.
(b) Communication with the irregular force.
(c) Capability to deliver organizers and supplies by air, sea, and land.

(6) The extent of irregular force activities and the force organization to include—

(a) Their origin and development.
(b) Their strength and morale.
(c) The personality of the leaders.
(d) Relations with the civil population.
(e) Effectiveness of organization and unity of command.
(f) Status of equipment and supplies.
(g) Status of training.
(3) Danger of betrayal.
(2) Rivalry between irregular force leaders.
(1) Political, social, economic, and ideological differences among
leaders.

These are—

- Characterizations of hostile targets and audiences.
- Possible divisive factors.
- Friendly, economic, and political programs.
- Propaganda themes based on the recognizable aspects of
- Friendly elements of the civil population.
- The noncommitted civil population.
- Those civilians who provide information, supplies, refuge,
- Intelligence units.

These are—

- The population is divided into the target audience, the
- Desired long-term goals, and should where possible contribute to their
- Immediate goals, with a minimum of aid.
- Propaganda activities aimed at achieving the immediate goals
- At the national unit of display as desired.
- Propaganda activities aimed at achieving the immediate goals
- In popular approval of the local presence of friendly units.
- Preserved and strengthened the support of friendly civilians.
- In the ability to support noncommitted civilians.
- Support of noncommitted civilians.
- In support of the irregular force.
- Redesign of interference in support of guerrilla elements.
- Members.

The following immediate goals:

1. Propaganda

Section III. PROPAGANDA AND CIVIC ACTION
(4) Harsh living conditions of guerrilla elements.
(5) Scarcity of arms and supplies.
(6) Selfish motivation of opportunists and apparent supporters of the resistance movement.

e. Troop units of the TOE 33-series should be included in the friendly force structure on a selective basis. (See FM 33–5, Psychological Warfare Operations.)

15. Civic Action

a. Civic action is any action performed by the military force utilizing military manpower and material resources in cooperation with civil authorities, agencies, or groups, which is designed to secure the economic or social betterment of the civilian community. Civic action can be a major contributing factor to the development of favorable public opinion and in accomplishing the defeat of the irregular force. Military commanders are encouraged to participate in local civic action projects wherever such participation does not seriously detract from accomplishment of their primary mission. (See FM 41–5, Joint Manual of Civil Affairs/Military Government, and FM 41–10, Civil Affairs/Military Government Operations.)

b. Civic action can include assistance to the local population as construction or rehabilitation of transportation and communication means, schools, hospitals, and churches; assisting in agricultural improvement programs, crop planting, harvesting, or processing; and furnishing emergency food, clothing, and medical aid as in periods of natural disaster.

c. Civic action programs are often designed to employ the maximum number of civilians until suitable economy is established. The energies of civilians should be directed into constructive channels and toward ends which support the purpose of the campaign. Unemployed and discontented masses of people, lacking the bare necessities of life, are a constant hindrance and may preclude successful accomplishment of the mission.

d. Civic action is an instrument for fostering active civilian opposition to the irregular force and active participation in and support of operations. The processes for achieving an awareness in civilian populations of their obligation to support stated aims should begin early. Commanders should clearly indicate that civil assistance by the military unit is not simply a gift but is also action calculated to enhance the civilians' ability to support the government.

e. Civil affairs units of the TOE 41-series are employed to assist in the conduct of civic action projects and in the discharge of civil responsibilities.
Section IV. POLICE OPERATIONS

16. General

Commanders and troops will usually be required to deal with local civil authorities and indigenous military personnel. When the local civil government is ineffective, the military commander may play a major role in keeping order.

a. The activities and movements of the civil population are restricted and controlled, as necessary, to maintain law and order and to prevent a guerrilla force from mingling with and receiving support from the civil population. When the military commander is not authorized to exercise direct control of civilians, he must take every legitimate action to influence the appropriate authorities to institute necessary measures. Police-type operations may be conducted by either military or civil forces or a combination of both.

b. Restrictive measures are limited to those which are absolutely essential and can be enforced. Every effort is made to gain the willing cooperation of the local population to comply with controls and restrictions. However, established measures are enforced firmly and justly. Free movement of civilians is normally confined to their local communities. Exceptions should be made to permit securing food, attendance at public worship, and necessary travel in the event of illness.

c. Punishment of civilians, when authorized, must be used with realistic discretion. If the people become frustrated and alienated as a result of unjust punishment, the purpose is defeated. Care is taken to punish the true offender, since subversive acts are often committed to provoke unjust retaliation against individuals or communities cooperating with friendly forces.

d. Police operations employ roadblocks and patrol, search and seizure, surveillance, and apprehension techniques. The following list is representative of the police-type controls and restrictions which may be necessary.

1. Prevention of illegal political meetings or rallies.
2. Registration and documentation of all civilians.
3. Inspection of individual identification documents, permits, and passes.
4. Restrictions on public and private transportation and communication means.
5. Curfew.
6. Censorship.
7. Controls on the production, storage, and distribution of foodstuffs and protection of food-producing areas.
8. Controlled possession of arms, ammunition, demolitions, drugs, medicines, and money.
e. Patrolling is conducted to maintain surveillance of urban and rural areas, both night and day. Foot patrols are similar to normal police patrols, but are usually larger. Motor patrols are used to conserve troops and to afford speed in reacting to incidents. Aircraft are employed to maintain overall surveillance and to move patrols rapidly. Improvised landing pads such as roofs of buildings, parks, vacant lots, and streets are used. A patrol is a show of force and must always reflect high standards of precision and disciplined bearing. Its actions are rigidly controlled to preclude unfavorable incidents.

f. Surveillance of persons and places is accomplished, both night and day, by using a combination of the techniques employed by military and civil police and counterintelligence agencies. The majority of surveillance activities are clandestine in nature and may require more trained agent personnel than are normally assigned or attached to army units. Surveillance operations must be highly coordinated among all participating agencies.

g. Facilities for screening civilian and interrogating suspects are established and maintained. The requirements are similar to those for handling refugees, line crossers, and prisoners of war. Organization is on a team basis and normally consists of military and civil police, interpreter/translators, POW interrogators, and CI agents. Each team is capable of operating at temporary locations on an area basis to support operations against civil disturbances and large scale search and seizure operations.

17. Roadblocks

Roadblocks are employed to control illegal possession and movement of goods, to check the adequacy of other controls, and to apprehend members of the irregular force.

a. Roadblocks are designed to halt traffic for search or to pass traffic as desired. They are established as surprise checks because irregular force members and their sympathizers soon devise ways of circumventing permanent checkpoints.

b. Teams are trained and rehearsed so as to be capable of establishing roadblocks in a matter of minutes at any hour. Local officials may be called on for assistance, to include the use of official interpreters, translators, interrogators, and local women to search women and girls.

c. Roadblocks are established at locations which have suitable areas for assembling people under guard and for parking vehicles for search. Troops are concealed at the block and along the paths and roads leading to the block for the purpose of apprehending those attempting to avoid the block.

d. The inspection of documents and the search of persons and vehicles must be rapid and thorough. The attitude of personnel per-
forming these duties must be impersonal and correct because many of the people searched will be friendly or neutral.

3. The establishment of roadblocks must be coordinated, but knowledge of where and when must be closely controlled.

18. Search and Seizure Operations

Search and seizure operations are conducted to screen a built-up area, apprehend irregular force members, and uncover and seize illegal arms, communication means, medicines, and supplies. Search and seizure operations may be conducted at any hour of night or day.

a. A search and seizure operation is intended to be a controlled inconvenience to the population concerned. The persons whose property is searched and whose goods are seized should be irritated and frightened to such an extent that they will neither harbor irregular force members nor support them in the future. Conversely, the action must not be so harsh as to drive them to collaboration with the irregular force because of resentment.

b. A built-up area to be searched is divided into block square zones. A search party is assigned to each zone and each party is divided into three groups: a search group to conduct the search, a security group to encircle the area to prevent ingress/egress, apprehend and detain persons, and secure the open street areas to prevent all unauthorized movement; and a reserve group to assist as needed. The population may or may not be warned to clear the streets and to remain indoors until permission is given to leave. Force is used as needed to insure compliance. Each head of household or business is directed to assemble all persons in one room and then to accompany the search party to forestall charges of looting or vandalism.

c. Buildings which have been searched are clearly marked by a coded system to prevent false clearances.

19. Block Control

Block control is the constant surveillance and reporting of personnel movements within a block or other small populated area by a resident of that block or area who has been appointed and is supervised by an appropriate authority. Because of the civil authority and lengthy time required to establish a block control system, it is normally instituted and controlled by civil agencies. An established block control system should be supported by the military force, and in turn, be exploited for maximum benefit.

a. Block control is established by dividing each block or like area into zones, each of which includes all the buildings on one side of a street within a block. A resident zone leader is appointed for each zone, and a separate resident block leader is appointed for each block. Heads of households and businesses in each zone are required to report
all movements of people to the zone leader; to include arrivals and departures of their own families or employees, neighbors, and strangers. Zone leaders report all movements in their zone to the block leader. The block leader reports daily, to an appointed authority, on normal movements; the presence of strangers and other unusual circumstances are reported immediately.

b. The cooperation of leaders is secured by appealing to patriotic motives, by pay, or through coercion.

c. Informants are established separately within each block to submit reports as a check against the appointed block and zone leaders. An informant net system is established using key informants for the covert control of a number of block informants.

20. Installation and Community Security

Critical military and civil installations and key communities must be secured against sabotage and guerrilla attack.

a. Special attention is given to the security of food supplies, arms, ammunition, and other equipment of value to the irregular force. Maximum use is made of natural and manmade obstacles, alarms, illumination, electronic surveillance devices, and restricted areas. Fields of fire are cleared and field fortifications are constructed for guards and other local security forces. The local security system is supplemented by vigorous patrolling using varying schedules and routes. Patrolling distance from the installation or community is at least that of light mortar range. Specially trained dogs may be used with guards and patrols. As a defense against espionage and sabotage within installations, rigid security measures are enforced on native labor, to include screening, identification, and supervision. All security measures are maintained on a combat basis, and all personnel keep their weapons available for instant use. The routine means of securing an installation are altered frequently to prevent irregular forces from obtaining detailed accurate information about the composition and habits of the defense.

b. The size, organization, and equipment of local security forces are dictated by their mission, the size, composition, and effectiveness of the hostile force, and the attitude of the civil population. Security detachments in remote areas normally are larger than those close to supporting forces. Patrol requirements also influence the size of security detachments. Remote detachments maintain a supply level to meet the contingency of isolation from their base for long periods and should be independent of the local population for supply. Balanced against the desirability for self-sufficient detachments is the certainty that well-stocked remote outposts will be considered as prime targets for guerrilla forces as a source of arms and ammuni-
tion. Reliable communications between the responsible headquarters and security detachments are essential.

c. Outlying installations are organized and prepared for all-round defense. Adequate guards and patrols are used to prevent surprise. Precautions are taken to prevent guards from being surprised and overpowered before they can give the alarm. Concealed and covered approaches to the position are mined and boobytrapped, with due consideration for safety of the civil population. Areas from which short-range fire can be placed on the position are cleared and mined. Personnel are provided with auxiliary exits and covered routes from their shelters to combat positions. Buildings used for shelters are selected with care. Generally, wooden or other light structures are avoided. If they must be used, the walls are reinforced for protection against small-arms fire. Supplies are dispersed and placed in protected storage. Adequate protection is provided for communication installations and equipment. Individual alertness is maintained by frequent practice alerts which may include full scale rehearsal of defense plans. Local civilians, including children, are not permitted to enter the defensive positions. Civilian informants and observation and listening posts are established along routes of approach to the installations.

21. Security of Surface Lines of Communication

Surface lines of communication which have proved particularly vulnerable to guerrilla attack and sabotage should be abandoned, at least temporarily, if at all possible. Long surface lines of communication cannot be completely protected against a determined irregular force without committing an excessive number of troops. When a railroad, canal, pipeline, or highway must be utilized, the following measures may be required.

a. Regular defensive measures are taken to protect control and maintenance installations, repair and maintenance crews, and traffic. Vulnerable features such as major cuts in mountain passes, underpasses, tunnels, bridges, locks, pumping stations, water towers, power stations, and roundhouses require permanent guards or continuous surveillance of approaches. If necessary, the right-of-way of highways, railroads, canals, and pipelines are declared and posted as a restricted zone. The zone includes the area 300 meters on each side of the right-of-way. Civilian inhabitants are evacuated from the zone; underbrush is cleared and wooded areas are thinned to permit good visibility.

b. Frequent air and ground patrols are made at varying times, night and day, along the right-of-way and to the flanks, to discourage trespassing and to detect mines, sabotage, and hostile movements.
Armored vehicles, aircraft, and armored railroad cars are used by patrols when appropriate.

c. Lone vehicles, trains, and convoys which cannot provide their own security are grouped if practicable and are escorted through danger areas by armed security detachments. All traffic is controlled and reported from station to station.

22. Apprehended Irregular Force Members

a. Operations against irregular forces may generate sizable groups of prisoners which can create serious problems for both the military force and civil administration. Large numbers of confined personnel can generate further political, social, and economic difficulties. Therefore, the evaluation and disposition of prisoners must contribute to the ultimate objective.

b. When irregular force members defect or surrender voluntarily, they have indicated that their attitudes and beliefs have changed, at least in part, and that they will no longer participate in irregular activities.

(1) Confinement should be temporary, only for screening and processing, and be separate from prisoners who have not exhibited a change in attitude.

(2) Promises made to induce defection or surrender must be met.

(3) Postrelease supervision is essential but need not be stringent.

(4) Relocation may be required to prevent reprisal from former comrades.

c. When irregular force members are captured, they can be expected to retain the attitude which prompted their participation in irregular activities.

(1) Confinement is required and may continue for an extended period.

(2) Prisoners against whom specific crimes can be charged should be brought to justice immediately. Charges of crimes against persons, such as murder, should be made, if possible, rather than charges of crimes directly affiliated with the resistance movement which may result in martyrdom and serve as a rallying point for increased irregular activity.

(3) Prisoners charged only with being a member of the irregular force will require intensive reeducation and reorientation while confined. In time, consistent with security, those who have demonstrated a willingness to cooperate may be considered for release under parole. Relocation away from previous comrades may be necessary and provision of a means for earning a living must be considered.

(4) Families of prisoners may have no means of support and a program should be initiated to care for them, educate them
in the advantages of law and order, and enlist their aid in reshaping the attitudes and beliefs of their confined family members.

Section V. COMBAT OPERATIONS

23. General

a. Combat operations are employed primarily against the guerrilla elements of an irregular force. However, underground elements sometimes attempt to incite large-scale organized riots to seize and hold areas in cities and large towns; combat operations are usually required to quell such uprisings.

b. Combat tactics used against guerrillas are designed to seize the initiative and to ultimately destroy the guerrilla force. Defensive measures alone result in an ever-increasing commitment and dissipation of forces and give the guerrillas an opportunity to unify, train, and develop communications and logistical support. A defensive attitude also permits the guerrillas to concentrate superior forces, inflict severe casualties, and lower morale. However, the deliberate use of a defensive attitude in a local area as a deceptive measure may prove effective.

c. Constant pressure is maintained against guerrilla elements by vigorous combat patrolling and continuing attack until they are eliminated. This keeps the guerrillas on the move, disrupts their security and organization, separates them from their sources of support, weakens them physically, destroys their morale, and denies them the opportunity to conduct operations. Once contact is made with a guerrilla unit, it is maintained until that guerrilla unit is destroyed.

d. Surprise is sought in all operations, but against well-organized guerrillas it is difficult to achieve. Surprise may be gained by attacking at night, or in bad weather, or in difficult terrain; by employing small units; by varying operations in important particulars; and by unorthodox or unusual operations. Counterintelligence measures are exercised throughout planning, preparation, and execution of operations to prevent the guerrillas from learning the nature and scope of plans in advance. Lower echelons, upon receiving orders, are careful not to alter their dispositions and daily habits too suddenly. Tactical cover and deception plans are exposed to guerrilla intelligence to deceive the guerrillas as to the purpose of necessary preparations and movements.

e. The military force attacks targets such as guerrilla groups, camps, lines of communication, and supply sources. Unlike normal combat operations, the capture of ground contributes little to the attainment of the objective since, upon departure of friendly forces, the guerrillas will reform in the same area. Specific objectives are sought that
will force the guerrillas to concentrate defensively in unfavorable
terrain, and that will facilitate the surrender, capture, or death of
the maximum number of guerrillas.

f. Those guerrilla elements willing to fight in open battle are iso-
lated to prevent escape and immediately attacked. Guerrilla elements
which avoid open battle are forced into areas which permit contain-
ment. Once fixed in place, they are attacked and destroyed. Consider-
ation should be given to the employment of chemical agents to assist
in these actions.

g. When the guerrilla area is too large to be cleared simultaneously,
it is divided into subareas which are cleared individually in turn.
This technique requires the sealing off of the subarea in which the main
effort is concentrated to prevent escape of guerrilla groups. Once a
subarea is cleared, the main combat force moves to the next subarea
and repeats the process. Sufficient forces remain in the cleared area to
prevent the development of new guerrilla groups and to prevent the
infiltration of guerrillas from uncleared areas. Pending the concen-
tration of a main effort in a subarea, sufficient forces are employed to
gain and maintain contact with guerrilla units to harass them, and to
conduct reaction operations.

24. Reaction Operations

a. Reaction operations are those operations conducted by mobile
combat units, operating from static security posts and combat bases,
for the purpose of reacting to local guerrilla activities. When a guer-
rrilla unit is located, the reaction force deploys rapidly to engage the
guerrilla unit, disrupt its cohesion, and destroy it by capturing or kill-
ing its members. If the guerrilla force cannot be contained and de-
stroyed, contact is maintained, reinforcements are dispatched if
needed, and the guerrillas are pursued. Flank elements seek to en-
velop and cut off the retreating guerrillas. The guerrillas should be
prevented from reaching populated areas where they can lose their
identity among the people, and from disbanding and disappearing by
hiding and infiltration. When escape routes have been effectively
blocked, the attack is continued to destroy the guerrilla force. The
mobility required to envelop and block is provided by ground and air
vehicles and by rapid foot movement.

b. Reaction operations are simple, preplanned, and rehearsed be-
cause the majority of actions will be required at night. To gain this
end the area and possible targets for guerrilla attack must be known in
detail. Common targets include desolate stretches and important
junctions of roads and railroads, defiles, bridges, homes of important
persons, military and police installations, government buildings, pub-
lic utilities, public gathering places, and commercial establishments.
Primary and alternate points are predesignated for the release of re-
action forces from centralized control to facilitate movement against multiple targets. Such points are reconnoitered and are photographed for use in planning and in briefing. Within security limitations, actual release points are used during rehearsals to promote complete familiarity with the area.

25. Harassing Operations

a. Harassing operations prevent guerrillas from resting and regrouping, inflict casualties, and gain detailed knowledge of the terrain. They are executed by extended combat patrols and larger combat units. Specific harassing missions include—reconnaissance to locate guerrilla units and camps; raids against guerrilla camps, supply installations, patrols, and outposts; ambushes; marketing targets; assisting major combat forces sent to destroy guerrilla groups; and mining guerrilla routes of communication.

b. Harassing operations are conducted night and day. Operations at night are directed at guerrillas moving about on tactical and administrative missions. Operations during the day are directed at guerrillas in their encampments while resting, regrouping, or training.

26. Denial Operations

a. Operations to deny guerrilla elements contact with, and support by an external sponsoring power, are initiated simultaneously with other measures. Denial operations require effective measures to secure extensive border or seacoast areas and to preclude communications and supply operations between a sponsoring power and guerrilla units.

b. The method of contact and delivery of personnel, supplies, and equipment whether by air, water, or land must be determined at the earliest possible time. Border areas are secured by employing border control static security posts, reaction forces, ground and aerial observers, listening posts equipped with electronic devices, and patrols. When time and resources permit, wire and other obstacles, minefields, cleared areas, illumination, and extensive informant nets are established throughout the border area. Radio direction finding and jamming, and Navy or Air Force interdiction or blockade elements may be required.

27. Elimination Operations

a. Elimination operations are designed to destroy definitely located guerrilla forces. A force much larger than the guerrilla force is usually required. The subarea commander is normally designated as overall commander for the operation. The plan for the operation is carefully prepared, and the troops are thoroughly briefed and rehearsed. Approaches to the guerrilla area are carefully reconnoitered. Deception operations are conducted to prevent premature disclosure of the operation.
b. The encirclement of guerrilla forces is usually the most effective way to fix them in position so as to permit their complete destruction.

1. If terrain or inadequate forces preclude the effective encirclement of the entire guerrilla held area, then the most important part of the area is encircled. The encirclement is made in depth with adequate reserves and supporting elements to meet possible guerrilla attack in force and to block all avenues of escape.

2. The planning, preparation, and execution of the operation are aimed at sudden, complete encirclement that will totally surprise the guerrillas. The move into position and the encirclement is normally accomplished at night to permit maximum security and surprise. The encirclement should be completed by daybreak to permit good visibility for the remainder of the operation.

3. Support and reserve units are committed as required to insure sufficient density and depth of troops and to establish and maintain contact between units. Speed is emphasized throughout the early phases of the advance to the line of encirclement. Upon arriving on the line of encirclement, units occupy defensive positions. The most critical period in the operation is the occupation of the line of encirclement, especially if the operation is at night. Large guerrilla formations may be expected to react violently upon discovering that they have been encircled. The guerrillas will probe for gaps and attack weak points to force a gap. Escape routes may be deliberately established as ambushes.

4. Units organizing the line of encirclement deploy strong patrols to their front. Air reconnaissance is used to supplement ground reconnaissance. Reserves are committed if guerrilla forces succeed in breaking through or infiltrating the line of encirclement.

5. Once the encirclement is firmly established, the elimination of the guerrilla force is conducted methodically and thoroughly. A carefully controlled contraction of the perimeter is begun, which may be conducted in any one of three ways:

   (a) By a simultaneous, controlled contraction of the encirclement.

   (b) By driving a wedge through the guerrilla force to divide the area, followed by the destruction of the guerrillas in each subarea.

   (c) By establishing a holding force on one or more sides of the perimeter and tightening the others against them.
(6) During any of the foregoing maneuvers the units that advance from the initial line of encirclement must be impressed with the necessity of thoroughly combing every possible hiding place for guerrilla personnel and equipment. Successive echelons comb all the terrain again. Areas that appear totally inaccessible, such as swamps or marshes, must be thoroughly searched. Guerrilla ruses discovered during the operation are reported promptly to all participating units and agencies. All local individuals, including men, women, and children, found in the area are held in custody and are released only after identification and on orders from appropriate authority.

c. Lack of time, inadequate forces, or the terrain may prevent encirclement operations. Surprise attacks followed by aggressive pursuit may prove successful in these cases. The position, probable escape routes, and strength of the guerrilla forces must be ascertained before launching the operation. Ambushes should be established early on possible escape routes. Patrolling should be conducted in a manner designed to confuse the guerrillas as to specific plans or intentions. Chances of achieving surprise are increased by using airmobile or airborne forces, and by inducing trustworthy local guides who are thoroughly familiar with the terrain and guerrilla disposition to collaborate and guide the attacking force over concealed routes.

d. After a successful attack on a guerrilla formation, the area is combed for concealed guerrilla personnel and equipment. Documents and records are collected for intelligence analysis. Ambushes are retained along trails in the area for extended periods to kill or capture escapees and stragglers from the guerrilla force.

28. Combat in Urban Areas

a. Underground elements in cities and towns often incite organized rioting, seize blockwide areas, erect street barricades, and resist any attempts to enter the area. Nonparticipants caught in the area are usually held as hostages. The objectives of these operations are to commit the countering force to actions against the civil population which will result in a gain of sympathizers for the irregular force and make it appear that the irregular force is promoting a popular cause.

b. When an urban area has been seized it must be reduced as soon as possible to prevent an apparent success or victory by the irregular force, to maintain popular support for the friendly cause, and to free troops for use elsewhere. The operations required to reduce it resemble normal street and house-to-house fighting. The following tactics are employed:
(1) A cordon is established to surround and seal the barricaded area. The cordon is established at the next street or road, out from the barricaded area, which offers good visibility, fields of fire, and ease of movement. All unauthorized personnel are cleared from the intervening area. The cordon controls all movements into and out of the encircled area.

(2) Announcement is made to the insurgents by such means as loudspeakers and leaflets, that the area will be attacked at a given time unless they lay down their arms, return their hostages safely, and surrender peacefully. Amnesty and protection may be offered to those who surrender prior to the attack.

(3) Maneuver and fire elements attack at the stated time and clear the area as rapidly as possible, with a minimum of killing and destruction of property. The cordon remains in place to maintain security, support the attack by fire where possible, and receive prisoners and rescued hostages from the attacking elements.

(4) If the area is large it is divided into sectors for control purposes. As each sector is cleared, the cordon moves in to exclude it; close surveillance of cleared areas is maintained in case underground passageways are used as escape routes. Succeeding sectors are attacked and cleared one at a time (fig. 4).
Cordon and screening posts; one block out.
Crosshatch is barricaded area.
Lettered subsectors are reduced in turn.
High buildings (1 and 2) are seized first.

Figure 4. Reducing barricaded urban area.
CHAPTER 3
ORGANIZATION AND EMPLOYMENT OF FORCES

29. General

a. The operational area, military forces, civil forces, and the population must be organized to provide—
   (1) Military or civil area administration.
   (2) Static security posts and combat bases.
   (3) Security detachments for protecting critical military and civil installations, essential routes of communication, and key communities.
   (4) Task forces for conducting police operations against underground elements.
   (5) Task forces for conducting combat operations against guerrilla elements.
   (6) Civil self-defense units for protecting individual villages and small towns.

b. The operational area is subdivided into geographic sectors, or sectors coinciding with internal political subdivisions. Specific sector responsibility for administration and local operations should be arranged for delegation to a single authority—either military or civil.

c. Static security posts are established to protect installations, routes of communication, and communities; maintain control in rural areas; and as bases for local reaction operations. No attempt is made to cordon or cover an area with strong points as this immobilizes forces, surrenders the initiative to the irregular force, and invites defeat in detail. Static security posts are organized to be as self-sufficient as possible, reducing dependence on vulnerable land routes of communication.

d. Combat bases are established as needed to facilitate administration and support of company and battalion-size combat units. Combat bases are located within or are immediately adjacent to the units' area of operations and are placed within established static security posts when practicable. A combat base is moved as often as is necessary to remain within effective striking range of guerrilla elements. Air and ground vehicles are employed extensively for deployment and support of troops to reduce the number of required combat bases.

e. All static security posts and combat bases are organized as both tactical and administrative entities to facilitate local security, rapid assembly, administration, and discipline.
30. Military Forces

a. The initial force assigned to combat an irregular force must be adequate to complete their elimination. Initial assignment of insufficient forces may ultimately require use of a larger force than would have been required originally. The size and composition of the force will depend on the size of the area, the topography, the civilian attitude, and the hostile irregular force. Historically, required forces have ranged from a company to a large field army. Organization will usually require the forming of battalion or battle group size task forces which will be given an area responsibility (fig. 5).

![Figure 5. Type task force organization (battalion or battle group).]
b. Infantry, armored cavalry, and airborne units are the TOE units best suited for combat against guerrillas. However, many other military units, when reequipped and retrained, can be employed effectively.

c. In active war situations, combat units withdrawn from the line for rest and rehabilitation, or fresh units preparing for commitment should not be assigned a counterirregular force mission except in emergencies.

d. A mobile force is based at each static security post and combat base which is capable of rapidly engaging reported hostile elements or reinforcing other friendly forces. This force, called a "reaction force," ranges in size from a reinforced platoon to a reinforced company and is capable of rapid movement by foot, truck, or aircraft.

c. The extensive use of patrols is required to assist in local security of installations and to locate and keep the irregular force on the defensive.

(1) Patrols are used in urban and rural areas to augment or replace civil police and their functions. These patrols may vary from two men to a squad in size. Military police units are ideally suited for employment in such a role and light combat units are quite capable of performing the same functions with little additional training.

(2) Regular combat patrols are formed and employed in a conventional manner and for harassing operations in areas of extensive guerrilla activity.

(3) Extended combat patrols are employed in difficult terrain some distance from static security posts and combat bases. They are normally delivered into the objective area by aircraft. Extended combat patrols must be capable of employing guerrilla tactics and remaining committed from 1 to 2 weeks, being supplied by air for the period of commitment, and equipped to communicate with base, aircraft, and adjacent patrols. Such patrols may vary from squad to company in size and have the mission of conducting harassing operations and making planned searches of the area so that it leaves no secure areas in which guerrilla forces can rest, reorganize, and train. The effectiveness of an extended combat patrol may be increased immeasurably by appropriate civilian augmentation to include local guides, trackers, and representatives of the civil police or constabulary.

31. Civil Forces and Local Individuals

a. To minimize the requirement for military units, maximum assistance is sought from, and use is made of civil police, paramilitary units, and local individuals who are sympathetic to the friendly cause. The use and control of such forces is predicated upon national and local
policy agreements and suitable screening to satisfy security requirements. Careful evaluation is made of their capabilities and limitations so as to realize their full effectiveness.

b. When policy and the situation permit, local individuals of both sexes who have had experience or training as soldiers, police, or guerrillas, should be organized into auxiliary police, and village self-defense units. Those without such experience may be employed individually as laborers, informants, propaganda agents, guards, guides and trackers, interpreters and translators.

c. Civil forces will usually require assistance and support by the military force. Assistance is normally required in an advisory capacity for organization, training, and the planning of operations. Support is normally required in supplying arms, ammunition, food, transportation, and communication equipment.

d. Local and regional police are employed primarily to assist in establishing and maintaining order in urban areas. Local police are most effective in areas which are densely populated.

e. The local defense of communities against guerrilla raids for supplies and terrorist attack may be accomplished in whole, or in part, by organizing, equipping, and training self-defense units. Self-defense units are formed from the local inhabitants and organization is based on villages, counties, and provinces. A self-defense unit must be capable of repelling guerrilla attack or immediate reinforcement must be available to preclude loss of supplies and equipment to guerrillas.

f. Gendarmerie or other national paramilitary units are particularly effective in the establishment and maintenance of order in rural and remote areas. Because of their organization, training, and equipment, they may also be employed in small scale combat operations.

g. Friendly guerrilla units that have operated in the same area as the hostile guerrilla units are usually willing to assist in the counterguerrilla effort. Such units may be effectively employed in extended combat patrol harassing missions. In addition, members of friendly guerrilla units can serve as trackers, guides, interpreters, translators, and espionage agents, and can man observation posts and warning stations. When friendly guerrilla units are employed, they must be supported logistically and should be subordinate to the military force commander who maintains control and communication by furnishing a liaison party to remain with the friendly guerrilla force, and by controlling the support furnished. Special forces operational detachments are ideally suited for this purpose.
CHAPTER 4
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS

Section I. INTELLIGENCE

32. General

a. Accurate, detailed, and timely intelligence is mandatory for successful operations against irregular forces. The irregular force is normally ever changing, compartmented, and difficult to identify, and it usually conducts extremely effective intelligence and counterintelligence programs. In consequence, a larger number of intelligence and counterintelligence personnel are often needed than would be required for normal combat operations. The nature of the enemy, the tactical deployment of troops, and the presence of both friendly and hostile civilians in the area dictate modification of normal collection procedures.

b. Intelligence activities are characterized by extensive coordination with, and participation in police, detection, and penetration type operations such as—

(1) Search and seizure operations.
(2) Establishing and operating checkpoints and roadblocks.
(3) Documentation of civilians for identification with central files.
(4) Censorship.
(5) Physical and electronic surveillance of suspects and meeting places.
(6) Maintenance of extensive dossiers.
(7) Use of funds and supplies to obtain information.
(8) Intensive interrogation of captured guerrillas or underground suspects.

c. The conduct of intelligence operations of this nature requires an intimate knowledge of local customs, languages, cultural background, and personalities. Indigenous police, security, military and governmental organizations are usually the best available source of personnel having this knowledge. Individual civilian liaison personnel, interpreters, guides, trackers, and clandestine agents are normally required. Key personnel must be trained in the proper use of indigenous liaison personnel and interpreters. The loyalty and reliability of such persons must be firmly established and periodic checks made to guard against their subsequent defection.
d. Special effort is made to collect information that will lead to the
capture of irregular force leaders, since they play a vital part in main-
taining irregular force morale and effectiveness.

e. Only when the military forces' knowledge of the terrain begins to
approach that of the irregular force can it meet the guerrillas and the
underground on equal terms. Terrain information is continuously col-
lected and processed, and the resulting intelligence is promptly dis-
sseminated. Current topographic and photo maps are maintained and
reproduced. Terrain models are constructed and used to brief staffs
and troops. Military map coverage of the area will frequently be in-
adequate for small unit operations. Intelligence planning should pro-
vide for suitable substitutes such as large scale photo coverage. Part-
ticular effort is made to collect information of—

(1) Areas likely to serve as guerrilla hideouts. Such areas
usually have the following characteristics:
   (a) Difficulty of access, as in mountains, jungles, or marshes.
   (b) Concealment from air reconnaissance.
   (c) Covered withdrawal routes.
   (d) Located within 1 day's foot movement of small settle-
       ments that could provide food, intelligence, information,
       and warning.
   (e) Adequate water supply.
   (f) Adjacent to lucrative targets.

(2) Roads and trails approaching, traversing, and connecting sus-
ppected or known guerrilla areas.

(3) Roads and trails near friendly installations and lines of
    communications.

(4) Location of fords, bridges, and ferries across water barriers.

(5) Location of all small settlements and farms in or near sus-
pected guerrilla areas.

(6) When irregular force elements are known or suspected to
    have contact with an external power: location of areas suit-
    able for airdrop or landing zones, boat or submarine rendez-
    vous, and roads and trails leading into enemy-held or neutral
countries friendly to the irregular force.

f. Dossiers on leaders and other key members of the irregular force
should be maintained and carefully studied. Frequently the opera-
tions of certain of these individuals develop a pattern which, if rec-
ognized, may aid materially in the conduct of operations against
them. Efforts are made to obtain rosters and organization data of
irregular force elements. The names and locations of families, rela-
tives, and friends of known members are desired. These persons are
valuable as sources of information, and traps can be laid for other
members contacting them. In communities friendly to guerrillas,
some persons are usually engaged in collecting food and providing
other aid such as furnishing message drops and safe houses for guerrilla couriers. Every effort is made to discover and apprehend such persons; however, it may be preferable in certain cases to delay their arrest in order to watch their activities and learn the identity of their contacts. It is sometimes possible to recruit these persons as informants, thereby gaining valuable information concerning the irregular force organization and its communication system.

33. Overt Collection

a. A large part of the intelligence required for operations against irregular forces is provided by intelligence personnel, troop units, and special information services assisted by civilian agencies and individuals.

b. Reconnaissance and surveillance is an indispensable part of operations against the guerrilla elements. Great care must be exercised, however, so that such activities do not alert the guerrillas and warn them of planned operations. Reconnaissance missions, whenever possible, should be assigned to units with a routine mission which is habitually executed in the area and which they can continue at the same time in order not to arouse the suspicions of the guerrillas of forthcoming operations. Extensive use is made of aerial surveillance using all types of sensors, with means for speedy exploitation of the interpreted results of such coverage.

c. Every soldier is an intelligence agent and a counterintelligence agency when operating against an irregular force. Each man must be observant and alert to everything he sees and hears. He reports anything unusual which concerns the civil population and the irregular force, no matter how trivial.

34. Covert Collection

Covert collection means are a necessary source of information. Every effort is made to infiltrate the irregular force with friendly agents. Indigenous agents are usually the only individuals capable of infiltrating an irregular force. Such agents are carefully screened to insure that they are not double agents and that they will not relate information gained about friendly forces to the irregular force. The most intensive covert operations possible must be developed consistent with time, available means, and established policy. Agents are recruited among the local residents of the operational area. They have an intimate knowledge of the local populace, conditions, and terrain, and often have prior knowledge of, or connections with members of the irregular force.

35. Counterintelligence

a. Irregular forces depend primarily upon secrecy and surprise to compensate for the superior combat power available to the countering
military force. Since the degree of surprise achieved will depend largely on the effectiveness of the intelligence gained by the irregular force, intensive effort must be made to expose, thwart, destroy, or neutralize the irregular force intelligence system.

b. Counterintelligence measures may include—

1. Background investigation of personnel in sensitive assignments.
2. Screening of civilian personnel employed by the military.
3. Surveillance of known or suspected irregular force agents.
4. Censorship or suspension of civil communications.
5. Control of civilian movement as required.
6. Checks on the internal security of all installations.
7. Indoctrination of military personnel in all aspects of security.
8. The apprehension and reemployment of irregular force agents.

c. Counterintelligence operations are complicated by the degree of reliance which must be placed on local organizations and individuals, the difficulty in distinguishing between friendly and hostile members of the population, and political considerations which will frequently hinder proper counterintelligence operation.

Section II. LOGISTICS

36. Supply and Maintenance

a. Supply planning lacks valid experience data for the wide variety of environments in which these type operations may occur. Consumption factors, basic loads, stockage levels, and bases of issue must be adjusted to fit the area of operation. Similar factors must be developed for civil forces which may be supported in whole or part from military stocks. The possible need for special items of material must be taken into consideration early.

b. Local procurement should be practiced to reduce transportation requirements.

c. It frequently will be necessary to establish and maintain stockage levels of supply at echelons below those where such stockage is normally maintained. Static security posts and combat bases are examples of localities where stockage will be necessary on a continuing basis.

d. The military force must be prepared to provide essential items of supply to civilian victims of irregular force attack, isolated population centers, and groups which have been relocated or concentrated for security reasons. These supplies may initially be limited to class I
items and such other survival necessities as medical supplies, clothing, construction materials, and fuel.

e. Supervision of the distribution of indigenous supplies destined for civilian consumption is necessary. Assembly, storage, and issue of those items to be used by the civilian population which could be used by irregular forces must be strictly controlled. Local civilians are employed in these functions to the maximum extent possible, but in some situations all or part of the effort may fall on the military agencies. Civil affairs units are organized and trained for this purpose.

f. Security of supply installations is more critical than in normal combat operations. Not only must supplies be conserved for friendly consumption, but their use must be denied to irregular force elements. Supply personnel must be trained and equipped to protect supplies against irregular force attack, and guard against pilferage of supplies by the civilian population.

g. Preventive maintenance should receive emphasis because the very nature of operations precludes the use of elaborate maintenance support. Time is required before and after each mission to effect repair and replacement.

h. Direct support units (DSU), or elements thereof, must provide rapid maintenance support at each static security post and combat base. Although emphasis is upon repair by replacement (direct exchange), effort is made to repair items without complete overhaul or rebuild. Stockage of float items is planned to insure that only fast-moving, high-mortality, and combat essential items are stocked.

i. Emergency repair teams, elements of the DSU, are employed to meet special requirements usually experienced in reaction and harassing operations. DSU teams accompany the combat elements and provide on-the-spot minor repair and limited direct exchange.

37. Transportation

a. Special transportation problems result primarily from—

1. Abnormal distances between static security posts, combat bases, and combat units operating in the field.

2. Difficult terrain and lack of signal communications in underdeveloped areas where operations against guerrillas are apt to occur.

3. The probability that movements of troops and supplies will be subject to attack, harassment, and delay.

b. Organic transportation means may require augmentation from both military and local sources. Dependent upon the conditions under which the command is operating, provision of adequate transportation may require such measures as—rerecruiting indigenous bearer units for man pack operations, organizing provisional animal pack units, to include the necessary logistical support, and exploitation of available
waterways and indigenous land transportation to include railway and highway equipment.

c. Security will normally be provided all surface movements. Appropriate measures include—intensive combat training of drivers and the arming of vehicles involved, aircraft route reconnaissance, and provision of convoy escorts.

d. Aircraft will frequently be the most effective means of resupply because of their speed, relative security from ground attack, and lack of sensitivity to terrain conditions. Army aviation and aviation of other services are utilized. The terrain, tactical situation, and landing area availability may require employment of parachute delivery as well as air-landed delivery.

38. Evacuation and Hospitalization

a. Medical service organization and procedures will require adaptation to the type operations envisioned. Medical support is complicated by—

(1) The distances between the number of installations where support must be provided.

(2) The use of small mobile units in independent or semi-independent combat operations in areas through which ground evacuation may be impossible or from which aerial evacuation of patients cannot be accomplished.

(3) The vulnerability of ground evacuation routes to guerrilla ambush.

b. Measures that may overcome the complicating factors are—

(1) Establishment of aid stations with a treatment and holding capacity at lower echelons than is normal. Such echelons include static security posts and combat bases. Patients to be evacuated by ground transport will be held until movement by a secure means is possible.

(2) Provision of sufficient air or ground transportation to move medical elements rapidly to establish or reinforce existing treatment and holding installations where patients have been unexpectedly numerous.

(3) Maximum utilization of air evacuation. This includes both scheduled and on-call evacuation support of static installations and combat elements in the field.

(4) Provision of small medical elements to support extended combat patrols.

(5) Assignment of specially trained enlisted medical personnel who are capable of operating medical treatment facilities for short periods of time with a minimum of immediate supervision.

(6) Formation of indigenous litter bearer teams.
(7) Strict supervision of sanitation measures, maintenance of individual medical equipment, and advanced first aid training throughout the command.

(8) Increased emphasis on basic combat training of medical service personnel; arming of medical service personnel; and use of armored carriers for ground evacuation where feasible.

(9) Utilization of indigenous medical resources and capabilities when available and professionally acceptable.

39. Construction

a. The underdeveloped transportation system and the difficult terrain conditions normal to areas in which operations against irregular forces may be conducted will frequently require greater light construction than normal combat operations by a similar size command.

b. Construction planning should provide for—
   (1) Combat bases, static security posts and their defenses.
   (2) An adequate ground transportation system.
   (3) Extensive airstrips, airfields, and helicopter pads to support both Army aviation and aviation of other services.
   (4) Essential construction of resettlement areas.
   (5) Required support to the local population in civic action projects.

c. The scope of the construction effort requires maximum exploitation of local labor and materiel resources. Combat units also may be required to participate in the construction of facilities both for their own use and for use by the local population.

Section III. SIGNAL COMMUNICATION

40. General

a. The extreme dispersion of units in operations against irregular forces places a strain on communications means throughout a command. The distances to be covered are greater than the normal area communication responsibility. Augmentation by signal teams and equipment are invariably required to answer basic needs.

b. Radio communication is the primary means, and radio nets are established between all echelons and as needed between military and civil agencies. Ground-air radio communication is established for all airborne, airmobile, and air-supported ground operations.

c. Radio relay and retransmission stations are often required. Aircraft may be used effectively for temporary relay of radio traffic to support a specific short-term action. Ground relay stations must be protected against irregular force raids and sabotage and should be located when possible in areas or installations which are already secured so as to reduce the requirements for guards.
d. Wire communication is used to the maximum extent within secure areas and installations. However, wire communication in unsecured areas is extremely vulnerable to irregular force action and normally will be unreliable. When wire lines extend into unsecured areas and have to be employed, maintenance crews must be accompanied by security guards. A widely used guerrilla tactic is to cut lines and then booby trap the area or ambush the wire maintenance crew.

e. Visual means of communication can be employed effectively between small units to supplement radio communication and for ground-to-air signaling and marking. The use of flags, lights, smoke, pyrotechnics, heliographs, and panels finds considerable application in such operations.

f. Messenger service between installations or units is limited to air messenger service and motor messengers who travel with security guards or armed convoys. Individual messengers are prime targets for irregular force attack.

g. Police, public, and commercial facilities, and private radio stations and operators are utilized when possible within policy and security requirements.

h. Pigeons may be used to back up electrical means of communication and as a primary means by isolated individuals such as intelligence agents.

41. Communication Equipment

a. Additional radios are required in most situations to meet basic communication requirements. It is seldom that additional telephone, teletype, or facsimile means will be needed.

b. Additional requirements for equipment are determined based on the distances between units, terrain, and the operations plan as follows:

1. Short-range, portable FM radios for ground-to-ground and ground-to-Army aircraft communications.
2. Medium range, portable and mobile AM radios for ground-to-ground communication.
3. Short-range, portable AM-UHF radios for ground-to-Air Force or Navy aircraft communication.
4. Appropriate radio relay stations.
5. Signaling flags and lights.
6. Panel sets for ground-to-air signaling and marking.

42. Communication Procedures

a. Irregular forces normally possess neither the sophisticated equipment nor the training required to conduct communication intelligence operations or electronic countermeasures. Nonetheless, normal com-
munication security precautions must be practiced since an irregular force must be credited with the capability of tapping wire circuits, monitoring radio transmissions, and receiving information from a sponsoring power or a conventional enemy force that can conduct communication intelligence operations.

6. All communication facilities are considered important targets by irregular forces and must be protected from sabotage or guerrilla attack, both from within and without.

43. Electronic Countermeasures

Large, well-developed irregular forces normally depend on radio communication for communicating with a sponsoring power and for control and coordination between major elements. In addition, radios and radar beacons may be employed by an irregular force to communicate with and to guide resupply aircraft, boats, and submarines. Maximum effort is made to: Intercept transmissions for communication intelligence purposes, locate irregular force elements by direction finding, deceive or mislead by false transmissions, locate rendezvous points and drop or landing zones used for resupply missions, or jam their radio transmissions when desirable.

Section IV. SUPPORT BY OTHER SERVICES

44. Air Force Support

a. Air Force units can assist in the conduct of operations by preventing air delivery of leaders, couriers, equipment, and supplies by a sponsoring power; by aerial resupply and other logistic support functions; by delivering airborne forces to gain tactical surprise; and by conducting close air support, interdiction, air defense, and tactical air reconnaissance, as required.

b. Close air support and interdiction may be difficult to provide and of little value because of the guerrilla capability for dispersion, effective camouflage, moving and fighting at night, and his tactics of clinging to his enemy or of mingling with the populace. Satisfactory results can be achieved, however, when air support can react promptly and attack observed guerilla elements under the guidance of forward air controllers, either on the ground or airborne over the objective area.

c. Well developed guerrilla forces may have a limited air defense capability which when carefully concealed and moved often, can reduce the effectiveness of air support. Another possible capability of guerrillas is the use of deceptive radio navigation transmitters or other deception measures to misdirect aircraft. Because of such possibilities, intelligence reports are carefully screened for indications of changes in guerrilla capabilities.
45. **Navy and Marine Support**

*a. Navy Forces.* Navy forces can assist in operations against irregular forces by disrupting such irregular force supply channels as are maintained by coastal craft; by providing sea transport for rapid concentration of ground forces when opportunities are presented to attack guerrilla formations in areas contiguous to the sea; by shore bombardment to assist ground operations in areas adjacent to the sea; and by preventing the seaward escape of irregular force elements. Navy forces can also provide seaward resupply and other logistic support functions.

*b. Marine Forces.* Marine forces can assist in operations against irregular forces by conducting operations both on the ground and in the air in a manner similar to both Army and Air Force forces.
CHAPTER 5
TRAINING

46. General

a. All troops committed to operations against irregular forces must be trained to appreciate the effectiveness of irregular forces and the active and passive measures to be employed. Troops must be indoctrinated never to underrate guerrillas. To look down on guerrilla forces as inferior, poorly equipped opponents breeds carelessness which can result in severe losses.

b. Training for operations against irregular forces is integrated into field exercises and maneuvers as well as in individual and small unit training programs. Aggressor force tactics in training exercises should include irregular activities, both covert and overt. Normal individual and small unit training should emphasize—

(1) Physical conditioning.
(2) Tactics and techniques appropriate to urban areas, mountains, deserts, swamps, and jungles.
(3) Tactics and techniques of CBR warfare.
(4) Extended combat patrol operations utilizing only such supplies as can be transported by the patrol.
(5) Immediate reaction to unexpected combat situations.
(6) Employment of Army aviation, to include techniques of airmobile assault and casualty loading.
(7) Aerial resupply by Army and Air Force aircraft to include drop and landing zone marking and materiel recovery techniques.
(8) Night operations.
(9) Techniques of raids, ambushes, ruses, and defensive and security measures against these types of operations.
(10) Riot control to include employment of chemical agents.
(11) Police-type patrolling and the operation of roadblocks and checkpoints.
(12) Cross training on all communications equipment available within the type unit and in communication techniques.
(13) Cross training on all individual and crew served light weapons available within the type unit.
(14) Marksmanship.
(15) Target identification.

c. When the characteristics of the area of operations and the irregular forces are known, further specialized training is required in such specially applicable subjects as—

(1) The use of animal transport for weapons and logistical support.
(2) Movement techniques, fieldcraft, and improvisation for fighting and living in mountains, jungles, or swamps.
(3) Cold-weather movement including ski and sled operations.
(4) Utilization of water means to gain access into areas occupied by irregular forces.
(5) Survival techniques to include manner and technique of living off the land for short periods.
(6) Indoctrination in the ideological and political fallacies of the resistance movement.
(7) Cross-country movement at night and under adverse weather conditions to include tracking and land navigation.
(8) Police-type search-and-seizure techniques, counterintelligence, and interrogation measures.
(9) Convoy escort and security.
(10) Advanced first aid, personal hygiene, and field sanitation.
(11) Use and detection of mines, demolitions, and booby traps.
(12) Small-unit SOP immediate-action drills.

d. Prior to entry into an area of operations, all troops must receive an orientation on the nature of the terrain and climate, unusual health hazards, customs of the population, and their relations with the civil population.

e. Training for specific operations often requires detailed rehearsal. Rehearsals are conducted in a manner which will not compromise actual operations, but are conducted under like conditions of terrain and time of day or night.

47. Morale and Psychological Factors

a. Troops employed against irregular forces are subjected to morale and psychological pressures different from those normally present in regular combat operations. This is particularly true in cold war situations and results to a large degree from—

(1) The ingrained reluctance of the soldier to take repressive measures against women, children, and old men who usually are active in both overt and covert irregular activities or who must be resettled or concentrated for security reasons.
(2) The sympathy of some soldiers with certain stated objectives of the resistance movement such as relief from oppression.
(3) Fear of the irregular force due to reported or observed irregular force atrocities and conversely, the impulse to take vindictive retaliatory measures because of such atrocities.
(4) The characteristics of the operations to include—
(a) The difficulty in realizing or observing tangible results in arduous and often unexciting operations.
(b) The primitive living and operating conditions in difficult terrain.
(c) The long periods of inactivity which may occur when troops are assigned to static security duty.
(5) Inexperience in guerrilla and subversive tactics.
(6) Ingrained dislike of clandestine and police-type work.
b. Soldiers who are untrained in such operations are prone to bewilderment when faced by irregular force tactics and the intense political and ideological feelings of guerrillas.

c. Commanders at all echelons must carry out, on a continuing basis, an indoctrination, education, and training program which will effectively offset these morale and psychological pressures. In addition, the training program must insure that troops impress the local populace with their soldierly ability, courtesy, and the neatness, efficiency, and security of their person, camps and installations.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

G. H. DECKER,
General, United States Army,
Chief of Staff.

Official:

R. V. LEE,
Major General, United States Army,
The Adjutant General.

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<td>VCofSA (2)</td>
<td>CMH (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCSPER (5)</td>
<td>USASA (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACSI (5)</td>
<td>Tech Stf, DA (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DGSO (5)</td>
<td>Adm &amp; Tech Stf Bd (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSCLOG (5)</td>
<td>ARADCOM (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACSRC (2)</td>
<td>MDW (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUSARROTC (2)</td>
<td>Seventh US Army (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CofF (2)</td>
<td>EUSA (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoA (2)</td>
<td>Corps (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRD (2)</td>
<td>Div (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNGB (2)</td>
<td>Bde (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA (2)</td>
<td>Bg (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TJAG (2)</td>
<td>Bn (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAG (2)</td>
<td>Co/Btry (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIG (2)</td>
<td>USAINTS (223)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CofCh (2)</td>
<td>USASWS (250)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINFO (2)</td>
<td>USACGSC (1200)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NG: State AG (3); units—same as Active Army except allowance is one copy for each unit.

USAR: Units—same as Active Army.

For explanation of abbreviations used, see AR 320-50.

Leider haben es Texte dieser Art so sich, nicht leicht verständlich zu sein. Veränderungen bleiben auch hier nicht aus.


Streng Geheim

FM 30–31

Anhang B zu FM 30–31

Headquarters
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C.
18. Mäerz 1970

Kapitel 1. Einführung

Kapitel 2. Hintergrund

Allgemeines
Notwendigkeit politischer Flexibilität
Charakteristische Schwachstellen innerhalb der Regierungen der Gastländer

Kapitel 3. Aufgaben des US-Militärgeneldienstes

Identifizierung besonderer Zielgruppen
Erkennen der Schwachstellen im Gastland
Eingreifen des US-Militärgeneldienstes
Kapitel 4. Leitlinien des Geheimdienstes

Allgemeines
Agentenrekrutierung
Unterstützung durch US-Bürger im Ausland
Unterwanderung der Rebellenbewegung
Agenten für Spezialleinsätze
Vorteile des US-Militärgeheimdienstes

Verteilung

Kapitel 1.

Einleitung.


Mit dem Begriff »Gastland-Geheimdienst« kann innerhalb dieser Ergänzung und gemäß dem Kontext folgendes gemeint sein:


b. Das Militär des Gastlandes im allgemeinen.

c. Weitere Organisationen des Gastlandes, z. B. die Polizei oder andere zivile Sicherheitsdienste, nationale und lokale Verwaltungsgremien sowie Propagandaorganisationen.


Die Verteilung dieser Ergänzung ist streng auf die Verteilerlisten beschränkt. Ihr Inhalts darf auf Geheim gehalten werden, wenn diese aufgrund ihrer Stellung und ihrer Einfluss auf das Gelingen der Operation einwirken können. Wann immer sich die Möglichkeit bietet, sollten detaillierte Anweisungen auf Basis dieser Ergänzung mündlich weitergegeben werden, wobei der extrem hohe Grad der Geheimhaltung betont werden muss.

Kapitel 2.

Hintergrund

1. Allgemeines

Wie in FM 30–31 angedeutet, haben jüngere Aufstände entweder in Entwicklungsländern oder in jungen Nationen stattgefunden, die vornehmlichen Kolonien waren.

2. Notwendigkeit politischer Flexibilität

Aus verschiedenen Gründen sind weder das US-amerikanische Militär noch andere US-Geheimdienste unwiderruflich dazu verpflichtet, irgendeine Regierung des Gastlandes zu unterstützen:

a. Eine von den USA unterstützte Regierung kann im Kampf gegen einen kommunistischen oder kommunistisch inspirierten Aufstand aufgrund zuständigen Willens oder fehlender Durchschlagskraft Schwächen zeigen.
b. Sie kann sich selbst aufgrund der Nichtbeachtung grundlegender nationaler Strukturen kompromittieren.
c. Sie kann sich zu extrem nationalistischen Verhaltensweisen hinreissen lassen, die mit den US-amerikanischen Interessen unvereinbar sind oder ihnen schaden.


Während gemeinsame Maßnahmen zur Niederlage eines Aufstands grundlegend und bevorzugt im Namen von Freiheit, Gerechtigkeit und Demokratie durchgeführt werden, behält sich die US-Regierung einen breiten Ermessensspielraum, um zu entscheiden, welches Regime ihre volle Unterstützung verdient.

Nur wenige unterentwickelten Länder bieten einen fruchtbaren Grund für Demokratie im westlichen Sinne. Unter Einfluß der Regierung, also durch Überzeugung oder schwächeren Eingriff, müssen umfassende Wahlen vorgenommen werden, deren autonome Führungstraditionen mit tief verwurzelt, daß sich der Wille des Volkes nur schwer auszumachen läßt.


3. Charakteristische Schwachstellen innerhalb der Regierungen der Gastländer

Soweit die US-Politik bemoost ist, muß die Aufmerksamkeit aufgrund der oben genannten Gesichtspunkte auf bestimmte Schwachstellen gerichtet werden, die den meisten unterentwickelten Nationen innewohnen:

a. Als Konsequenz ihrer unterentwickelten Status, ihrer jüngeren Ursprünge oder von beiden zeigten Regime, die von Aufständen bedroht werden, gewöhnlich Symptome der Zerwürfnung und Instabilität. Ihre politischen Führer sind häufig untereinander, stehen in offensiver Widerspruch zueinander und sind korrupt. Führer mit außergewöhnlichen Qualitäten sehen sich häufig mit einem den modernen Ansprüchen angemessen angepaßten so wie mit effizientem und unverzüglichem Personal bestehenden Regierungssystem konfrontiert, was ihre Amtserfüllung oft zunichte macht.

b. Diese Schwächen bieten Möglichkeiten zur weitläufigen Konkurrenz zwischen Regierungsratsen im Geheimdienst und dem Ausland. Im Anblick der chronischen Instabilität, dieser Regime ist unter drängender, die sie unterstützten, der Wunsch nach einer Abweichung gegen einen möglicherweise totalen oder teilweise Sieg der Rebellion weit verbreitet.

Das Interesse der amerikanischen Armeen am Militär des Gastlandes ist nicht auf deren Professionalität ausgerichtet, sondern hat weitaus größere politische Bedeutung. In den meisten Ländern, in der Entwicklung begriffenen Nationen spielt das Militär eine wichtige politische Rolle, deren Bedeutung zunimmt, sobald sich ein Regime mit einem bewaffneten Aufstand konfrontiert sieht, der militärische Gegenmaßnahmen erfordert macht.

3. Kapitel
Aufgaben des US-Militärgeheimdienstes
4. Identifizierung besonderer Zielgruppen

Besondere Zielgruppen innerhalb des Militärs des Gastlandes stellen Mitarbeiter in besonders Positionen dar, z. B:
   c. Lokale Einheiten, mit denen der US-Militärgeheimdienst weder in direkten noch indirekten Kontakt steht und die daher besonders anfällig für die politische Einflussnahme lokaler aufständischer Kräfte sind.
   d. Mobile Einheiten, wie etwa Spezialeinheiten in Langstrecken-Aufklärungspatrouillen, die in Gebieten operieren, die teilweise oder nur zeitweise unter der Kontrolle des Aufständischen sind, und die daher ebenso leicht von solchen Einflüssen betroffen sind.


Operationen des US-Militärgeheimdienstes, die auf die oben genannten Zielgruppen ausgerichtet sind, verfolgen unterschiedliche Absichten:
   b. Sie sollen verhindern, daß Angehörige des Gastland-Militärs versuchen, ihre eigene Zukunft zu sichern, indem sie aktive oder passive Kontakte zu den Aufständischen knüpfen.
   c. Sie sollen Korruption und Ineffizienz innerhalb des Gastland-Militärs auf ein tragbares Maß reduzieren.
   d. Sie sollen zur Förderung von Offizieren im Gastland-Militär beitragen, die den USA gegenüber nachsichtig, loyal sind.
Um diese Ziele erreichen zu können, müssen die frühzeitige Erkennung von Schwachstellen in Gastland-Geheimdiensten sowie Möglichkeiten eines rechtzeitigen Eingreifens des US-Militärgeheimdienstes gewährleistet sein.

5. Erkennen von Schwachstellen im Gastland

Zu den Symptomen, die Schwachstellen in Gastland-Geheimdiensten anzeigen und deren Untersuchung und Erkennung sowie das Eingreifen des US-Militärgeheimdienstes erforderlich machen, zählen folgende:


c. Blutsverwandtschaft, die Angehörige der Regierung des Gastlandes mit den Auständischen verbindet. Es ist eine tiefe Praxis innerhalb der Familie, ihre Loyalität vorsätzlich auf die Regierung und die Auständischen zu vertiefen, so daß sie, egal welche Seite gewinnt, immer Kontakt zum richtigen politischen Lager hält. Diese Blutsbrüder spielen gerade unter Polizeieinheiten eine wichtige Rolle, die häufig in den eigenen Wohngebieten eingesetzt und daher dem Druck durch ihre Familien und Freunde besonders ausgesetzt sind.

d. Korruption, die den einzelnen dem Druck aufständischer Elemente aussetzt und, wenn sie übersteht nimmt, das öffentliche Vertrauen in die Regierung unterminiert, was wiederum der Ausbreitung der Rebellion zuarbeitet.

e. Ineffizienz, die ab einem bestimmten Maß den gewohnten Handlungsablauf darunter beeinflußt, daß sie in gewissem Weise direkt dem Feind zurückspringt. Auch hierdurch können Sympathien für den Aufstand entstehen. Dies ist eine wohlbekannte Form regierungsinterner Sabotage, die sich relativ einfach durchführen und, wenn überhaupt, nur sehr schwer nachweisen läßt.


Der US-Militärgeheimdienst muß darauf vorbereitet sein, entsprechende Maßnahmen vorzuschlagen, für den Fall, daß die Symptome der Schwachstellen lange genug existieren, um wirksamen Schaden anzurichten. Solche Maßnahmen können sich gegen einzelne Personen richten oder darauf ausgerichtet sein, Druck auf Gruppen, Organisationen und, in letzter Instanz, auf die Regierung des Gastlandes auszuüben.


Dieser Konfliktbereich entsteht meistens dann, wenn sich Strafmaßnahmen gegen einzelne richten, die durch persönliche, politische oder bürokratische Verleihungen geschützt sind.

Handlungen, die darauf ausgerichtet sind, Geheimdienste des Gastlandes oder sogar die Regierung selbst zu brechen oder unter Druck zu setzen, setzen voraus, daß die Interessen der USA gefährdet sind. Der Situation angemessene Maßnahmen können offiziell oder inoffiziell erfolgen.


4. Kapitel

Leitlinien des Geheimdienstes

7. Allgemeines

Der Erfolg innerer Stabilisierungsprozesse, die im Rahmen innerer Verteidigungsstrategien durch den US-Militärgeheimdienst geformt werden, hängt zu großen Teilen vom gegenwärtigen Ver-
rändnis des US-Personals und des Personals der Geheimdienste des Gastlandes ab.


Das Anwerben führender Mitarbeiter der Gastland-Geheimdienste als Langzeit-Agenten ist daher besonders wichtig.

8. Agentenrekrutierung


Hinsichtlich der Anwerbung von Langzeit-Agenten verdienen Angehörige folgender Kategorien besondere Beachtung:

a. Offiziere, die aus Familien stammen, die seit langem wirtschaftliche und kulturelle Beziehungen mit den Vereinigten Staaten und ihren Alliierten pflegen.

b. Offiziere, die Gelegenheit hatten, sich mit US-militärischer Trainingsschulen vertraut zu machen, insbesondere diejenigen, die in den Vereinigten Staaten selbst ausgebildet wurden.

c. Offiziere, die für bestimmte Posten im Übersee-Gastland-Geheimdienst ausgewählt wurden. Ihnen gebührt besondere, wenn nicht exklusive Beachtung.


Fragen bezüglich der Anwerbung werden in FM 30-31A ausführlicher behandelt, worin die allgemeine Doktrin zur Handhabung der Agententätigkeit (HUMINT) dargestellt und ausgeführt ist. Die dort beschriebenen Direktiven sollten bei Rekrutierungsmaßnahmen hinzugezogen werden, welche die Beteiligung von Geheimdiensten vorsehen, die der Regierung des Gastlandes nahestehen.

9. Unterstützung durch US-Bürger im Ausland


10. Unterwanderung der Rebellenbewegung

In FM 30-31 wurde die Notwendigkeit betont, daß Geheimdienste des Gastlandes die aufstrebende Bewegung im Hinblick auf eine erfolgreiche Gegenbewegung durch die Einschleusung von Agenten unterstützen. Es wurde deutlich gemacht, daß die Gefahr besteht, daß auf Seiten der Aufständischen stehende Agenten die großen Organisationen des Gastlandes, staatliche Behörden, die Polizei und Einheiten des militärischen Geheimdienstes mit der Absicht infiltrieren, geheime Informationen zu sammeln. Ebenso wurde klar herausgearbeitet, daß, wenn die Geheimdienste der Gastländer nur mangelnde Informationen über pro-rebellische Agenten in Bereichen, in denen deren Tätigkeit bekannt ist, benutzen, dies ein Hinweis sein kann, daß es diesen Agenten be-
sein erfolgreich gelungen ist, die Geheimdienste des Gastlandes zu unterwandern. Sie befinden sich somit in der Position, Schritte der Regierung vorwegzunehmen.

In diesem Zusammenhang sollte der US-Militärgeheimdienst zwei grundsätzliche Aktionsebenen verfolgen:
a. Er sollte dahingehend arbeiten, die Agenten zu identifizieren, die durch Geheimdienste des Gastlandes, die für die interne Sicherheit zuständig sind, in die außerdienstliche Bewegung eingeschleust wurden, um die Arbeit dieser Agenten der geheimen Kontrolle durch den US-Militärgeheimdienst zu unterstellen. (Die Vorgangsweise wird in diesen Fällen von den vorherrschenden Gegebenheiten im jeweiligen Land abhängig sein.)

11. Agenten für Spezialeinsätze


In Fällen, in denen ein erfolgreiches Einschleusen solcher Agenten in die Führungsschicht der Rebellen nicht durchgeführt werden konnte, kann es, um die oben genannten Ziele zu erreichen, hilfreich sein, die Mitarbeit externer Linkskommunistischer Organisationen für die eigenen Zwecke zu nutzen.


In FM 30-31 wurde erwähnt, dass die Einrichtung von National Internal Defense Coordination Centers (NIDCC) und Area Coordination Centers (ACC) erstrebenswert ist, um Geheimdienstarbeit, Administration und Logistik in das gemeinsame Bemühen zu integrieren, eine Problemsammlung bezüglich der Rebellion zu erreichen.

nen US-Personal, das den NIDCC oder den ACC angeschlossen ist, befindet sich in gleitiger Position, seine Aufmerksamkeit auf die Gesamtorganisation des Militärs im Gastland zu richten, was sowohl Militäroperationen, die Administration, die Logistik als auch den Geheimdienst umfasst.


Auf Anweisung des Militärbeauftragten:

W. C. Westmoreland
Für die Richtigkeit: General, United States Army
Kenneth C. Wickham Chief of Staff
Major General, United States Army
The Adjutant General

Verteiler: S. S. 13

# Stability Operations

## Intelligence - Special Fields

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Introduction</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 2</td>
<td>Overview</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3</td>
<td>U.S. Army Intelligence Tasks</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 4</td>
<td>Intelligence Guidance</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Chapter 2
- General
- Need for Political Flexibility
- Characteristic Vulnerabilities of HC Regimes

### Chapter 3
- Identification of Special Targets
- Recognition of HC Vulnerabilities
- U.S. Army Intelligence Action

### Chapter 4
- General
- Recruitment for Intelligence Purposes
- Assistance from U.S. Citizens Abroad
- Penetration of the Insurgent Movement
- Agents on Special Operations
- U.S. Army Intelligence Advantages

**Distribution List**

**GROUP II**
Excluded from Automatic Distribution
TOP SECRET

FM 30-31B

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

This TOP SECRET classified supplement FM 30-31B, owing to its specially
sensitive nature, is not a standard issue in the FM series.

FM 30-31 provided guidance on doctrine, tactics and techniques for intelligence
support of U.S. Army stability operations in the internal defense environment.
As it was intended for wide distribution, its contents were limited to
matters directly concerned with counterinsurgency and with joint U.S. and host
country (HC) operations to secure stability.

FM 30-31B, on the other hand, considers HC agencies themselves as targets
for U.S. Army intelligence. It does not repeat the general intelligence guidance
laid down in other documents, such as FM 30-31 and FM 30-31A. Its aim is limited
to stressing the importance of HC agencies as a special field for intelligence
operations and to indicating certain directions in which the procurement of
information about the host country, in a manner more general than that required by
straightforward counterinsurgency, may advance overall U.S. interests.

Operations in this special field are to be regarded as strictly clandestine, since the acknowledged involvement of the U.S. Army in HC affairs is
restricted to the area of cooperation against insurgency or threats of insurgence.
The fact that U.S. Army involvement goes deeper can in no circumstances
be acknowledged.

The use of the term "HC agencies" in this supplement may be taken to mean,
according to context:

1. The HC organization for internal defense operations.
2. The HC armed forces generally.
3. HC agencies other than the armed forces, e.g., the police and other
civilian security agencies, national and local administrative bodies, pro-
progressive organizations.

In other words, U.S. Army intelligence has a wide-ranging role in assisting
to determine the precise counterinsurgency potential of the host country
in all its aspects and the relation of that potential to U.S. policy. In pursuing
its more specialized military objectives, it should not neglect the wider
aspects of U.S. interests wherever opportunity offers to further them.
Distribution of this supplement is strictly limited to the addresses shown on the distribution list. Its substance may be transmitted further to those selected at the discretion of the addressees as being well suited and well placed to contribute to the end in view. Whenever possible, detailed instructions issued on the basis of this supplement should be passed on verbally, with strong emphasis on the particular sensitivity of this whole field of action.
CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND

1. General

As indicated in FM 30-31, most recent insurrections have taken place in developing nations or in nations newly emerged from former colonies.

U.S. involvement in these less-developed nations threatened by insurgency is part of the worldwide U.S. involvement in the struggle against Communism. Insurgency may have other than Communist origins, in tribal, racial, religious, or regional differences. But, whatever its source, the fact of insurgency offers opportunities for Communist infiltration which, in the absence of effective counterreasures, may culminate in a successful Communist takeover. Therefore, the criterion determining the nature and degree of U.S. involvement is the political stance of the NC government in relation to Communism on the one hand and to U.S. interests on the other.

2. Need for Political Flexibility

The U.S. Army, in line with other U.S. agencies, is not committed irrevocably to the support of any particular government in the host country for a variety of reasons:

a. A government enjoying U.S. support may weaken in the war against Communist or Communist-inspired insurgency through lack of will or lack of power.

b. It may compromise itself by failing to reflect the interests of important sections of the nation.

c. It may drift into extreme nationalist attitudes which are incompatible with or hostile to U.S. interests.

Such factors may create a situation in which U.S. interests require changes of government...direction enabling the host country to obtain more constructive benefit from U.S. assistance and guidance.

While joint counterinsurgency operations are usually and properly conducted in the name of freedom, justice, and democracy, the U.S. government sometimes finds itself with some flexibility in determining the nature of a regime deserving its full support.
Few of the less-developed nations provide fertile soil for democracy in any meaningful sense. Government influence, persuasive or brutal, is brought to bear on elections at all levels; traditions of autocratic rule are so deeply rooted that there is often little popular will to be ascertained.

Nevertheless, U.S. concern for world opinion is better satisfied if regimes enjoying U.S. support observe democratic processes, or at least maintain a democratic facade. Therefore, a democratic structure is to be welcomed always subject to the essential test that it satisfies the requirements of an anti-Communist posture. If it does not satisfy those requirements, serious attention must be given to possible modifications of the structure.

3. Characteristic Vulnerabilities of LC Regimes

In the light of the above considerations affecting U.S. policy, attention must be drawn to certain vulnerabilities inherent in the nature of LC regimes in the less-developed nations:

a. In consequence of their backwardness or recent origin or both, the regimes against which insurrection is directed usually suffer from inefficiency and instability. Their leading political figures are often inexperienced, politically inarticulate, and corrupt. When leaders of exceptional stature emerge, their efforts are often frustrated by government machinery ill-adapted to meet conditions and manned by inefficient and underpaid personnel.

b. These weaknesses give rise to a wide area of possible contacts between employees of government agencies and the insurrection. Having regard to the chronic instability of the regime, the desire for reinsurance among their supporters against possible total or partial victory for the insurgency is widespread.

c. In most cases of internal conflict in the less-developed nations, there exists a propensity of nationalist-minded, but the often insular nature and relatively few contacts of U.S. support gives the insurgency much propaganda advantage by laying the regime open to charges of parsimony. Its first-rate consequence is a growth of anti-American feeling among both the public in general and employees of the regime including the armed forces. Whether the armed forces are subversive to the regime or dominate it, they usually reflect its nature and share its vulnerabilities.

U.S. Army interest in the LC armed forces is not confined to a narrow conservative interest but a much wider political interest. In most newly developed nations, the armed forces play an important role in political life, and the effectiveness of the state is enhanced whenever a regime is controlled by armed forces capable of military countermeasures.
CHAPTER 3
U.S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE TASKS

6. Identification of Special Targets

U.S. Army Intelligence is in a position to procure information over a wide range of NC government activity. But the specialist interests of the U.S. Army require that the major part of its intelligence effort be directed towards the NC Army and related NC organizations for internal defense operations.

Special intelligence targets within the NC Army include the well-placed personnel of:

a. Units at national and local level with which U.S. Army Intelligence is in direct working contact.

b. Units at national and local level with which U.S. Army Intelligence, usually through the medium of its working contacts, can establish productive contact outside the limits of normal military activity.

c. Local units with which U.S. Army Intelligence is not in contact, directly or indirectly, and which for that reason may be particularly vulnerable to political contamination from local insurgent sources.

d. Mobile units, such as Special Force units and Long Range Reconnaissance Parties, which operate in areas under partial or intermittent insurgent control and which therefore may also be vulnerable to such contamination.

In addition to the NC Army and its organization for internal defense operations, attention must be paid to the organization of the police.

The police generally stand closer to the local population than the army and for that reason may be at the same time better sources of information and greater security risks. The security risks may become acute when police are drafted into the armed forces and replaced by recruits of less experience, training and stability.

U.S. Army Intelligence operations directed towards the special targets listed above have several major objectives in view:

1. To guard NC Army units against infiltration and influence from elements sympathetic to the insurgency or hostile to the United States.
4. To guard against the possibility of HC army personnel reinforcing their own future by developing active or passive contacts with the insurgency.

5. To reduce corruption and inefficiency within HC army units to tolerable levels.

6. To assist in the promotion of HC officers known to be loyal to the United States.

7. To extend the same forms of protection to all HC agencies falling within the field of U.S. Army intelligence operations.

The achievement of these objectives calls for the timely recognition of vulnerabilities in HC agencies and for timely counteraction by U.S. Army intelligence.

5. Recognition of HC Vulnerabilities

The symptoms of vulnerability among HC agencies calling for investigation, identification, and action by U.S. Army intelligence include:

a. Political vulnerability, such as lukewarm attitudes toward the regime, sympathy with the insurgency, outright collaboration with the insurgency.

b. Anticipation arising from exposure to insurgent propaganda, false information between employees of HC and U.S. organizations at the personnel or working level or from the too-obvious presence of American personnel in the role of senior workers.

c. Fixed relationships linking employees of the HC government with the insurgency. It is common practice for a family deliberately to split its loyalty between the regime and the insurgency, so that whichever wins ultimately the family will be a friend of the right party. Political ties are of special relevance as to be aware, whether of family or personal in their own home districts and therefore exposed to pressure from neighbors and friends.

d. Corruption, which exposes the individual to pressure from insurgent elements and, when it becomes general, undermines popular confidence in the regime thus encouraging the spread of insurgency.

e. Inefficiency reaching a level at which it impedes the smooth flow of operations and thus a reduction in the level of direct assistance to the regime. It may thus cut off the possibility of the regime. It is a well-recognized fact of administrative inefficiency and relatively difficult to detect in its identity at such.
6. U.S. Army Intelligence Action

U.S. Army Intelligence must be prepared to recommend appropriate action in the event of symptoms of vulnerability persisting long enough to become positively disturbing. Such action may include measures taken against individuals or more general measures designed to put pressure on groups, agencies, or, in the last resort, on the HC government itself.

It is desirable that U.S. Army Intelligence should obtain the active cooperation of the appropriate HC authority in pursuing punitive measures against HC citizens. But there are areas where combined action is frustrated by divergent or conflicting aims and interests, and where U.S. Army Intelligence must defend the U.S. position against contrary forces at work in the host country.

This area of divergence or conflict is often entered in the matter of punitive action against individuals who may be protected by a tangle of personal, political and bureaucratic complications.

Action designed to influence or pressurize HC agencies or the government itself presupposes a situation in which U.S. interests are at stake. Measures appropriate to a given situation may be official or unofficial.

Official action is not relevant to the issue discussed in this document, but unofficial action involving clandestine effort falls into the sphere of responsibility shared by U.S. Army Intelligence with other U.S. agencies.
CHAPTER 4
INTELLIGENCE GUIDANCE

7. General

The success of internal stability operations undertaken by U.S. Army intelligence in the framework of internal defense depends to a considerable extent on the degree of mutual understanding between American personnel and the personnel of agencies of the host country.

However, whatever the degree of mutual understanding between U.S. personnel and their host country counterparts, a more reliable basis for the solution of U.S. Army intelligence problems is the availability in RC agencies of individuals with whom U.S. Army intelligence maintains agent relationships.

Therefore, the recruitment of leading members of RC agencies in the capacity of long-term agents is an important requirement.

8. Recruitment for Intelligence Purposes

For the special purposes of U.S. Army intelligence, the most important field of recruiting activity is the officer corps of the RC army. In many less-developed nations, officers of the armed forces tend to be of properly trained, conservative by virtue of family background and education, and therefore receptive to counterinsurgency doctrine. They are of special importance as long-term prospects because they not infrequently play a decisive role in determining the course of developments in areas of their respective countries.

The following categories require special attention with a view to long-term recruitment:

a. Officers from families with long-standing economic and cultural associations with the United States and its allies.

b. Officers known to have received favorable impressions of U.S. military training programs, especially those who have been trained in the United States itself.

c. Officers destined for assignment to posts within the RC intelligence structure. Those require special though not exclusive attention.
Directives to U.S. instructors at U.S. training establishments require the study of officers mentioned in sub-paragraph 2 (b) above from the point of view of political loyalty; of their familiarity with Communist ideology and their devotion to the democratic ideals of the United States. The Secret Annex to the final training report on each RC officer passing through a U.S. training program contains an assessment of his prospects and possibilities as a long-term agent of U.S. Army intelligence.

Questions of recruitment are treated in greater detail in FM 30-31a where the general doctrine governing agent intelligence (SHAPE) is stated and elaborated. The directives laid down there should be applied to recruiting operations envisaging RC government agencies.

9. Assistance from U.S. Citizens Abroad

U.S. Army intelligence must take into account potential assistance from U.S. citizens working in the host countries, both as direct sources of information and as indicators of leads for the recruitment of RC citizens, official and otherwise, as long-term intelligence agents. Such U.S. citizens include official workers for agencies other than the U.S. Army and U.S. business firms, as well as representatives of the mass media, operating in the host countries.

10. Penetration of the Insurgent Movement

In FM 30-31 attention was drawn to the importance of RC agencies penetrating the insurgent movement by agent means with a view to successful counteraction. It was pointed out that there is a danger of insurgent agents penetrating RC base organizations, government agencies, police, and military intelligence units with a view to the collation of secret intelligence. Stress was also laid on the probability that lack of information from RC agencies about insurgent activities in areas that they are known to exist may indicate that insurgent agents have successfully penetrated RC agencies and are therefore in a position to anticipate government moves.

In this connection, U.S. Army intelligence should pursue two main lines of action:

a. It should endeavor to penetrate agents infiltrated into the insurgent by RC agencies responsible for internal security with a view to establishing the degree of control by U.S. Army intelligence over the work of such agents. Operational measures in each such will depend on the conditions prevailing in each country.

b. It should endeavor to institute suitable agents into the insurgent leadership, both special contacts or the insurgent intelligence units directed by RC agencies. It must be borne in mind that information from insurgent sources above
the personnel of HC agencies might be of particular value in determining the proper conduct of U.S. Army intelligence and in suggesting timely measures to further U.S. interests.

11. Agents on Special Operations

There may be times when HC governments show passivity or indecision in face of Communist or Communist-inspired subversion, and react with inadequate vigor to intelligence estimates transmitted by U.S. agencies. Such situations are particularly likely to arise when the insurgency seeks to achieve tactical advantage by temporarily restraining from violence, thus bulling HC authorities into a state of false security. In such cases, U.S. Army intelligence must have the means of launching special operations which will convince HC governments and public opinion of the reality of the insurgent danger and of the necessity of counteraction.

To this end, U.S. Army intelligence should seek to penetrate the insurgency by means of agents on special assignment, with the task of forming special action groups among the more radical elements of the insurgency. When the kind of situation envisaged above arises, these groups, acting under U.S. Army intelligence control, should be used to launch violent or nonviolent actions according to the nature of the case. Such actions could include those described in NH 36-31 as characterizing Phases II and III of insurgency.

In cases where the infiltration of such agents into the insurgent leadership has not been effectively implemented, it may help towards the achievement of the above ends to utilize ultra-leftist organizations.

12. U.S. Army Intelligence Advantages

In the field of Human Intelligence (HUMINT), U.S. Army personnel enjoy the advantage of working closely at many levels with their opposite numbers in the national intelligence structure of the host country. By virtue of their generally superior training, expertise and experience, they are well qualified to get the better of any exchange arising from such cooperation, even in dealing with HC personnel who counter them. This close cooperation enables U.S. Army intelligence to build up a comprehensive and detailed picture of the national intelligence structure.

Mention has been made in NH 36-31 of the desirability of establishing National Intelligence Defense Coordination Centers (NI/DCC) and Area Coordination Centers (ACC) to integrate intelligence operations, administration and logistics into a single approach to the problem of insurgency.
This recommendation was designed to improve the effectiveness of the \textit{RC} counterinsurgency effort. But it may also be used to facilitate U.S. Army intelligence penetration of the \textit{RC} area as a whole. U.S. personnel attached to the \textit{RC} and \textit{ACC} are well placed to spread their attention over the whole range of \textit{RC} organization, to embrace operations, administration and logistics as well as intelligence.

The establishment of joint central archives at the \textit{RC} should be used to assist the procurement of intelligence about the personnel of \textit{RC} agencies, and the more selective archives kept at \textit{ACC} level should serve the same purpose. Where the existence of separate RC archives not officially accessible to U.S. personnel is known or suspected, careful consideration should be given to the possibility of operations designed to gain the desired access.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

Official:

F. C. HIGGINS,
Major General, United States Army,
The Adjutant General.

Distribution: See page 12.
27 January 1978

Potential Communist Impact on Italian Defense Posture

Issues and Evidence

Important problems that might arise from communist participation in the governments of Italy are shaped partly by the different institutional positions of the two countries within the NATO alliance.

Italy, as a member of NATO's integrated military structure, has direct access to sensitive NATO intelligence, defense plans, and nuclear planning information. Any potential for communist access to this information, even if seemingly unlikely in circumstances of limited participation in the Italian government, probably would result in a cutoff of key information and planning data to Italy and thus a sharp reduction of Italian-NATO defense cooperation.
Evidence on the defense policies of the Italian and French Communist parties comes from the public record of statements and writings of the parties. Conflicting pressures to maintain their Marxist-Leninist credentials and at the same time appeal to a wide spectrum of West European opinion often causes the Communists to "straddle the fence" on defense issues—providing a poor basis for judging what their governing policies would be. Nevertheless, we offer the following preliminary thoughts concerning Italy.

(italy)

A large segment of Italian society is reserved in its support for NATO and Italian defense policies, and Communist (PCI) attitudes on defense questions are generally shared by Socialists and other parties of the Left. On some issues, the
PCI has supported the Christian Democratic Party against the positions taken by other leftist parties. And opposition to the government's defense programs and NATO issues is generally led not by the PCI but by Falco Accame, the Socialist chairman of the House Defense Committee.

The chief effect of a minor PCI involvement in the Italian government (for instance, control of two or three non-sensitive ministries concerned with Italian internal matters) would likely be a tightening of restrictive trends (already affecting Italy's defense establishment) and, by extension, Italian cooperation with NATO and the US. These include: increasingly close Parliamentary control over military budgets and policy decisions; a generally skeptical approach toward nuclear weapons and facilities; a tendency to distinguish between Italian interests and needs on the one hand and those of NATO on the other—especially with reference to programs which are instigated by the US or appear primarily to benefit the US. Presumably, with a formal share in power, the PCI would more actively work to place sympathetic and "reliable" persons in important posts—including senior military ones—throughout the government.

It nevertheless is unlikely that the PCI would attempt to undermine military discipline or capabilities, or to
politicize the military to an extent that would have this effect. In recent years, the PCI has behaved toward the military like a party which fully expects some day to "control the levers." While backing legislation to improve living conditions and wages and to strengthen soldiers' civil rights and liberalize disciplinary regulations, the Party has opposed military unionism as inconsistent with the requirements of military discipline. It also has stopped well short of uncritical support of protest movements and demonstrations involving non-commissioned officers that have been organized by left-wing fringe groups. Moreover, the PCI has generally supported passage of funds for military modernization programs, especially when Italian jobs are at stake. PCI parliamentarians frequently question specific defense needs or programs, and last fall they suggested delaying passage of procurement funds which had not yet been committed to programs--yet they have not played an obstructionist role. (To the extent that the PCI has neutralized the military as a source of opposition, it appears to have succeeded by convincing the bulk of military officers, like other Italians, that PCI involvement in the government is a) inevitable, and b) not particularly dangerous.)
If the PCI were to have substantial control in the government, more far-reaching changes are possible. The actions taken in the near-term by a PCI government would likely be heavily dependent on the attitudes and policies of Italy's NATO allies. The Party has said that it fully supports Italy's membership in the Alliance and would carry out all commitments. It would probably review very carefully any new or additional commitments in the light of its complicated attitudes toward the East-West division, its European as opposed to Atlantic orientation, its opposition to nuclear weapons, and so on. But it would likely be reluctant immediately to withdraw units committed to NATO missions, close down NATO and US facilities, or renego on already-agreed NATO weapons programs. If, however, the allies deny Italian access to classified information or close down NATO facilities in Italy, PCI ambivalence toward NATO would likely be resolved, leading to some kind of break in the relationship.
MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: The Moro Kidnapping and Italian Politics

1. One of the last governments headed by the veteran Christian Democratic politician Aldo Moro spanned the period from the breakup of the old center-left coalition in 1974 to the electoral surge toward the Communists in 1975. The transitional nature of Moro's government led Italian politicians to dub it a "bridge to the unknown". Now, the kidnapping of the party leader by the Red Brigades terrorist organization is forcing Italian politicians to bridge a new political abyss. The many questions raised by the case could lead to fundamental changes in the country's politics.

2. Six weeks after the kidnapping, an air of uncertainty and distrust pervades Italian political life. This results in part from Moro's absence; no one else is equipped to play his stabilizing role in Christian Democratic internal politics and in the party's relations with the Communists. It also reflects widespread frustration over the government's inability to find Moro.

3. Moro was abducted just as the Christian Democrats and Communists completed two months of delicate negotiations on a new governing formula. Although the talks had produced an agreement under which the Communists support Prime Minister Andreotti's Christian Democratic minority government in parliament, many contentious details concerning relations between the two parties still had not been spelled out.

4. Preoccupation with the crime has since prevented anyone from addressing these outstanding questions in a systematic way. When politicians do take up such issues, they will have to deal with two emerging trends--trends that work against each other and contribute to the confused political atmosphere. On the one hand, the emergency nature of the situation is pushing the Christian Democrats and Communists
toward closer cooperation. On the other hand, distrust and tensions are growing between the two parties.

5. Andreotti has consulted the Communists closely in connection with the investigation. Communist chief Berruguer and other party leaders, including the directorate member responsible for security affairs, are in contact with the Christian Democratic leadership regarding the poisoning. In addition, some members of the cabinet, although probably not Panghini, plan to consult directly with their counterparts in the Communist Party before completing major administrative actions.

6. At the same time, relations between the two parties are marked by growing tension. The Communists, for example, have been publicly critical of the government's lack of progress in the case and have bluntly told Interior Minister Cossiga to move more vigorously against the terrorists.

7. For their part, the Christian Democrats are planning to charge during a coming series of local elections that the Communist Party's antagonism toward the security forces years ago was the direct antecedent of the current political violence. This is bound to touch an exposed nerve in the Communist Party, which publicly admits to an earlier complacency about left-wing violence but argues that terrorism has its real roots in the government's long neglect of fundamental social and economic problems.

8. The tension reflects the absence of Moro's steadying influence both on his own party and on its relations with the Communists. Moro's fine-tuning of Christian Democratic-Communist relations was one of his major contributions to Italian politics.

9. Increasingly, however, Italian politicians are saying the humiliating letters Moro has written from captivity have finished him politically, whether or not he survives physically. That conclusion seems premature, but it will nevertheless stimulate increased rivalry and maneuvering among Christian Democrats anxious to succeed Moro as party chief and to assume his role as front runner in the December presidential election. It seems likely also to encourage renewed activity on the part of a substantial group of the Christian Democrats who want the party to pursue a policy of confrontation with the Communists but who were outmaneuvered by Moro in the final days of the government crisis.
10. The Christian Democrats have not said much officially about relations with the Communists since the kidnaping, other than to stress their refusal to go beyond the degree of collaboration represented by the arrangements on which the Andreotti government is based. But the Christian Democrats' resolve in this regard is contingent on a variety of developments, not the least of which is the outcome of the Moro affair. If it drags on or if violence escalates, tougher law-and-order measures may be required, and the Christian Democrats will need Communist acquiescence to enact them.

11. Moreover, the Christian Democrats still have no realistic alternative to collaboration with the Communists—a fact underlined by the recent Socialist Party congress. The Socialists—the only party that could give the Christian Democrats a non-Communist majority—made it clear that a return to such an alliance any time soon is extremely unlikely.

12. The local elections set for May 14-15 will also affect inter-party relations. The elections will involve about 10 percent of the electorate—the first significant sampling of voter sentiment since the Communists' unprecedented gains in the 1976 parliamentary elections.

13. As such, the contests will be studied closely for some indications of how the country has reacted to the period of Christian Democratic-Communist cooperation that began in a formal sense with the installation of Andreotti's previous government two months after the 1976 election.

14. If the Communists lose substantially, the Christian Democratic hierarchy will be confirmed in its belief that the Communists' growing involvement in government decisionmaking has the beneficial side effect of hurting them at the polls. But such a result would also pose a dilemma for the Christian Democrats, because it would cause the Communists to question whether they can afford further cooperation with Andreotti, who will clearly need their help in the months ahead.

15. A Communist gain on the other hand—in conjunction with either a Christian Democratic loss or a further gravitation of the voters toward the two large parties at the expense of the smaller ones—would ease some of Communist leader Berlinguer's internal party problems and cause the Christian Democrats to reassess their strategy.

16. Of the many questions raised for Italian politics by the Moro kidnaping, the most important clearly centers on the effect the affair
is likely to have on the internal cohesion of the Christian Democratic Party and on its ability to remain Italy's major political force.

[17] So far, the affair appears to have accelerated two trends that were already threatening to immobilize the Christian Democrats. On the one hand, it has increased the internal party strains that Moro worked so hard to keep in check. At the same time, it has made it even more difficult for the Christian Democrats to credibly use anti-Communism as a unifying force. Many Christian Democrats had become more open to cooperation with the Communists even before the present emergency set in and the longer it extends the more difficult it will be for those who remain opposed to that cooperation to make their case.

[18] All of this seems likely to further weaken the Christian Democrats' effectiveness as a governing party. And the persistence of present trends could ultimately create a political vacuum that would draw the Communists into greater governmental responsibilities—even though they are not pushing hard for them at the moment.
Rapport transmis par Andreotti
à la commission Stragi
- SID parallelo - Operazione Gladio*

I. Les réseaux clandestins au niveau international

Après la Seconde Guerre mondiale, la peur de l'expansionnisme soviétique et l'infériorité des forces de l'OTAN par rapport au Kominform conduisait les nations d'Europe de l'Ouest à envisager de nouvelles formes de défense non conventionnelles, créant sur leur territoire un réseau occulte de résistance destiné à œuvrer en cas d'occupation ennemie, à travers le recueil d'informations, le sabotage, la propagande et la guérilla.

Des réseaux de résistance furent organisés par la Grande-Bretagne, en France, en Hollande, en Belgique et vraisemblablement au Danemark et en Norvège. La France occupa des territoires alliés et austro-tchèques contrôlés à son profit et du territoire national jusqu'aux Pyrénées, tandis que la Yougoslavie centra sa préparation militaire essentiellement sur ce type d'opérations spéciales. Quine à notre pays, le Service Information des Forces Armées (SIFAR) étudia depuis 1951 la réalisation d'une organisation « clandestine » de référence soit pour uniformiser dans un seul cadre opérationnel de défense les structures milit-
2. Stay-Behind et la participation italienne
aux organes collégiaux de coordination du secteur,

Alors que la structure italienne avançait dans sa mise en place, un accord fut signé entre les services américains et le SIFAR, relatif à l'organisation et aux activités du « réseau clandestin post-occupation », accord communément appelé Stay-Behind par lequel furent confirmées toutes les obligations précédemment intervenues entre l'Italie et les USA. Ainsi, les bases furent jetées pour réaliser l'opération indiquée en code sous le nom de « Gladio ». Une fois constitué l'organisme clandestin de résistance, l'Italie fut appelée à participer, à la demande française, aux travaux du CPP (Comité Clandestin de Planification) opérant dans le cadre du SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe). Un tel organe était chargé d'étudier la conduite de l'activité informativo-collective en cas de guerre, avec une référence particulière aux territoires suscepibles d'occupation ennemie. Dans le comité étaient déjà représentés les États-Unis, la Grande-Bretagne, la France, l'Allemagne et d'autres pays de l'OTAN. En 1964, notre service Informations fut invité à rejoindre le CCA (Comité Clandestin Allié), organisme chargé d'étudier et de résoudre les problèmes de coopération entre les différents pays, pour le fonctionnement des réseaux d'activation et de fuite. La Grande-Bretagne, la France, les États-Unis, la Belgique, les Pays-Bas, le Luxembourg et l'Allemagne de l'Ouest apparaissaient déjà à ce comité.

3. L'opération Gladio

Sur la base des accords signés tour à tour avec les organisations parallèles des autres nations, le SIFAR inaugura l'organisation clandestine à travers la constitution d'une structure.
- Contrôlée par la structure officielle d’information,
- Formée d’agents opérant sur le territoire qui, au vu de l’âge, du sexe et de l’occupation, détenaient de bonnes possibilités d’échapper à d’éventuels dépoïsitionnaires et interrogeurs.
- De gestion facile, même de la part d’une structure de commandement extérieure au territoire occupé.
- Couvrante par un secret maximal et pour cette raison subdivisée dans un ordonnancement cellulaire pour réduire au minimum les dommages de dysfonctionnement.
- Le réseau destiné s’articulait ainsi :
  - Service informations.
  - Service sabotage.
  - Service propagande et résistance générale.
  - Service radio-communication.
  - Service chiffrés.
  - Service réception et transfert de personnes.

- Les secteurs devaient opérer indépendamment les uns des autres, dont, en théorie, ils ne devaient ignorer l’existence, raccordées et coordonnées à une base extérieure de repli, individualisée par le SMG en Sardaigne.
- Selon le plan de travail fait par le SIFAR, l’organisation de la structure de résistance comportait :
  - La formation du personnel directeur à travers un cours d’instruction auprès de la Training Division de l’Intelligence Service britannique.
  - Le recrutement des chefs de réseaux et des agents, avec le concours du service informations.
  - La planification géographique et opérationnelle des différents services en Italie septentrionale, à raccorder aux bureaux opérationnels des trois forces armées et au service Info USA.
- Le choix du matériel avec l’Intelligence US.

Après une longue phase de gestation en 1956, fut constituée dans le cadre du bureau « R » du SIFAR, une section entraînement dénommée SAD (Équipes spéciales et entraînement du personnel), à travers laquelle le SIFAR, pour la première fois dans son histoire, met en œuvre le commandement des forces.
spéciales" et de l'appareil d'organisation didactique et logistique nécessaire à leur fonctionnement.

La section, dont le responsable avait un rôle de coordinateur général de l'opération "Gladio", s'articulait en quatre groupes : l'un de soutien général, un autre de secrétariat permanent et d'activation des branches opérationnelles, un troisième de transmissions, le dernier de support aérien, logistique et opérationnel. Autre structure à la disposition de la section : le CES (Centre d'Entraînement Sapeurs).

Les lignes directrices qui unifomisent l'activité de la nouvelle section sont :
- La constitution de l'appareil directeur central et la planification générale.
- La constitution et le renforcement de la base d'entraînement, des instructeurs et des équipements didactiques.
- La constitution du centre de transmission (pour les liaisons à grande distance, activités de propagande, radio, transmission de brouillage).
- La planification des éléments fondamentaux de l'organisation (sécurité, personnel, entraînement, organisation et documentation).
- La dispensation de cours d'entraînement à l'étranger (auprès de l'école du service US).
- Activation des branches opérationnelles (40 noyaux parmi lesquels :
  6 informations
  6 propagande
  10 sabotage
  6 évacuation et fuite
  12 guérilla

5 unités de guérilla prêtes à l'emploi dans les régions stratégiques appelées : Étoile alpine, Étoile marine, Rhododendron, Azulée et Géniè.

- L'entraînement et la qualification des éléments des noyaux et des unités prêtes à l'emploi.
- La reconnaissance terrestre et aérienne des zones stratégiques,
- Le recueil de la documentation (cartographique, monographique et photographique).
Les activités expérimentales dans le cadre du CES (aériennes, marines, parachutistes, sous-marines et terrains difficiles). 

4. Les dépôts d’armes.

En 1959 l’Intelligence OS envoyait auprès du CES les matériaux opérationnels destinés à équiper les unités et les unités opérationnelles, à dissimuler en temps de paix dans des caches appropriés enterrés dans les différentes zones d’opération.

Les matériaux en question furent enveloppés dans des emballages spéciaux afin d’en assurer la parfaite conservation et, à partir de 1963, la pose des containers commença. On comprit dans ce matériel des armes portables, munitions, explosifs, bombes, poignards, couteaux, mitrailleuses de 60 mm et canons de 57 mm, fusils de précision, transmetteurs (émetteurs radio), visées et différents accessoires.

À la suite de la découverte fortuite d’un container par des carabiniers aux environs de Florina, afin d’obtenir des meilleures conditions de sécurité, on commença à partir de 1972, à récupérer tout le matériau et à le stocker dans des postes de carabiniers proches du lieu où il avait été enfoui. Les explosifs furent concentrés près du CES et du dépôt de munitions de Kaliponela (Nuo). L’opération de récupération, menée en 1975, permit de récupérer 127 des 139 containers.

Parmi les containers manquants:
- 2 (armes légères) furent emportés par des inconnus, sans doute à l’époque où on les avait enterrés (31.11.84).
- 8 (armes légères, matériels) furent abandonnés sur les lieux mêmes, car leur récupération impliquait des démolitions inopportunes.
- 2 (un avec des armes légères, un avec des explosifs) irrécupérables parce qu’englobés par une extension de superficie d’un cimetière.

5. Directives sur la guerre non orthodoxe (GNO)

Dès les années 80, la réduction des exigences inhérentes aux précédentes dépositions post-Seconde Guerre mondiale et les
modifications radicales survenues au Service d'Information et de Sécurité Italien ont conduit à revoir les modalités de réalisation de la guerre non orthodoxe, fût-elle dans le respect par notre pays des accords internationaux.

Dans un tel contexte, la réduction des directives du SHAPE, en particulier sur la guerre non orthodoxe, de janvier 1969, et les accords conclus au siège du Comité de Coordination Alliée ont entraîné la formation du SISMI de cadres qualifiés et gradés pour instruire du personnel extérieur, en cas d'invasion, sur des opérations militaires clandestines telles que :
- Informations et propagande.
- Évasion et infiltration.
- Guérilla.
- Sabotage.

Toute la conduite des opérations est confiée à du personnel du SISMI qui active une base nationale déjà prête sur notre territoire. En temps de paix, cette base assure également des fonctions d'entraînement pour la lutte clandestine et les dépêches de matériel sous le nom conventionnel de Centre d'entraînement sapeurs et paras.

Pour les opérations clandestines, il fut prévu au départ l'enseignement d'un millier d'éléments environ parmi lesquels une centaine déjà recrutés et entraînés pour les activités d'information, de propagande, d'évasion et d'infiltration. L'entraînement et la participation à des actions de sabotage et de guérilla sont réservés à des membres du service particulièrement sélectionnés. En cas de conflit, on prévoit le recrutement, au sein des cadres du service, d'un nombre indéfini de partisans (soldats).

L'activité principale en temps de paix consiste essentiellement à rechercher et éventuellement à recruter des personnes aptes à assurer des fonctions de commandement et des éléments maîtrisant des notions spéciales.
- L'entraînement du personnel recruté.
- Des exercices en commun avec les services alliés.
- L'acquisition et la conservation à long terme du matériel.
- Le contrôle du personnel déjà recruté à des fins de sécurité.
- L'échange d'expériences avec les services rattachés entre eux.
Le recrutement du personnel civil en quatre phases : individualisation, sélection, entraînement et contrôle.

La loi 80.177 prévoit :
- L’interdiction de recruter des sujets tels que membres du Parlement, conseillers régionaux, provinciaux ou municipaux, magistrats, ministres de culte ou journalistes.
- La possession de qualités garantissant « une fidélité scrupuleuse aux valeurs de la Constitution républicaine antifasciste ».

Bien sûr pas de charge pénale, ni de politique activiste, ni de participation à des mouvements extrémistes quels qu’ils soient.

Des contrôles réguliers vérifient la permanence des exigences précisées, dont le manquement implique — dans certains cas, cela s’est produit — l’exclusion de l’organisation.

6. Conclusion

On peut affirmer aujourd’hui que l’opération :
- Est prévue par des directives de l’OTAN et insérée dans la planification.
- Est réalisée en perfectionnée à des fins de sécurité absolue, surtout en ce qui concerne le contrôle sur l’emploi du matériel, dont le personnel ne pourra entrer en possession que sur l’initiative des autorités centrales et par le recours à des modalités particulières qui ne tolèrent aucune initiative autonome au niveau intermédiaire.
- Est destinée à contrarier d’éventuelles occupations étrangères du territoire national susceptibles de mettre en péril les institutions démocratiques ou la libre expression des droits constitutionnels.

A la lumière des événements récents et significatifs qui ont bouleversé l’Europe de l’Est..., le gouvernement s’impose de revoir toutes les dispositions en matière de guerre non orthodoxes et de promouvoir une initiative propre à vérifier, tant sur le plan politique que sur celui de la technique militaire, l’actuelle utilité et la validité des systèmes de protection du territoire national.
7. Reaffirms its support for the most comprehensive and stringent embargo as a means of bringing pressure to bear on Iraq with a view to restoring the rule of law in Kuwait and avoiding war.

8. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council, European Political Cooperation, the governments of Iraq and Kuwait and the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

2. **Gladio**

— **Joint resolution replacing B3-2021, 2058, 2068, 2078 and 2087/90**

**RESOLUTION**

on the Gladio affair

*The European Parliament.*

A. having regard to the revelation by several European governments of the existence for 40 years of a clandestine intelligence and armed operations organization in several Member States of the Community,

B. whereas for over 40 years this organization has eluded all democratic controls and has been run by the secret services of the states concerned in collaboration with NATO,

C. fearing the danger that such clandestine networks may have interfered illegally in the internal political affairs of Member States or may still do so,

D. whereas in certain Member States military secret services (or uncontrolled branches thereof) were involved in serious cases of terrorism and crime as evidenced by various judicial inquiries,

E. whereas these organizations operated and continue to operate completely outside the law since they are not subject to any parliamentary control and frequently those holding the highest government and constitutional posts have claimed to be in the dark as to these matters,

F. whereas the various ‘GLADIO’ organizations have at their disposal independent arsenals and military resources which give them an unknown strike potential, thereby jeopardizing the democratic structures of the countries in which they are operating or have been operating,

G. greatly concerned at the existence of decision-making and operational bodies which are not subject to any form of democratic control and are of a completely clandestine nature at a time when greater Community cooperation in the field of security is a constant subject of discussion,

1. Condemns the clandestine creation of manipulative and operational networks and calls for a full investigation into the nature, structure, aims and all other aspects of these clandestine organizations, any misuse thereof, their use for illegal interference in the internal political affairs of the countries concerned, the problem of terrorism in Europe and the possible collusion of the secret services of Member States or third countries;

2. Protests vigorously at the assumption by certain US military personnel at SHAPE and in NATO of the right to encourage the establishment in Europe of a clandestine intelligence and operation network;

3. Calls on the governments of the Member States to dismantle all clandestine military and paramilitary networks:
Thursday, 22 November 1990

4. Calls on the judiciaries of the countries in which the presence of such military organizations has been ascertained to elucidate fully their actual extent and modus operandi and to clarify any action they may have taken to destabilize the democratic structures of the Member States;

5. Requests all the Member States to take the necessary measures, if necessary by establishing parliamentary committees of inquiry, to draw up a complete list of organizations active in this field, and at the same time to investigate their links with the respective state intelligence services and their links, if any, with terrorist action groups and/or other illegal practices;

6. Calls on the Council of Ministers to provide full information on the activities of these secret intelligence and operational services;

7. Instructs its Political Affairs Committee to consider holding a hearing in order to clarify the role and impact of the ‘GLADIO’ organization and any similar bodies;

8. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council, the Secretary-General of NATO, the governments of the Member States and the United States Government.

3. Computer industry

— Joint resolution replacing B3-2019, 2036, 2059 and 2086/90

RESOLUTION

on mass redundancies in the European computer industry, in particular at Philips, Olivetti and Bull

The European Parliament.

A. whereas on 25 October 1990, the Board of Directors of the Philips Group announced a plan involving 50,000 job losses, in addition to the 10,000 already announced on 2 July, together with the closure of production units,

B. whereas these job losses are symptomatic of a crisis affecting the entire electronics and data processing sector in Europe: the announcement by Bull data processing systems on 7 November 1990 of 5,000 job losses and by Olivetti on 13 November of 7,000 job losses, together with the buy-out of the British ICL by the Japanese Fujitsu,

C. whereas other important sectors are also threatened with drastic job losses,

D. whereas the Philips Group is participating in the European programme of research into high-definition television and the European JESSI programme of research into the development of a new generation of memory banks and is receiving public funds from the Member States and the European Community for this purpose,

E. whereas the procedure that the Philips management proposes to follow involves no more than the provision of information at national rather than at international or European level.

F. whereas the European market is awash with products from countries where there is complete disregard for the principles enshrined in the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights for Workers and this is also undermining the European industrial-relations model,

G. whereas social dialogue is an essential feature of this model and, under the EEC Treaty, the Commission is mandated to develop the dialogue between management and labour at European level (Article 118b),